Allen Philip Welman

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for aggravated assault and weapon possession, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order at a forensic hospital.

He argued the Board made material factual errors and that he should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Board made mischaracterizations of the evidence, these errors did not impact the reasonableness of its risk assessment or disposition.

The court concluded that the Board understood the correct factual context when its reasons were read as a whole, and that the detention order remained the least onerous and restrictive disposition consistent with public safety, given the appellant's ongoing substance abuse and lack of insight into his mental illness.

The applicants, Anisur and Sharmin Sikder, brought a motion for summary judgment against Carol Jesseau regarding deficiencies in a purchased residential property, for which their insurer sought subrogated reimbursement.

The respondent, Ms. Jesseau, sought leave to amend her pleadings.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial concerning whether consideration was provided for a "Warranties and Bill of Sale" document signed by Ms. Jesseau and whether the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The court granted Ms. Jesseau leave to amend her pleadings and ordered further amplification of the record through viva voce evidence to resolve the enforceability of the Warranty.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The Board had rescinded a certificate of involuntary admission but upheld the physician’s finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment due to inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing antipsychotic medication.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review and the test for capacity under s. 4 of the Act, the court found the Board reasonably concluded the appellant’s delusional beliefs and disorganized thinking prevented her from performing a risk–benefit analysis regarding treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the Board equated mental illness with incapacity or failed to ensure the appellant had been informed about treatment options.

The appeal was dismissed.