ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
Court File Numbers: 24–24100127 24–24100265
BETWEEN:
TORONTO (CITY OF)
— AND —
YE, JUAN
Before Justice of the Peace R. Shawyer
Heard on September 15, 17, and 18, November 5, 2025, and December 11, 2025.
Reasons for Judgment dated January 13, 2026
AYRES, D……………………………………………………... counsel for the Prosecution
WELMAN, A counsel for the Defendant
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SHAWYER:
Introduction
1In this electronic age fully electronic trials in the City of Toronto’s (hereinafter the “City”) POA Courts are not yet possible.
2The trial was conducted in person.
3The Prosecution presented their evidence electronically. All the documentary evidence that the Prosecution was relying on was presented in electronic fashion.
4During the trial counsel for the defendant, Ms. Juan Ye (hereinafter the “defendant”), made comments about the issue of the defendant’s lack of access to the internet. When the Prosecution called its final witness and they had completed their testimony, counsel for the defendant advised the Court that pursuant to instructions from the defendant they would be filing a Charter1 Application in relation to the issue of the defendant’s lack of access to the internet during the trial.
5To the prosecutor’s credit they were prepared to and did try to present their case electronically. Had they been able to the trial would have been efficient and time would have been saved. However, because the defendant did not have the same access to the internet as both the Court and the Prosecution, the Prosecution midway through the defendant’s trial, had to resort to printing out all the documents that had been made exhibits to that point to ensure the trial process was as fair possible to the defendant. While this was prudent of the Prosecution the defendant’s trial nevertheless had to be adjourned to a third day to allow the defendant to serve and file their Charter application.
6The defendant’s matter returned before the Court on November 5, 2025, for argument of the defendant’s Charter application. Unfortunately, due to service issues on the part of the defendant, the trial had to be adjourned to a fourth day to allow the defendant to correct the deficiencies in the service of their Charter application.
7When the defendant’s matter returned before the court for a fourth day, December 11, 2025, the defendant advised that due to further service issues they were abandoning their Charter application. Therefore, the defendant’s trial proceeded with the Prosecution closing its case, the defendant presenting their case, and the Court hearing closing submissions by both parties.
8Had there been full electronic access during the defendant’s trial judicial economy could have been achieved; all the evidence and submissions could have been put before the Court in less time than the defendant’s trial took. Instead, precious judicial resources were needlessly wasted because of a lack of full internet connectivity for all the parties involved.
9If trials in the City’s POA courts are going to proceed electronically in the future, then full access to the internet in the City’s courtrooms will have to be provided to everyone, and not just the prosecution. Anything less raises a host of access to justice issues that may have to be litigated in the future.
The Law and Analysis
10The Prosecution ultimately sought a conviction on two charges. The first charge the Prosecution seeks a conviction on is failing to clean/clear refuse from land pursuant to section 548-5 of Chapter 548 of the Toronto Municipal Code, as amended 2017-04-28 by By-law 426-2017 (hereinafter the “Code”).
11This section states that “the owner of land on which waste has been thrown, placed, dumped or deposited shall immediately clean and clear the waste from the land. This is because Chapter 548-4 of the Code states that “no person shall place, dump or deposit or permit to be placed, dumped or deposited any quantity of waste on any land, not including buildings, within the City, including ponds, lakes and streams, except as required or permitted under Chapter 841, Waste Collection, Commercial Properties, and Chapter 844, Waste Collection, Residential Properties”.
12In section 548-1 of Chapter 548 of the Code, waste, as was referred to during the defendant’s trial, is defined as:
“[g]arbage – [w]aste other than recyclable materials, organic materials, yard waste and prohibited waste and includes but is not limited to (d) [a]ny other unused or unusable material that by reason of its state, condition or excessive accumulation, appears to: (1) have been case aside, discarded or abandoned; or (2) be worthless, useless or of no other particular value; or (3) be used up, expended or worn out in whole or in part.
13The second offence the defendant was accused of committing was failing to comply with a Property Standards Order pursuant to section 36(1)(b) of the Building Code Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 23 (hereinafter the “Act”). This section states that [a] person is guilty of an offence if the person, fails to comply with an order, direction or other requirement made under this Act.
