Adam J. Aldersley

The defendants brought a motion for leave to admit an expert report from Dr. Armstrong concerning the plaintiff's life expectancy in a personal injury action.

The court found that while the defendants provided a reasonable explanation for the late delivery of the report and that the plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the delay, the report itself was inadmissible.

The report failed to comply with Rule 53.03(2.1)6 by not providing a methodology or listing all relied-upon documents.

Furthermore, its probative value was deemed very low due to the expert's inappropriate analytical approach (life insurance vs. annuity) and use of general population statistics without proper explanation.

Finally, Dr. Armstrong was not qualified to provide a medical diagnosis as he had not been a member of the College of Physicians and Surgeons since 2010.

The motion for leave was dismissed, and the report was ruled inadmissible.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a ruling that serving a subpoena on a doctor would allow them to receive the doctor's entire clinical notes and records without the doctor being sworn or called as a witness.

The plaintiffs opposed this.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, holding that Rule 53.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires a witness's attendance and testimony at trial, and that a subpoena cannot be used to bypass established discovery processes or to obtain documentary disclosure without the witness being subject to cross-examination.

The court emphasized that such a practice would lead to "trial by ambush" and discourage early settlement.

The plaintiff was awarded over $1.1 million in damages following a personal injury trial.

The parties appeared before the court to determine the costs of the trial and the calculation of a management fee.

The court found that the plaintiff had made reasonable offers to settle that were more favourable than the judgment, entitling her to elevated costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $852,528.03 in costs and disbursements, and fixed the management fee at $125,000 based on an annualized sliding scale rather than a fixed percentage.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the defendant driver ran a red light and t-boned the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.

The court found the defendants 100% liable.

The plaintiff, a self-employed jewelry designer, suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, PTSD, and post-concussion syndrome.

The court awarded $1,101,568.55 in total damages, including $225,000 for general damages, $328,402.20 for past and future economic loss, and $489,300 for future care costs, plus a management fee and tax gross-up.

The defendant doctors brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to produce settlement documents and a pre-trial conference brief from two prior actions (a tort action and a statutory accident benefits action).

The plaintiff refused on the basis of settlement privilege.

The defendants argued that disclosure was necessary to prevent double recovery regarding a litigation loan that was claimed as damages in all three actions.

The court granted the motion, finding that the public interest in preventing overcompensation and facilitating meaningful settlement discussions in the current action outweighed the public interest in protecting the prior settlements, distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in Sable Offshore.

At the outset of a motor vehicle accident trial, the parties sought a ruling on whether section 12 of the Evidence Act, which limits a party to calling three expert witnesses without leave, applies to participant experts and non-party experts.

The plaintiff intended to call four litigation experts and two participating experts, and file numerous medical reports under section 52.

After reviewing the jurisprudence, including Westerhof v. Gee Estate, and the Osborne Report, the court ruled that section 12 applies only to litigation experts retained for the purpose of the proceeding, and not to participant or non-party experts.

This endorsement addresses two motions in a personal injury action arising from a 2009 motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs, who commenced their action eight years post-accident, claim damages against the County of Renfrew for alleged road maintenance failures.

The County brought an omnibus motion, including for summary judgment against municipal employees and for documentary production related to the plaintiffs' limitation defence.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion regarding undertakings and refusals.

The court granted summary judgment against the municipal employees on consent, lifted the deemed undertaking rule for previous litigation files, and ordered production of those files subject to privilege.

The court also provided guidance on the form of affidavits of documents and ordered answers to some discovery questions while denying others.

During jury deliberations in a motor vehicle personal injury trial, the jury foreman conducted internet research and found the Fault Determination Rules under the Insurance Act.

The jury asked a question about the regulation, prompting the trial judge to give a correcting charge instructing them to disregard it.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict finding the plaintiff 73% contributorily negligent.

The plaintiffs moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury was contaminated and failed to follow the correcting charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the correcting charge was sufficient, the jury's prompt disclosure of the research indicated a willingness to follow instructions, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

Following a jury verdict, the plaintiff brought a motion for judgment to determine the pre-judgment interest (PJI) rate applicable to general non-pecuniary damages.

The plaintiff argued for a 5% PJI rate, asserting that amendments to the Insurance Act effective January 1, 2015, were not retroactive as PJI is a matter of substantive law, relying on the Divisional Court's decision in Carr v. Modi.

The defendant conceded the court was bound by Carr, despite believing the case law was wrongly decided, given a pending Court of Appeal decision in El-Khodr v. Lackie.

The parties agreed to issue judgment with a 5% PJI rate, with a mechanism to revisit the calculation if the El-Khodr appeal decision impacted it.

The court ordered judgment for the plaintiff in the agreed amount.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under section 267.5 of the Insurance Act, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent and serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function as a result of a motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her injuries, including PTSD and major depression, met the threshold criteria.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff had, on a balance of probabilities, suffered a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function caused by the collision.

The court also made findings on the credibility and reliability of the defence medical expert.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle collision action brought a motion to include the names of the parties' respective motor vehicle insurers (Belair Direct and Aviva) in the jury pre-screening process.

The plaintiff argued that public awareness of mandatory insurance mitigated prejudice and that broader "connections" beyond employment should be screened.

The defendant opposed, citing potential prejudice and increased complexity.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that civil jury selection in Ontario does not permit challenges for cause based on unspecified partiality and that the presumption of juror impartiality is strong.

The court held that identifying insurers at the outset could mischaracterize the dispute as one between insurers rather than individuals and potentially mislead the jury regarding a defendant's personal exposure.

The plaintiff sought a specific instruction to the jury regarding the defendant's in-court admissions concerning fault for a collision.

During cross-examination, the defendant stated she did not believe the plaintiff was responsible and that her decision to enter a lane ultimately caused the accident.

The court had previously given a general instruction that the jury are the triers of fact and the defendant's views on fault are merely her views.

The plaintiff argued these were in-court admissions warranting a specific instruction that the jury should rely on them unless contradicted.

The court ruled that the defendant's answers were her views, not admissions of fact based on all relevant evidence, and therefore did not warrant specific mention in the jury charge.

The defendant in a personal injury action sought to rely on approximately 20 posts from the plaintiff’s Facebook page for cross-examination, which had been retrieved through an agreement but not formally disclosed.

The plaintiff objected, citing prejudice due to the late disclosure of a significant volume of materials, which prevented proper trial preparation, expert review, and settlement negotiations.

The court dismissed the defendant's request, emphasizing the importance of full and rigorous compliance with disclosure obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the agreement between counsel.

The defendant sought to admit surveillance video of the plaintiff as substantive evidence in a personal injury action.

The court applied a three-part test for admissibility (accuracy, fairness/absence of intention to mislead, and verification on oath) and found that the surveillance evidence did not meet these criteria due to issues with inconsistent time-stamping, selective editing, subjective descriptions by the investigator, and significant gaps in footage.

The court also determined that the evidence had minimal probative value and that its potential prejudice to the plaintiff, particularly given the claim of post-traumatic stress disorder and the lack of expert review of the surveillance, outweighed any probative value.

Additionally, the defendant's late disclosure of 2016 surveillance evidence, two weeks before trial, was deemed non-compliant with disclosure obligations, and leave to rely on it was denied.

The motion to admit the surveillance evidence was dismissed in its entirety.