Christopher William Greg Bendick

The defendant was charged with three counts of failing to comply with Property Standards Orders under the Building Code Act.

The defendant argued he lacked notice of the orders, the officer's entry was unlawful, the orders were vague, and winter weather prevented compliance.

The court found the essential elements proven, as the property remained in disrepair.

The court rejected the defendant's challenges to the validity and wording of the orders as impermissible collateral attacks, noting he failed to appeal them.

The court also rejected the due diligence defence, finding the defendant took no meaningful steps to comply.

The defendant was found guilty on all counts.

Following guilty pleas to thirteen counts of failing to comply with property standards and unsafe building orders relating to a rental apartment building, the court considered a joint submission on sentence.

Applying the Anthony-Cook public interest test in a regulatory sentencing context, the court accepted the proposed fines for eleven counts but rejected the proposed $75,000 fines for two counts involving dangerous balcony and parking garage conditions posing grave risk to life and permanent injury.

The court emphasized deterrence, denunciation, repeat offending, the corporation's broad economic activity, and the vulnerability of affected tenants.

Fines of $400,000 were substituted on the two unsafe-building counts, for a total fine of $950,000 plus victim fine surcharges and court administration fees.

The defendant in a Building Code Act prosecution brought a second disclosure motion seeking field notes, memoranda, and investigators' files from the City of Toronto.

The first disclosure motion had been denied as a fishing expedition.

However, the defendant subsequently obtained documents through a Freedom of Information request that supported potential defences of officially induced error, statute of limitations, and legal non-conforming use.

The court found the defendant satisfied the onus to establish relevance and granted the second disclosure motion, noting the City did not respond to oppose it.

In a Provincial Offences Act prosecution arising from alleged Building Code Act non-compliance, the defendant brought a disclosure motion seeking further municipal records said to support a defence relating to pre-existing structures and historic permits.

The court held that the Stinchcombe disclosure framework applies in POA matters, but the practical intensity of the analysis depends on the complexity and seriousness of the prosecution.

Applying the first-party versus third-party disclosure principles discussed in McGuigan, the court found the request was speculative and unsupported by a sufficient factual foundation showing that relevant undisclosed records existed in the prosecution's possession.

The motion for further first-party disclosure was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a breach of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (right to be tried within a reasonable time) in a Provincial Offences Act matter concerning alleged violations of the Building Code Act.

The defendant was charged on March 24, 2023, with contravening section 36(1) of the Building Code Act and failing to comply with an inspector's order.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of delay attributable to the defendant, the Crown, and the court itself, calculating net delay of 8.87 months as of the hearing date.

The court found that the defendant did not take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, having changed legal representation three times, failed to properly serve and file amended Charter application materials, and did not raise disclosure issues until the eleventh hour.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no breach of section 11(b) rights, as the net delay remained well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R v. Jordan for provincial court matters.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the appeals against conviction of Mehendran Kandiah and Rhenu Jewellery Inc. for violating COVID-19 public health orders but allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the fines imposed.

The court found no loss of jurisdiction despite procedural irregularities and emphasized the importance of specific and general deterrence in regulatory offences, especially during a public health crisis.

The decision highlights the court's approach to jurisdictional challenges, the admissibility and impact of fresh financial evidence on sentencing, and the balancing of deterrence with proportionality and restraint in fines for corporate and individual offenders.

The appellant, Peter Dimakos, appealed the dismissal of his s.11(b) Charter application related to allegations under the Building Code Act.

The Ontario Court of Justice upheld the trial justice’s decision that the application was not properly before the court due to failure to properly serve the Attorney General, emphasizing the mandatory nature of proper service.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial justice’s procedural ruling and declined to order a new trial under s.120(1) of the Provincial Offences Act despite acknowledging alternative procedural approaches.

This appeal concerns procedural fairness and the application of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the context of a zoning by-law breach trial.

The appellant challenged the trial justice of the peace's summary dismissal of an unfiled s. 11(b) application, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing submissions and by accepting COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance justifying delay.

The court held that no formal s. 11(b) application was before the court as it was neither filed nor served, and thus the trial justice did not err in refusing to hear or summarily dismiss the application.

The court approved a bifurcated approach, deferring the ineffective assistance of counsel issue to a later stage.

The defendant, AIPL Canada Holdings Inc., brought a pre-trial application to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, concerning charges under the Building Code Act.

The total delay from the earliest information sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 39 months and 16 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that significant portions of this delay were implicitly waived by the defence through their agreement to adjournments for resolution discussions.

The Court found that the periods where the defence agreed to adjournments for resolution discussions constituted implicit waiver, even without explicit waiver or objection to delay on the record.

Subtracting this implicitly waived delay resulted in a net delay of 263 days, which is below the 18-month ceiling.

The Court dismissed the defendant's application, finding that the defence had not discharged its onus to prove the delay was unreasonable.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed by a lower court after the respondents pleaded guilty to breaches of the Building Code Act.