14The offences with which the defendant is accused of committing are not criminal in nature but rather regulatory. Under the common law that has developed in Canada there is a distinction “between truly criminal conduct and conduct, otherwise lawful, which is prohibited in the public interest.”2 That distinction is the element of mens rea3.
15While the mens rea presumption always applies to criminal offences because of the fault and moral culpability, which they imply; that same presumption does not necessarily apply to regulatory offences.
16Regulatory offences are not criminal in any real sense but rather are acts, which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty4. Therefore, regulatory offences can best be understood to be those “….category of offences created by statutes enacted for the regulation of individual conduct in the interests of health, convenience, safety and the general welfare of the public” which (generally5) are not subject to the common law presumption of mens rea as an essential element to be proven by the Crown.”6
17The reason regulatory offences can be understood in this manner is because of the Supreme Court of Canada’s (hereinafter “SCC”) decision in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 3 C.R. (3d) 30, 21 N.R. 295, 7 C.E.L.R. 53, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (hereinafter “Sault Ste. Marie”). In Sault Ste Marie the SCC affirmed the distinction between criminal and regulatory offences.
18Dickson J, as he was then, writing on behalf of a per curiam (unanimous) Court in Sault Ste. Marie,
“recognized public welfare offences as a distinct class. He held (at pp. 1302-1303 [S.C.R., pp. 34-35 C.R.]) that such offences, although enforced as penal laws through the machinery of the criminal law, “are in substance of a civil nature and might well be regarded as a branch of administrative law to which traditional principles of criminal law have but limited application.”7
19In doing so the SCC created a middle ground between criminal and regulatory offences. The Court did so by recognizing that a standard, that of strict liability, existed between the standards of full mens rea and absolute liability, which were the standards that governed regulatory offences prior to Sault Ste Marie8. Therefore, when a defendant is charged with a regulatory offence they can be charged with an:
absolute liability offence, which are offences where the Crown need only prove that the offence charged was committed.
A strict liability offence is an offence where the Crown must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, A defendant can defend against a strict liability offence by demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that either they took all reasonable steps to avoid committing the particular offence charged or that they reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts, which if true, would render the alleged wrongful act underpinning the offence innocent; or
a mens rea offence, which are offences where not only must the Crown prove that the defendant committed the alleged offence but also meant to commit the alleged offence.
20In the matter before the Court, it was agreed by counsel that the offence(s) with which the defendant was charged were strict liability offences. Therefore, the defendant needed to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that they took all reasonable steps to avoid committing the offence charged or that they reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts, which if true, would render the alleged wrongful act underpinning the offence innocent.
21At the close of the prosecutions case the defendant took the stand, which she is not required to do, in her own defence. She did so because her testimony formed the basis of her defence as she called no other evidence.
22Since the defendant took the stand in her own defence; offered no other evidence other than her testimony in her defence; the Court’s determination of whether the defendant has satisfied the Court on a balance of probabilities is governed by the SCC’s decision in R. v. W.(D.), 1991 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 (hereinafter “W.D.”).
23To paraphrase the SCC’s decision in W.(D.) the Court:
Even if it does not believe the defendant’s testimony, if that testimony leaves the Court with a reasonable doubt, must find the defendant not guilty.
If it does not know whom to believe, thereby leaving it with a reasonable doubt, must find the defendant not guilty.
Even if it finds that the defendant’s testimony does not raise a reasonable doubt about their guilt, if after considering all the evidence that it does accept, is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, must find the defendant not guilty.
In going through this process, must remember that the defendant, like every other person charged, is presumed to be innocent unless and until the Prosecution has proven their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Must remember that it is not enough to believe that the defendant is probably or likely guilty because proof of probable or likely guilt is not proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Must remember it is nearly impossible to prove anything with absolute certainty and the Prosecution is not required prove its case to the degree of absolute certainty because absolute certainty is a standard of proof that does not exist in law.
Must remember the direction from the SCC in R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] S.C.J. No. 40 at paragraph 242 that "the reasonable doubt standard ... falls much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of probabilities."
