Jennifer Frear Griffiths

Following a summary judgment motion with divided success between the plaintiff and Sun Life, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The court awarded costs to CHEO on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $20,000 plus HST and disbursements, finding the hours claimed to be excessive.

No costs were awarded between the plaintiff and Sun Life as both parties failed on their respective summary judgment motions.

The plaintiff sued her former employer and long-term disability insurer, alleging they negligently misrepresented her options and wrongfully induced her to resign rather than continue her disability benefits.

The employer and insurer both brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims.

The court granted the employer's motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute concerned the plaintiff's resignation and termination of employment, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the collective agreement's arbitration provisions.

However, the court dismissed the insurer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the insurer improperly maintained a singular focus on returning the plaintiff to a workplace environment that caused her disability.

The appellant was injured in a workplace accident and received WSIB benefits while retraining at an architectural firm.

He was subsequently injured in a motor vehicle accident, rendering him a paraplegic and unable to continue his retraining, which reduced his WSIB benefits.

He applied for income replacement benefits under the SABS, but his insurer denied the claim on the basis that he was not 'employed' at the time of the accident.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Licence Appeal Tribunal erred in its interpretation of 'employed' by requiring an exchange of wages for services, and held that the appellant's employment relationship and receipt of employment-related income satisfied the statutory requirement.

The applicant sought judicial review and appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision holding him to a 2004 settlement of his motor vehicle accident claims.

The applicant argued the settlement was invalid because he initialed, rather than signed, the Statutory Disclosure Notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant's failure to sign the specific signature line was a technical and immaterial defect that did not invalidate the notice or allow him to rescind the agreement.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision finding it lacked jurisdiction to award punitive damages for statutory accident benefits claims.

The appellant argued the LAT had jurisdiction or, alternatively, that section 280 of the Insurance Act was unconstitutional for eliminating punitive damages claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the LAT's jurisdiction is strictly statutory and does not include punitive damages, as established by binding Court of Appeal precedent.

The court also rejected the constitutional challenge, finding the legislature clearly and validly removed jurisdiction over these claims from the courts to the LAT.

Certas Home & Auto Insurance Company appealed an interim arbitration decision which held that Unifund Assurance Company had complied with the notice provisions under s. 3(1) of O. Reg. 283/95 (Disputes Between Insurers) by providing timely notice of a priority dispute for statutory accident benefits.

The core issue was the interpretation of "completed application" and when the 90-day notice period for disputing liability began.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the arbitrator's interpretation or application of the regulation.

The court affirmed that a "completed application" for the purpose of s. 3 means one that provides sufficient information to allow the first insurer to notify another insurer of a dispute, not merely a filled-out and signed OCF-1 form.

This medical malpractice action concerned the plaintiff's claim of chronic pain resulting from the defendants' alleged negligence in treating a ruptured Achilles tendon.

The court found that while Dr. Boivin breached the standard of care by failing to properly immobilize the plaintiff's foot or refer her to a specialist, and Kingsway Health Centre was negligent in administrative follow-up, these breaches did not cause the plaintiff's injuries.

The plaintiff's own non-compliance with medical advice and delay in seeking surgery were found to be the cause of her worsened condition.

The court also found the plaintiff to be an unreliable and incredible witness regarding her injuries and financial losses.

The action was dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned charges of assault with a weapon and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle against Aaron J. George.

The charges arose from an incident in a busy parking lot where the accused, after being told to slow down, intentionally drove his vehicle into a pedestrian, causing him to fall onto the car's hood, and then sped away.

The court found the accused's testimony evasive and inconsistent, preferring the evidence of the Crown's witnesses.

The judge concluded that the accused's driving constituted an objectively dangerous marked departure from the standard of care and that the act of striking the pedestrian was intentional.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault of a police officer, breach of probation, uttering threats to kill, attempted theft of a motor vehicle, and mischief.

The offences occurred on October 30, 2019, and involved threatening a homeowner and her family, assaulting a security guard with racial slurs and damaging his phone, and spitting on a police officer's face while in custody.

The Crown sought 15-18 months imprisonment; the defence sought 9-12 months or time served given COVID-19 circumstances.

The court imposed a sentence of 1 day plus 252 days of enhanced presentence custody (8.2 months), effectively time served, along with a 12-month probation order with no-contact conditions and ancillary orders including a DNA order and 10-year weapons prohibition.

A young person was charged with second degree murder in connection with the death of S.K., who died from a single stab wound to the chest during a marijuana trafficking transaction that went wrong.

The accused admitted holding the knife that caused the fatal injury but claimed he was acting in self-defence and that the stabbing was accidental.

The Crown alleged intentional stabbing with either intent to kill or intent to cause bodily harm known to be likely to cause death.

The court found the accused not guilty of murder but guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, finding that while self-defence was not established, the accused did not have the specific intent required for murder.

The defendant was charged with assaulting a peace officer engaged in the execution of his duty.

Following a break and enter and theft of cigarettes, the defendant resisted arrest, struggled with police, and during the altercation at the scene, bit a police officer's hand.

The defendant claimed the officer's hand was cut by his broken tooth when the officer was punching him.

The court found the police officers' testimony credible and reliable, rejected the defendant's version as unreliable given his state of intoxication, and found the defendant guilty of assault on a peace officer based on both the biting incident and the overall violent and belligerent conduct during arrest.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.