Tonya Kent

The court sentenced the offender after convictions for three armed robberies, one attempted armed robbery, related firearms offences, and multiple breaches of a weapons prohibition while on release.

Applying proportionality, denunciation, deterrence, restraint, and totality principles, the court treated repeated planned gunpoint offences against vulnerable workers as highly aggravating, while also weighing youth, lack of record, family support, and evidence of systemic anti-Black racism context.

The court fixed a global fit sentence at nine years' custody before credit.

After credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions, the remaining global custodial sentence was eight years and six months.

DNA and lifetime weapons prohibition orders were imposed, with additional no-contact and surcharge orders.

The offender was serving a conditional sentence for fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged she breached the order by providing forged employment contracts and paystubs to her supervisor to gain exceptions to her house arrest condition.

The court found the breaches established on a balance of probabilities, noting the offender's calculated deceit and fabrication of documents.

Applying the presumption of incarceration for unjustified breaches, the court terminated the conditional sentence and committed the offender to custody for the remaining 21 months of her sentence.

The accused was charged with 23 offences arising from four armed robberies at gunpoint and firearm possession charges.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of each robbery as similar act evidence to establish identity.

The court admitted the similar act evidence, finding striking similarities across all four robberies including the use of the same firearm, vehicle, clothing, and modus operandi.

The court convicted the accused of three counts of armed robbery, one count of attempted armed robbery, four counts of pointing a firearm, four counts of disguising face with intent to commit indictable offence, four counts of possessing a weapon for purpose of committing criminal offence, four counts of breaching a release order, and three firearm possession offences.

The court sentenced Telique Ricketts for manslaughter with a firearm, following a guilty plea entered mid-trial for the killing of Adrian Richardson during a planned home invasion and robbery.

The decision reviews the facts, victim impact, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant case law, ultimately imposing a sentence of 11 years, reduced to 6 years and 146 days after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court also imposed a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, a young person, was charged with kidnapping, forcible confinement, sexual assault, and failing to comply with a release order.

The victim was kidnapped at gunpoint by two older men, sexually assaulted in the vehicle by one of them, and then driven to a garage where the accused and two other young men were waiting.

The victim was tied to a chair and tortured by the other young men while the accused was present and provided a syringe with fentanyl used to threaten her.

Incident to arrest, the police obtained a penile swab from the accused without providing him an opportunity to have a parent or counsel present.

The court found that the police lacked objective reasonable grounds to believe the penile swab would afford evidence of the sexual assault, and that the manner of execution violated s. 8 of the Charter because the accused was not afforded enhanced procedural protections as a youth.

However, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not warranted, finding that a sentence reduction was an appropriate alternative remedy.

Findings of guilt were entered for kidnapping, forcible confinement, and failing to comply with a release order, while the sexual assault count was dismissed.

The accused, Antony Muchemi, faced a judicial interim release hearing where the Crown sought preventative detention on secondary grounds due to numerous alleged offences and a reverse onus position.

The court considered the accused's background, the nature of the allegations, and the conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

Despite the Crown's concerns, the court found that a preventative detention order was not appropriate, emphasizing the presumption of innocence, the principle of restraint, and the accused's vulnerable circumstances (homelessness, potential mental health issues, and lack of criminal record).

The court determined that a release plan with conditions could reduce the risk to a tolerable level, thereby releasing the accused.

This decision concerns the sentencing of J.B., a young Black male, for serious offences stemming from a pharmacy robbery.

The court applied principles from the Youth Criminal Justice Act and general sentencing principles, with a particular focus on the impact of anti-Black racism and the role of Enhanced Pre-Sentence Reports (EPSRs).

The court considered aggravating factors such as the seriousness of the offence and harm to victims, alongside mitigating factors including J.B.'s troubled upbringing, exposure to systemic racism, and his newfound role as a father.

Despite the Crown seeking a custodial sentence, the court imposed a non-custodial sentence of 24 months probation with various conditions, emphasizing rehabilitation and reintegration while acknowledging the systemic barriers faced by racialized individuals.

The accused, charged with child pornography offences and breach of a conditional sentence, applied for release on a 90-day detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused proposed a release plan involving two sureties, house arrest, and electronic monitoring.

The court found that the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention were met, given the accused's significant criminal record for similar offences, the substantial likelihood of reoffending, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for release was dismissed and continued detention was ordered.

The applicant sought a detention review, arguing material changes in circumstances and errors by prior courts regarding his release plan and Gladue factors.

The court dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances, upholding the prior decisions that continued detention was justified on secondary and tertiary grounds due to the applicant's history of re-offending, particularly driving while disqualified, and the proposed release plan's inability to mitigate public safety risk.

The court also addressed the application of Gladue factors, concluding that while systemic factors were present, the proposed plan did not sufficiently address the risk to public safety.