Must remember that the reasonable doubt standard is a tough standard, and is tough for good reason. It is because as Justice Cory stated in R. v Lifchus, 1997 319 (SCC), [1997] S.C.J. No. 77, at paragraph 13"[t]he onus resting upon the Crown to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt ... is one of the principal safeguards which seeks to ensure that no innocent person is convicted."
24In short, in accordance with the SCC’s decision in W.(D.), if the Court believes the defendant’s testimony, it must find the defendant not guilty of the offences with which they are charged.
a. Documentary Evidence
25As mentioned in the introduction to these reasons the Prosecution sought to present all the documentary evidence it was relying on in an electronic format. This led the defendant to initially raise the issue of authentication of the documentary evidence the Prosecution was relying on.
26The authentication of electronic documents is governed by the Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5 (hereinafter the “CEA”). In R v. Hirsch, 2017 CarswellSask 77, 2017 SKCA 14 (Hereinafter “Hirsch”) the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (hereinafter “SKCA”) dealt the interpretation of the section of the CEA that governs the authentication of documentary evidence.
Authentication of electronic documents
31.1 Any person seeking to admit an electronic document as evidence has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is that which it is purported to be.
Application of best evidence rule — electronic documents
31.2(1) The best evidence rule in respect of an electronic document is satisfied
(a) on proof of the integrity of the electronic documents system by or in which the electronic document was recorded or stored; ...
Presumption of integrity
31.3 For the purposes of subsection 31.2(1), in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of an electronic documents system by or in which an electronic document is recorded or stored is proven
(a) by evidence capable of supporting a finding that at all material times the computer system or other similar device used by the electronic documents system was operating properly or, if it was not, the fact of its not operating properly did not affect the integrity of the electronic document and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the electronic documents system;
(b) if it is established that the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party who is adverse in interest to the party seeking to introduce it; or
(c) if it is established that the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party and who did not record or store it under the control of the party seeking to introduce it.
Application
31.7 Sections 31.1 to 31.4 do not affect any rule of law relating to the admissibility of evidence, except the rules relating to authentication and best evidence.
Definitions
31.8 The definitions in this section apply in sections 31.1 to 31.6.
computer system means a device that, or a group of interconnected or related devices one or more of which,
(a) contains computer programs or other data; and
(b) pursuant to computer programs, performs logic and control, and may perform any other function.
data means representations of information or of concepts, in any form.
electronic document means data that is recorded or stored on any medium in or by a computer system or other similar device and that can be read or perceived by a person or a computer system or other similar device. It includes a display, printout or other output of that data.
electronic documents system includes a computer system or other similar device by or in which data is recorded or stored and any procedures related to the recording or storage of electronic documents.
27In Hirsch Caldwell J.A. on behalf of a unanimous Court wrote:
18 ….In my assessment, s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act is a codification of the common law rule of evidence authentication. The provision merely requires the party seeking to adduce an electronic document into evidence to prove that the electronic document is what it purports to be. This may be done through direct or circumstantial evidence: The Honourable Justice David Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence, 2016 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) at 104 [Watt’s Manual]. Quite simply, to authenticate an electronic document, counsel could present it to a witness for identification and, presumably, the witness would articulate some basis for authenticating it as what it purported to be (see: Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2016 FCA 161 (F.C.A.) at para 93, (2016), 400 D.L.R. (4th) 723 (F.C.A.) ). That is, while authentication is required, it is not an onerous requirement. In Watt’s Manual, the author notes at 1115:
The burden of proving authenticity of an electronic document is on the person who seeks its admission. The standard of proof required is the introduction of evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is as it claims to be. In essence, the threshold is met and admissibility achieved by the introduction of some evidence of authenticity.
[Emphasis in original]
As this suggests, the integrity (or reliability) of the electronic document is not open to attack at the authentication stage of the inquiry. Those questions are to be resolved under s. 31.2 of the Canada Evidence Act — i.e., the best evidence rule, as it relates to electronic documents. (See, as examples, the applications of ss. 31.1 and 31.2 in R. v. Himes, 2016 ONSC 249 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras 45-48; R v. M. (K.), 2016 NWTSC 36 (N.W.T. S.C.) ; R. v. Oland, 2015 NBQB 245 (N.B. Q.B.) at paras 52-91, (2015), 446 N.B.R. (2d) 224 (N.B. Q.B.) ; and R. v. Moon, 2016 ABPC 103, 36 Alta. L.R. (6th) 386 (Alta. Prov. Ct.)
