Robert M. G. Shawyer

The defendant in a Building Code Act prosecution brought a second disclosure motion seeking field notes, memoranda, and investigators' files from the City of Toronto.

The first disclosure motion had been denied as a fishing expedition.

However, the defendant subsequently obtained documents through a Freedom of Information request that supported potential defences of officially induced error, statute of limitations, and legal non-conforming use.

The court found the defendant satisfied the onus to establish relevance and granted the second disclosure motion, noting the City did not respond to oppose it.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a breach of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (right to be tried within a reasonable time) in a Provincial Offences Act matter concerning alleged violations of the Building Code Act.

The defendant was charged on March 24, 2023, with contravening section 36(1) of the Building Code Act and failing to comply with an inspector's order.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of delay attributable to the defendant, the Crown, and the court itself, calculating net delay of 8.87 months as of the hearing date.

The court found that the defendant did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, having changed legal representation three times, failed to properly serve and file amended Charter application materials, and did not raise disclosure issues until the eleventh hour.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no breach of section 11(b) rights, as the net delay remained well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R v. Jordan for provincial court matters.

This decision addresses a Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of the accused's section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The accused, Luciano Battiston, was charged following a pedestrian accident resulting in bodily harm and death.

The Court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's framework from R v. Jordan and R v. K.G.K., confirming that the presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials is 18 months.

The Court found the total delay of approximately 18.5 months presumptively unreasonable, with no exceptional circumstances or complexity to justify the delay.

The Court also critically examined state-caused delay due to lack of internet connectivity in Toronto Provincial Offences Act (POA) courts, attributing such delay to the Crown.

The Court ordered a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.

This decision addresses a Charter application under section 11(b) seeking a stay of proceedings for delay in a Provincial Offences Act (POA) matter involving careless driving causing bodily harm and death.

The defendant argued that despite the trial being scheduled within the 18-month presumptive ceiling established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Jordan, his right to a timely trial was violated due to systemic delays, particularly in disclosure by the Toronto Police Service (TPS).

The Court analyzed the defendant’s efforts to expedite the trial, the complexity of the case, local systemic factors affecting POA prosecutions in Toronto, and the Crown’s conduct.

The Court found the case was not complex, the defence took all meaningful steps to expedite, and the Crown acted reasonably given local conditions.

The Court emphasized the systemic challenges in POA disclosure and trial scheduling in Toronto but concluded that the trial was scheduled within the constitutional ceiling and denied the stay of proceedings.

The accused, Antony Muchemi, faced a judicial interim release hearing where the Crown sought preventative detention on secondary grounds due to numerous alleged offences and a reverse onus position.

The court considered the accused's background, the nature of the allegations, and the conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

Despite the Crown's concerns, the court found that a preventative detention order was not appropriate, emphasizing the presumption of innocence, the principle of restraint, and the accused's vulnerable circumstances (homelessness, potential mental health issues, and lack of criminal record).

The court determined that a release plan with conditions could reduce the risk to a tolerable level, thereby releasing the accused.

The accused, S.E., sought judicial interim release on serious charges including human trafficking, procuring, sexual assault, and drug trafficking.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds, citing S.E.'s alleged breaches of a previous release order and the unsuitability of proposed sureties.

The court found the proposed sureties unsuitable due to their "blind spots" and inability to provide adequate supervision, and determined that the release plan would not reduce the substantial likelihood of reoffending or maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

Despite S.E. being a member of an overrepresented vulnerable population, the court ordered his detention.