The accused, Alaelddein Alhajsalem, brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to a 17-day delay in his bail hearing, arguing a violation of sections 7, 9, and 11(e) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded a breach of section 11(e) but argued against a stay.

The court found the delay was caused by systemic issues in the Newmarket Bail Court, not related to the pandemic, and that a judicial admonition or sentence reduction would be inadequate.

Balancing the seriousness of the charges against the persistent systemic problem and the flagrant Charter breach, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

Timothy Clarke Anthony applied for bail review and detention review after being denied bail by a Justice of the Peace.

He faced multiple charges, including criminal negligence causing death and numerous counts of driving while disqualified, with a significant criminal record involving breaches of court orders.

The application argued errors in law by the Justice of the Peace, a material change in circumstances with a new release plan and sureties, and unreasonable delay.

The court found no errors in the original decision, determined the new release plan did not constitute a material change sufficient to mitigate the high risk of re-offending, and concluded that the delay was not unreasonable under the Jordan framework.

The application was dismissed, and detention was warranted due to the compelling risk of re-offending.

The accused, a bank teller charged with identity theft and fraud, brought Charter applications under ss. 8 and 10(b) and a Garofoli application to exclude evidence mid-trial.

The police arrested the accused in a parking lot and briefly searched his car to retrieve his wallet for identification, finding a sticky note with customer data.

The court held the search was a valid search incident to arrest and, alternatively, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court also dismissed the Garofoli application, finding sufficient basis for the cell phone warrant even without the sticky note, and dismissed the s. 10(b) claim as the short delay in providing access to counsel at the nearby station was reasonable.

The accused, a 21-year-old first-time offender, pleaded guilty to weapons dangerous, robbery, and breach of bail.

The court considered his youth, lack of prior record, strong family support, and the impact of the pandemic on his life prospects.

Applying the principles of restraint and rehabilitation for youthful first offenders, and noting the availability of a conditional sentence following R. v. Sharma, the court imposed a conditional discharge for the weapons offence, a 6-month conditional sentence for the robbery (along with 5 months deemed pre-trial custody credit for house arrest), and 7 days deemed time served for the breach.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant under s. 8 of the Charter pursuant to R. v. Garofoli.

Police obtained a warrant to search a residence and vehicle based on information from a confidential informant that the applicant was trafficking in drugs, corroborated by an undercover drug purchase and police investigation.

The applicant argued the warrant was insufficient because the informant was wrong about the vehicle used and the connection to the residence was weak.

The court upheld the warrant, finding that the police investigation provided sufficient corroboration of the informant's tip and that reasonable inferences could be drawn establishing a nexus between the applicant and the residence where drugs could be found.

The accused was charged with break and enter, robbery, uttering threats, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose following a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including a cellphone belonging to the accused found at the scene, and eyewitness identification by the complainant.

The court rejected the eyewitness identification as unreliable but found the accused's explanation for his cellphone being at the scene to be implausible.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's testimony and found that the circumstantial evidence established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the break and enter, robbery, and weapons charges.

The accused was acquitted of uttering threats due to insufficient evidence regarding which perpetrator made the threat.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the court considered whether the two accused should be committed to stand trial for first-degree murder in a stabbing death.

The Crown argued the murder was planned and deliberate or occurred during a forcible confinement.

The court found no evidence of planning or deliberation, and concluded any confinement was inherent in the act of killing rather than a distinct act.

The accused were committed to stand trial for second-degree murder.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, proposing two new sureties to replace the unsuitable one from the initial hearing.

The applicant was charged with robbery, intent to commit an indictable offence while masked, and failing to stop for police.

The court found that while the new sureties were an improvement, they did not constitute a material change in circumstances because they did not address the underlying reasons for detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds, specifically the applicant's history of robberies and the seriousness of the offences.

The application was dismissed.

Shanice Waldron was found guilty by a jury of importing 2.753 kg of cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior criminal record for identity fraud, and mitigating factors such as her youth, status as a single mother, strong rehabilitation prospects, and a history of sexual abuse leading to vulnerability.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the defence proposed a range of five and a half to six and a half years.

The court imposed a sentence of six and a half years of incarceration, along with a mandatory 10-year firearms prohibition, a lifetime prohibition under s. 109(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, and a DNA order.

The court specifically found that the presence of her young son during the offence was not an aggravating factor.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a witness residing in Saanich, British Columbia to testify via video link pursuant to section 714.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding insufficient evidence regarding the witness's personal circumstances, the costs of attendance, the technology to be used, and practical logistics such as document presentation and examination site integrity.

The court held that while section 714.1 provides a valuable mechanism to reduce witness attendance costs, it requires a proper evidentiary foundation and balancing of statutory and common law factors.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.