6 total
Norwich order denied where plaintiffs had already sued defendants and could use normal discovery.
The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Norwich order against two cryptocurrency exchanges to trace assets allegedly misappropriated by the defendants in relation to a meme coin project.
The plaintiffs sought to identify the owners of wallets to which the unaccounted crypto assets were sent.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had already identified the alleged wrongdoers, commenced an action, and could obtain the information through the normal discovery process or a motion for third-party production.
The court concluded that a Norwich order was not necessary and the interests of justice did not favour granting it.
Motions for leave to appeal two lower court decisions dismissed with costs.
The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal the decisions of Hooper J. dated March 15, 2024, and C. MacLeod J. dated October 9, 2024.
The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the total amount of $5,200.
Leave granted to commence a derivative action where corporate gridlock threatened bankruptcy over unauthorized withdrawals.
The applicant sought leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of the company against the respondent, who allegedly took corporate funds for personal use without authorization.
The parties were the sole directors and equal voting shareholders, resulting in corporate gridlock.
The court found the applicant met the requirements under section 239 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act, including providing proper notice, acting in good faith, and showing the action was in the company's interest.
Leave was granted, and the company was ordered to pay the applicant's reasonable legal fees, with the ultimate amount to be determined at trial.
The court invalidated a corporate call option exercise, reinstating the applicant as a shareholder and director due to lack of default and strict non-compliance with timelines.
The applicant, a co-founder and major shareholder of a blockchain technology start-up, applied for declarations that he remains a shareholder and director after the company purported to repurchase his shares for nominal consideration under a default provision.
The respondent CEO alleged that the applicant had committed various defaults, including disparaging the company and withholding access to corporate funds.
The court found that the respondent failed to prove any of the alleged defaults, noting that much of the evidence was inadmissible double-hearsay and that the notice of default was untimely.
Additionally, the court held that the purported repurchase was void because the company failed to pay the purchase price within the strict timelines required by the agreement.
Consequently, the court granted the application.
The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial justice's decision that the appellant's Charter delay application was improperly served.
The appellant, Peter Dimakos, appealed the dismissal of his s.11(b) Charter application related to allegations under the Building Code Act.
The Ontario Court of Justice upheld the trial justice’s decision that the application was not properly before the court due to failure to properly serve the Attorney General, emphasizing the mandatory nature of proper service.
The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial justice’s procedural ruling and declined to order a new trial under s.120(1) of the Provincial Offences Act despite acknowledging alternative procedural approaches.
Interlocutory steps related to a Mareva injunction constitute steps required to advance a class proceeding, avoiding mandatory dismissal for delay.
The defendants brought a motion to dismiss a proposed class proceeding for delay pursuant to section 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.
They argued that the plaintiff had not filed a complete certification motion record or established a timetable within the first anniversary of the proceeding's commencement.
The plaintiff contended that extensive interlocutory proceedings related to a Mareva injunction, including timetables for affidavit exchange and cross-examinations, constituted "steps required to advance the proceeding." The court adopted a functional interpretation of section 29.1, finding that the injunction-related steps, which involved a deep dive into the merits and evidence relevant to certification, did indeed advance the proceeding.
Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.