Stefania Fericean

The accused, Hassan Abdulle, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 9, 11(b), and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The total delay was calculated at 19-20 months, well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The court applied the Jordan framework, requiring the defence to demonstrate both "meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings" and that the matter "took markedly longer than it reasonably should have." The court found that the defence did not take sufficient sustained steps beyond merely requesting earlier dates and did not waive any procedural steps.

Furthermore, considering the complexity of securing witness testimony and the multiple charges, the court concluded the matter had not taken "markedly longer than it should have." The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, Eric Brazau, brought an application to strike his guilty pleas to one count of causing a disturbance, one count of breach of probation, and one count of breach of recognizance.

Brazau argued that the Crown over-charged him, that new evidence undermined the hate crime allegations (which were not part of the plea but were aggravating factors), and that the facts did not make out the offence of causing a disturbance.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the plea was voluntary and unequivocal, the Crown did not engage in undue oppression, and the facts supported the mens rea for causing a disturbance, distinguishing between motive and intention.

The court also affirmed the Crown's ability to rely on Brazau's comments as aggravating factors under s. 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Jonathan Vasquez Clase, was found guilty of attempted choking to commit sexual assault and sexual assault.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the predatory nature of the attack, the victim's fear for her life due to choking, and the significant physical and emotional impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the accused being a first-time offender with employment history and positive character references.

The court also addressed collateral immigration consequences and the principle that lack of remorse from maintaining innocence at trial is not an aggravating factor.

A total sentence of four years and ten months was imposed after credit for bail terms.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration following a minor motor vehicle collision in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken at roadside via an approved screening device and subsequent Intoxilyzer readings at the police station, supported by toxicology evidence.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of all BAC evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that the officer failed to comply with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code by delaying approximately 10 minutes between forming reasonable suspicion and making the formal ASD demand.

The court found a breach of the "forthwith" requirement and, applying the three-part test under section 24(2) of the Charter, excluded the BAC evidence as the admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with assaulting a peace officer engaged in the execution of his duty.

Following a break and enter and theft of cigarettes, the defendant resisted arrest, struggled with police, and during the altercation at the scene, bit a police officer's hand.

The defendant claimed the officer's hand was cut by his broken tooth when the officer was punching him.

The court found the police officers' testimony credible and reliable, rejected the defendant's version as unreliable given his state of intoxication, and found the defendant guilty of assault on a peace officer based on both the biting incident and the overall violent and belligerent conduct during arrest.

The accused, Jonathan Vasquez Clase, was charged with attempted choking to commit sexual assault and sexual assault.

The complainant alleged non-consensual sexual intercourse and choking, while the accused claimed consensual sex and denied choking.

The court assessed credibility, noting the accused's admitted lies to police regarding the sexual encounter and drug use, and the complainant's consistent testimony corroborated by physical evidence of bruising to her wrists and neck.

The court rejected the accused's explanation for lying and found the complainant's lack of consent proven beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to convictions on both counts.

The applicant sought exclusion of breath sample evidence under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that police violated his section 8 rights by obtaining the samples without reasonable grounds to arrest.

The applicant challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest on an "over 80 mgs" charge and make an Intoxilyzer demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant raised three main issues: whether the officer should have delayed the approved screening device (ASD) test to eliminate mouth alcohol concerns, whether the officer should have verified device calibration, and whether the officer demonstrated sufficient competence in operating the device.

The court found no section 8 breach and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with impaired operation, excess alcohol, and possession of cocaine following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to establish that the accused was the driver.

The court found that while the accused exhibited clear signs of impairment, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was driving the vehicle or in care and control of it.

The accused was found 30 feet from the disabled vehicle when police arrived, with no direct evidence of driving or occupancy of the driver's seat.

The court applied the three-pathway test for care and control and found that the Crown had not established a realistic risk of danger as required.