22 At common law, the best evidence rule requires the proponent of a record to produce the original record or the next best available record: Watt’s Manual at 106. However, the concept of an original is not readily applied to electronic documents. Further, due to the inherent nature of electronic documents, it is often impossible to provide direct evidence of the integrity of an electronic document sought to be adduced into evidence. For this reason, the Canada Evidence Act dispenses with the common law requirement of an original record and substitutes other means of satisfying the purpose that underpins the best evidence rule. See, for example, the application of these provisions in R. c. Soh, 2014 NBQB 20, 416 N.B.R. (2d) 328 (N.B. Q.B.).
23 The purpose of the best evidence rule is to assist the trier of fact with the verification of the integrity of documents because alterations are more readily detectible on original documents. Sections 31.2 to 31.6 of the Canada Evidence Act set out the means by which a party may prove the integrity of an electronic document. In simple terms, under that Act, the integrity of an electronic document is proven by establishing the integrity or reliability of the electronic document system in which it is recorded or stored. That is, proof of electronic document system integrity is a substitute for proof of electronic document integrity.
24 Of importance in this case, s. 31.3(b) provides for a presumption of integrity in the circumstances where a party has established that the electronic document the party seeks to adduce into evidence was recorded or stored by another party who is adverse in interest to the party seeking to introduce it.
28Ultimately, the issue of the authentication of the electronic evidence raised by the defendant was resolved as between counsel. The defendant through their counsel advised they consented to all the documentary evidence that was tendered by the prosecution in electronic format be made exhibits without objection.
b. Uncontested Facts
29On June 15, 2018, the defendant bought the property, 75 Don Valley Drive in the City of Toronto (hereinafter the “property” or the “defendant’s property”) that is the subject of these proceedings. The defendant rents out the property and lives elsewhere.
30At some point in time the City became aware of zoning and waste issues with the defendant’s property. That is why according to Toronto By-law officer M. Kealy (hereinafter “Officer Kealy”), he and his partner who he identified as fellow Toronto Bylaw officer J. Sepp (hereinafter “Officer Sepp)9 initially inspected the defendant’s property twice on May 4, 2023.
31After the inspections were carried out on May 4, 2023, Officer Kealy issued a Property Standards Order, pursuant to s. 15.2(2) of the Act, in relation to the defendant’s property10. This is the first of two charges the defendant before the Court faces in this trial.
32Two weeks later, on May 18, 2023, Officer’s Kealy and Sepp reattended the property. While at the subject property the house the front door of the property was placarded11 by Officer Kealy with the Property Standards Order.
33During the morning of July 14, 2023, Officer Kealy again visited the defendant’s property. That morning, he met with the defendant, left the property at the request of the defendant, and then reattended the property at the invitation of the defendant later that morning. When Officer Kealy reattended the property he reached the conclusion that the Property Standards Order that he had issued had not been complied with and advised the defendant that he would be charging them. The charge that Officer Kealy laid was one of the two charges that was before the Court during the defendant’s trial12.
34On March 4, 2024, another pair of Toronto Bylaw Officers, this time Officer Brannan and his partner Officer Sepp13 visited the defendant’s property. This visit was prompted, according to Officer Brannan, by reports the City received through its 311 service14 about the subject property.
35Not finding anyone at home on March 4, 2024, the officers gained access to the defendant’s property through the rear yard. Upon entering onto the subject property, the officers independently testified that they observed a variety of waste (car tires, bike tires, bags of waste, etc.) scattered throughout the property.
36On March 6, 2024, the officer’s reattended the defendant’s property. The purpose was to determine whether the property had been cleaned and if it had not to service a Notice of Violation15, which Officer Brannan called a Waste Notice during his testimony.