The appeal concerned whether the sentencing judge erred by undercutting a joint submission on the fine amount.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge failed to follow the established framework for departing from joint submissions, specifically by not raising concerns or inviting further submissions, and by not providing cogent reasons for the departure.

The appeal was allowed, and the fine was substituted to the amount originally proposed in the joint submission.

The City of Toronto appealed the acquittal of 2694605 Ontario Inc. on charges under the Cannabis Control Act (CCA) for knowingly permitting an illegal cannabis dispensary.

The Justice of the Peace had found the respondent met the statutory defence by taking "reasonable measures" to prevent the activity.

The City argued that "reasonable measures" should be interpreted as "all reasonable steps" akin to a due diligence standard.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that "reasonable measures" is a lower standard than "all reasonable steps" based on a plain reading of the CCA and comparison with other statutes like the Criminal Code and Liquor Licence Act.

The court found the respondent's actions, including attempts to evict tenants and change locks, were reasonable given the circumstances.

The defendant, charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a Charter motion arguing that proceeding by certificate evidence without the charging officer's attendance violated sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, seeking a stay or an order for the officer to attend.

The court dismissed the section 7 argument, noting that speeding is an absolute liability offence with no risk of incarceration.

For section 11(d), the court applied a contextual approach for regulatory offences, finding that the right to cross-examination is limited and requires a showing of material irregularity under section 49(4) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The court found the defendant's request for the officer's attendance was based on speculation and did not meet the threshold for a material irregularity, dismissing the Charter motion and the request to compel attendance.

The applicant sought an order of mandamus compelling a justice of the peace to proceed with the respondent's trial for a speeding infraction.

The justice of the peace had previously ruled that the court lost jurisdiction over the respondent because administrative adjournments during the COVID-19 pandemic were not properly recorded on the offence notice.

The Superior Court found that the justice of the peace erred, as the respondent had attorned to the court's jurisdiction by appearing via a representative, and the administrative adjournments complied with COVID-19 directives.

The application for mandamus was granted.

The appellant, Igor Iagolnik, appealed a speeding conviction under the Highway Traffic Act, arguing the Justice of the Peace erred by refusing an adjournment when the prosecution used certified statements and that the evidence was insufficient.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that certified statements under s. 48.1 of the Provincial Offences Act are admissible and sufficient proof in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

The court also clarified that pre-conditions for speed measurement evidence admissibility are no longer required for established technologies like RADAR/LIDAR, and speculation does not constitute evidence to the contrary.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed the dismissal of a speeding charge against the respondent, which was originally dismissed by a Justice of the Peace who found the certified statement evidence insufficient due to "unanswered questions" regarding the speed measurement device.

The appeal court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by relying on speculation rather than inferences reasonably arising from the evidence.

As the certified statements were deemed proof of facts in the absence of evidence to the contrary under the Provincial Offences Act, and no such contrary evidence was presented, the appeal was allowed.

The appellants, 1085638 Ontario Limited and Meadow Valley Garden Centre Ltd., appealed convictions under the Building Code Act and Planning Act related to the operation of a garden centre without proper permits and in violation of zoning.

The appeal focused on two issues: legal non-conforming use under s. 34(9) of the Planning Act and delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that for a legal non-conforming use, the activity must be in active operation on the day the zoning by-law was passed.

Regarding the s. 11(b) claim, the court found no error in the lower court's conclusion that the corporate appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice, applying the pre-Jordan test.

The appellant, convicted of speeding, appealed the dismissal of his provincial offences appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial justice of the peace made a palpable and overriding error by failing to consider a significant discrepancy between the officer's oral testimony regarding time and distance and the radar reading, which could have raised reasonable doubt about the radar's functioning.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the Crown indicating it would withdraw the charge.

Costs were not awarded, consistent with the general rule for Provincial Offences Act proceedings.

The appellant was charged with failing to comply with orders under the Building Code Act requiring him to obtain building permits or remove structures.

At trial, he argued he had obtained permits for some buildings and no permits were required for others.

The appeal judge convicted him, finding these defences were impermissible collateral attacks on the orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that arguing compliance (having permits) is not a collateral attack, restoring those acquittals.

However, arguing no permits were required is an impermissible collateral attack, so those convictions were upheld.

The appellants were convicted of traffic offences under the Highway Traffic Act after their applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter were dismissed.

The net delay in each case was under 14 months.

The summary conviction appeals judge upheld the dismissals, finding that the 18-month presumptive ceiling from R. v. Jordan applied to Part I Provincial Offences Act proceedings, and that the appellants failed to show they took steps to expedite their cases or that the delay was markedly longer than reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, confirming that the 18-month Jordan ceiling applies uniformly to all provincial court proceedings, including regulatory offences, and found no error in the lower court's refusal to grant a stay.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that substituted a conviction for an acquittal on charges of failing to comply with building inspector's orders.

The moving party argued that his defence—that he had previously obtained the required permits—was not a collateral attack on the orders.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal raised a question of law respecting the interpretation and application of the doctrine of collateral attack, and that special grounds existed.