The accused was acquitted of the driving charges but convicted of cocaine possession, as the arrest was found to be lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The Crown brought a written request under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a self-represented litigant's motion on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found the motion did not actually raise questions of law, instead inviting findings of fact and reasserting long-standing allegations of police misconduct that had been advanced in multiple prior proceedings.

The court held the motion was a thinly veiled attempt to revisit issues already disposed of on multiple occasions.

The Rule 2.1 request was granted and the underlying motion was dismissed, with costs submissions to follow.

The applicant sought to quash a common law peace bond imposed by a provincial court judge during a preliminary inquiry.

After the complainant recanted her allegations, the Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence for committal.

The judge, on his own motion, initiated a peace bond hearing based on the complainant's testimony regarding a history of domestic violence.

The applicant consented to the peace bond and was subsequently discharged on the criminal charges.

On review, the Superior Court held that a provincial court judge, acting in their capacity as a justice of the peace, retains the inherent common law jurisdiction to impose a peace bond in a separate proceeding, regardless of the statutory limitations of a preliminary inquiry.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The sole ground of appeal argued that the trial judge improperly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunn by diminishing the weight of the defence evidence because the defence version was not put to Crown witnesses during cross-examination.

The appellate court held that trial judges retain discretion in determining how to address a breach of the rule, including considering the failure to cross-examine when assessing credibility.

The court found that defence counsel had the opportunity to seek recall of witnesses after the issue was raised but chose not to do so.

The trial judge’s treatment of the issue was a permissible exercise of discretion and did not amount to reversible error.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assaulting a police officer arising from a confrontation at the doorway of his condominium during a noise complaint investigation.

The central issue was whether the officer was lawfully in the execution of his duty when he stepped into the dwelling and refused to leave after the occupant asked him to do so.

The court held that the officer lacked lawful authority to enter or remain in the residence because none of the recognized exceptions to the common law “sanctity of the home” principle applied, including hot pursuit, exigent circumstances, or a warrant.

The trial judge erred in relying on doctrines of hot pursuit, implied licence, and officer safety to justify the entry.

As the officer was a trespasser and not acting in the execution of his duty, an essential element of the offence was not proven.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of impaired operation under s. 253 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge accepted the possibility that the accused’s intoxication may have resulted from involuntary consumption after an intervening act, such as someone placing a substance into his unattended drink.

The Crown argued the trial judge engaged in speculation, misapprehended evidence, and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The court held that the trial judge correctly applied the principles from R. v. King and R. v. W.D., and that the accused only needed to raise a reasonable doubt about voluntary consumption.

The acquittal was therefore entitled to deference and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault arising from an incident involving his spouse, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles from R. v. W.D. and improperly relied on the complainant’s demeanour to assess credibility.

The case turned on conflicting testimony between the complainant and the accused, supported by photographic evidence of injury.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s reasons and concluded that the proper burden of proof analysis was expressly articulated and applied.

The trial judge’s brief observation about demeanour was expressly minimized as having little or no value.

The court found no error of law or misapplication of the W.D. framework and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code arising from a collision on Highway 401.

The trial judge relied on a combination of breathalyzer readings below the legal limit and expert toxicology evidence indicating likely impairment, together with findings about the manner of the collision.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to breathalyzer readings, expert opinion, and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court held that while the trial judge did not err in evaluating the collision or the breathalyzer and expert evidence, the analysis of bolus drinking was flawed because it focused improperly on large consumption while driving and involved speculation about the location of a bottle of alcohol in the vehicle.

Given the central role of this reasoning to the finding of guilt, the conviction could not stand.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge had excluded Intoxilyzer breath test results on the basis that the police officer allegedly lacked reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand under the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court held that proof of reasonable grounds is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of breath test results at common law or under the Criminal Code evidentiary scheme.

Rather, the absence of reasonable grounds may support a Charter challenge and potential exclusion under s. 24(2), but does not automatically render the results inadmissible.

Because the trial judge treated the issue as an automatic bar and failed to conduct the proper Charter analysis, the acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.