37Again, on March 6, 2024, the Officers found no one home. Therefore, Officer Brannan, placarded the door of the home on the defendant’s property with the Notice of Violation.
38On March 27, 2024, Officers visited the defendant’s property for a third time. During this visit Officers determined that the Notice of Violation had not been complied with; in fact, according to testimony the Court heard, the Officers concluded that even more waste had accumulated on the property since their last visit on March 6, 2024. Therefore, Officer Brannan determined that his next steps would be to charge the defendant and schedule a date to have the materials deemed to be waste removed from the property at the defendant’s cost.
39Sometime after March 27, 2024, Officer Brannan charged the defendant pursuant to Section 548-5 of Chapter 548 of the Code. This is the second charge that defendant faced at trial. The charge that Officer Brannan laid was one of the charges against the defendant faced16.
40On April 16, 2024, Officer Sepp visited the defendant’s property. On that date he spoke to someone who told him that the items17 were not theirs and belonged to someone else.
41Finally, on April 22, 2024, Officers Brannan and Sepp attended at the defendant’s property with a contractor licensed by the City to have what was deemed as waste removed from the property. During the removal process Officer Brannan was the Officer who oversaw the removal of the waste while Officer Sepp took pictures. According to testimony the Court heard two bins of waste was eventually removed from the property.
42The Court heard that the defendant could have appealed the actions of both Officer Kealy and Officer Brannan. However, according to the testimony the Court heard, the defendant never did so.
c. Prosecution’s evidence
43The prosecution called three witnesses to testify. Those witnesses were as follows:
Toronto Bylaw Officer N. Brannan who has been employed by the City as a Bylaw Officer for 9 years as of the date of the trial.
Toronto Bylaw Officer J. Sepp, who testified they have been a bylaw officer for 23 years as of the date of the trial; and
Toronto Bylaw Officer M. Kealy who testified that they have been a bylaw officer since 2019 as of the date of the trial.
44None of the evidence the three bylaw officers gave in chief was seriously challenged by the defendant during cross-examination. It was not because:
the cross examination of Officer Brannan consisted mainly of clarifying when Officer Brannan attended at the subject for inspection purposes and getting him to agree that what one person considers junk can be considered another person’s treasure.
the cross examination of Officer Sepp focused on the dates he visited the subject property and the photo’s he took of the subject property18 and;
the cross-examination of Officer Kealy focused on his service of an order to comply on the defendant19 and the state of just one of a plethora of items found at the subject property, namely a refrigerator20, that were deemed to be waste by the City inspector’s.
45Given the fact that the three bylaw officers testimony was not challenged in any meaningful way by the defendant the Court finds the evidence of the three officer credible, consistent, and reliable. The Court now moves onto analyzing the evidence called by the defendant called. As noted earlier in these reasons the only evidence the defendant put before the Court was by their oral testimony.
d. Defendant’s Evidence
46The defendant asserted a due diligence defence. In short, they asserted that they took all reasonable steps to avoid committing the offence(s) they are charged with.
47The first line of defence the defendant asserted during their testimony is that when they tried to clean up the subject property they were told by their tenants that the items strewn about the property were useful. This line of defence is in keeping with the assertion put to one of the bylaw officers in cross examination that “one mans trash, is another man’s treasure”.
48In support of their first line of defence the defendant testified during examination in chief as follows:
They told the tenants the items in the backyard of the subject property needed to be cleaned up and if there were useful items amongst the items in the backyard those items needed to be put in the tenant’s rooms.
During their discussion(s) with their tenants about cleaning up the subject property they were told by the tenants no, the subject property is there house, and they have rights.
When they brought up the subject of cleaning up the subject property the tenants became angry and agitated with them, which was expressed by a loss of control on the part of the tenants who resorted to using four letter words when talking with them about cleaning up, and the tenants telling them to leave the subject property as they were not welcome at the subject property.
When the tenants got angry, they were scared, so they left the subject property; and
They called the police when the tenants got angry at them because on one occasion, they were concerned that the tenants were going to attack them.
49While it is conceivable that the defendant called the police about their tenants the problem is that the Court only has the defendant’s word for it.
None of the three bylaw officers who testified, testified either in chief or during cross examination that the defendant told them about the problem with the tenants and/or having to call the police.
The defendant did not produce any documentary evidence to support their testimony about calling the police.
Finally, when bylaw officers Brannan and Sepp testified about the waste removal operation they conducted at the subject property on April 22, 2024, neither of them in examination in chief or during cross-examination testified that they encountered any problems with the tenants or resistance by the tenants.
50The second line of defence offered by the defendant to the charges before the Court was that they hired a cleaning person to cleanup the subject property. During examination in chief the defendant testified that when they sent over the cleaning person to the subject property, they were prevented from cleaning the property by the tenants.
51The issue with the defendant’s second line of defence is almost identical to the problems with the defendant’s first line of defence.
None of the three bylaw officers who testified, testified either in chief or during cross examination that the defendant told them that she made efforts to try and clean up the property by hiring a cleaning person.
The defendant did not produce any documentary evidence to support their testimony about hiring a cleaning person. The defendant did not tendered as exhibits a contract with a cleaning person, a receipt demonstrating payment for cleaning services, or any other documentation that a Court would expect a person making this type of claim to produce; and
They did not call the cleaning person that they testified they hired to give evidence to testify.
52The third, and final, line of defence the defendant offered during their examination in chief is that they tried to repair the broken fridge located inside the subject property. The defendant testified during examination in chief that when they were told by a tenant about a fridge that was not working inside the subject property, they sent a repair person to fix said fridge.
53Again, the problem with the defendant’s third line of defence is almost identical to the problems with the defendant’s first two lines of defence. Namely:
None of the three bylaw officers who testified, testified either in chief or during cross examination that the defendant told them that she made efforts to try and repair the broken fridge inside the subject property.
The defendant did not produce any documentary evidence to support their claim that they tried to repair the broken fridge. Again, the defendant did not tender as exhibits a contract with a repair service, a receipt demonstrating payment for repair services, or any other documentation that a Court would expect a person making this type of claim to produce; and
They did not call the repair person that they testified they hired to give evidence to testify
54Even if the problems identified above are not problems with the defendant’s evidence on this point there is still a significant issue with the defendant’s testimony in this regard. That problem is that the fridge was only one item amongst many that brought the City Officers to the defendant’s property.
55Given the problems with the defendant’s evidence the Court cannot except the defendant’s evidence. The problems with the defendant’s evidence demonstrate that unlike the prosecutions evidence the defendant’s evidence is neither credible, consistent, or reliable. Therefore, the Court rejects the defendant’s evidence in its entirety.
Conclusion
56After considering all the evidence and applying the law the Court finds the defendant guilty of failing to clean/clear refuse from the subject property pursuant to section 548-5 of Chapter 548 of the Code. The defendant’s testimony did not, on a balance of probabilities, leave the Court with a reasonable doubt.
57It was clear to the Court after having considered all the evidence, both documentary and oral, and applying the law that the items strewn around the subject property were not useful, could not be considered of value to the tenants who lived at the subject property and can only be defined as waste pursuant to section 548-1 of Chapter 548 of the Code. This is so because beside there being discarded bicycle parts in the backyard, there were also hypodermic needles, a broken fridge, and other similar items that cannot be described as anything other than waste.
58Finally, before counsel began their submissions the Prosecutor invited the Court to dismiss the charge against the defendant for failing to comply with an order. The Prosecution rightly did so because the evidence that was heard by the Court did not support a conviction on this charge. Therefore, only a conviction will be entered as against the defendant for failing to comply with section 548-5 of Chapter 548 of the Code.
Footnotes
- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 91(24).
- Ibid., at para. 17.
- The term “mens rea” is defined as a guilty mind, which refers to the blameworthy state of mind required for the commission of the particular crime charged, as prescribed by the definitional elements of the crime. Thus, mens rea is defined by the essential elements of the crime: See R v. Letouche, 2000 29664 (CMAC), 2000 CarswellNat 1673, [2000] C.M.A.J. No. 3, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 420, 190 D.L.R. (4th) 73, 37 C.R. (5th) 58, 47 W.C.B. (2d) 306.
- R v. Wholesale Group Inc., 1991 39 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 at para. 20 quoting from Sherras v. De Rutzen[1895] 1 Q.B. 918, [1895-9] All E.R. Rep. 1167 (D.C.), at p. 922 [Q.B.].
- The Courts word has been added to the quote from the Supreme Court of Canada’s (hereinafter “SCC”) decision in R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd.1970 178 (SCC), [1971] S.C.R. 512C.R.N.S. 27212 D.L.R. (3d) 591[1970] 5 C.C.C. 193, at p. 13 [S.C.R.] because a few years later the SCC in an unanimous decision in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), 1978 11 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 3 C.R. (3d) 30, 21 N.R. 295, 7 C.E.L.R. 53, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161 subdivided regulatory offences into categories of strict and absolute liability.
- See R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd.1970 178 (SCC), [1971] S.C.R. 512C.R.N.S. 27212 D.L.R. (3d) 591[1970] 5 C.C.C. 193, at p. 13 [S.C.R.]
- Supra., note xii at para. 21.
- See Supra., note xii at para. 22.
- During his testimony Officer Sepp did not testify that he visited the defendant’s property on May 3, 2023.
- A City of Toronto Property Standards Order is a formal legal notice issued to a property owner, under Subsection 15.2(2) of the Building Code Act, for failing to meet the standards outlined in the City's Property Standards By-law. The order specifies the violations, the required repairs or cleanup, and a deadline for compliance, and may be appealed to the City of Toronto Property Standards Committee. If the owner fails to comply, the City can perform the work itself and add the costs to the property tax bill.
- Placarding a property means affixing an official notice, known as a placard, to a building to indicate that it has been deemed unsafe, unfit for human occupancy, or in violation of building codes. The property owner or occupants are typically prohibited from using or entering the building while a placard is in effect. Source: www.bangormaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/386/Code---Placarding-FAQs-PDF
- A third charge, pursuant to the Planning Act | R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13.,with an information ending in #0642.
- The same officer Sepp who inspected the defendant’s property with Officer Kealey.
- 311 Toronto provides residents, businesses and visitors to the City of Toronto with access to non-emergency City services, programs and information 24 hours a day, seven days a week in more than 180 languages: https://www.toronto.ca/home/311-toronto-at-your-service/.
- A copy of a "Notice of Violation pursuant to Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 548, Littering and dumping of refuse" was made an exhibit during the defendant’s trial. The Notice that was made an exhibit is a formal document issued by the City of Toronto, informing a property owner or person that they have contravened by-laws related to litter and illegal dumping. This notice requires the recipient to take corrective action, such as cleaning up accumulated refuse from their property, within a specified timeframe. If the violation is not corrected, the City of Toronto can perform the cleanup itself and charge the costs, along with a remedial fee, to the property owner's municipal tax bill.
- A third charge against the defendant, pursuant to the Planning Act | R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13.,with an information number ending in 0642 was laid but later withdrawn.
- Officer Sepp in his testimony used the word “items” when testifying about his visit to the property on April 16, 2024. The Court took Officer’s Sepp’s use of the word “items” to mean what was determined to be waste strewn throughout the property that was eventually removed on April 22, 2024.
- The problem with the cross-examination of Officer’s Sepp regarding what photo’s he took and when is that while there may have been some issues with Officer Sepp’s independent recollection of what photo’s he took, when he took them, and how many he took, is that the photo’s Officer Sepp took of the subject property were admitted as evidence on consent by the defendant; thereby, rendering a large portion of the cross-examination of Officer Sepp of limited to no value to the Court in assessing whether the defendant is guilty of the charge(s) she faced at trial
- When the Prosecution before the beginning of closing submissions invited the Court to dismiss the fail to comply with a building code order charge that the defendant was facing the cross examination of Officer Kealy was rendered of no value to the Court in determining whether the defendant was guilty of the remaining charge before the Court.
- The Cross-examination of Officer Kealy on the state of the fridge focused on whether it was being used by tenants at the subject property, which the Officer testified it was not, thereby supporting the City contention and not the defendant’s.