Christopher William Greg Bendick

The Regional Municipality of York appealed acquittals on six Building Code Act charges arising from Orders to Comply issued in 2013 for unauthorized construction at a marina property.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent on the basis that the 2013 Orders were identical to Orders issued in 1996, and that the respondent had complied with the earlier Orders.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by permitting a collateral attack on the 2013 Orders, which had not been appealed to the Superior Court as required by statute.

The court also rejected defences of due diligence, estoppel, laches, and officially induced error.

The acquittals were overturned and convictions were entered on all counts, with fines of $100 per count totalling $600.

Three appellants appealed dismissals of their Charter section 11(b) applications for stays of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in Part I Provincial Offences Act prosecutions.

The central issue was whether the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan applies to Part I offences or whether a lower ceiling should apply given the simplicity of such proceedings.

The court held that the 18-month ceiling applies to all provincial court matters, including Part I offences.

The court also addressed the test for demonstrating unreasonable delay below the ceiling, the requirement for meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, and the circumstances in which summary dismissal of frivolous applications is appropriate.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act.

He requested disclosure of the testing and operating procedures from the user manual for the Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device used to measure his vehicle's speed.

The prosecutor refused disclosure, taking the position that user manuals constitute third-party records requiring a third-party production application.

The justice of the peace ordered disclosure.

The prosecutor obtained a certiorari order quashing the disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the certiorari order was improper and that the disclosure was required as first-party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for violations of the Building Code Act and Planning Act.

The appellants operated a garden centre on property zoned within the Oak Ridges Moraine without required permits and in violation of zoning restrictions.

The trial court convicted both appellants on multiple counts and imposed substantial fines.

The appellants appealed on six grounds, including challenges to the rejection of a legal non-conforming use defence, the refusal to adjourn sentencing, and a prior s. 11(b) delay application.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no legal error in the trial court's application of zoning law principles or procedural rulings.

The Regional Municipality of York sought leave to appeal a provincial court appeal judge's decision that set aside a stay of proceedings in a speeding charge against Steve Tomovski.

The appeal judge had found that while the delay breached the Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under the R. v. Jordan framework, the breach was attributable to the defendant.

The appeal judge also opined that the presumptive delay ceiling for Part I Provincial Offences Act proceedings should be 13 to 15 months, rather than the 18 months established in Jordan.

York sought leave to appeal on questions of law regarding the appropriate presumptive delay ceiling and the application of Charter s. 11(b) to Part I POA proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that York was seeking to appeal the reasons for judgment rather than the judgment itself, and that the appeal judge's opinion on the presumptive delay ceiling was not a "judgment" appealable under s. 139 of the POA.

The appellant was charged with violations of the Building Code Act for failing to comply with six orders to comply issued in 2013.

At trial, the appellant sought disclosure of prior charges and prosecutions, including orders to comply issued in 1995 and 1996 that had resulted in withdrawn charges.

The justice of the peace granted the disclosure order.

The respondent municipality applied for certiorari to quash the disclosure order.

The Superior Court granted certiorari, finding the earlier orders were distinct due to different compliance deadlines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred by failing to apply the substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice test and by prematurely determining the relevance issue mid-trial.

On appeal from a stay of proceedings entered by Justice of the Peace H. Radtke on June 21, 2016, the court considered whether the respondent's right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

The respondent was charged with speeding on December 30, 2014, and the matter proceeded through two adjournments before a stay was granted.

The appeal court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, and determined that the net delay of 326 days (10 months and 22 days) was presumptively reasonable.

The court also addressed whether the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan applies to Part I Provincial Offences Act proceedings, concluding that a lower ceiling of approximately 14 months is more appropriate for such regulatory matters.

The self-represented plaintiffs in a malicious prosecution action brought a motion to dismiss or stay a related Provincial Offences Act property standards prosecution, alleging it was an abuse of process and a SLAPP proceeding.

They also sought permanent restraining orders against the municipal defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the request for a stay was res judicata as it had been previously dismissed by another judge.

The request for permanent restraining orders was also dismissed because such relief requires a full adjudication of rights and was not pleaded in the statement of claim.

The respondent, who operated a body rub parlour licensed by the City of Vaughan, was charged with contravening a municipal by-law governing the hours of operation of body rub parlours.

He challenged the constitutionality of the by-law, arguing it was ultra vires the municipality because it constituted criminal law.

A justice of the peace and the Ontario Court of Justice agreed, finding the provisions were criminal in pith and substance and invaded federal authority.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the pith and substance of the hours of operation provision was business licensing, falling within provincial authority over property and civil rights and licensing.

The court found the lower courts erred by focusing exclusively on extrinsic evidence while ignoring intrinsic evidence, and by failing to recognize that municipalities may legislate to suppress conditions conducive to crime when anchored in a valid provincial head of power.

The Regional Municipality of York sought an order of mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash a disclosure order made by a Justice of the Peace and to compel the continuation of a trial.

The disclosure order required the prosecution to provide information on previous charges against the respondent from 1995 and 1996, which the applicant argued constituted a collateral attack on unappealed 2013 orders to comply under the Building Code Act.

The court found that the disclosure order was indeed a collateral attack on the 2013 orders, which the respondent had failed to appeal, and therefore granted the applicant's request.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that quashed convictions for minor traffic offences on the ground that officers had amended certificates of offence after serving offence notices but before filing the certificates with the court.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Provincial Offences Act does not expressly authorize such amendments, nothing in the statute precludes officers from correcting information on certificates before filing.

The validity of proceedings is preserved under section 90 of the Provincial Offences Act where the defendant has not been misled or prejudiced by minor clerical corrections.

The convictions were restored.

The Regional Municipality of York sought certiorari to quash a disclosure order made by a justice of the peace, which required the prosecutor to disclose a user's manual outlining testing procedures for a Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device in a speeding case.

The court found that the York Regional Police and the provincial prosecutor are not a single Crown entity for disclosure purposes, and certiorari was an available remedy as the order affected the prosecutor's legal rights on a final basis.

The court held that the testing procedures were not "fruits of the investigation" under the Stinchcombe first-party disclosure regime but rather a third-party record, and therefore the justice of the peace erred in ordering the prosecutor to disclose it.

The application for certiorari was allowed, and the disclosure order was quashed.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted in absentia of careless driving following a rear-end collision.

His appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice was dismissed on the basis that he had no defence to the charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's explanation—that the car in front of him pulled over and then suddenly pulled back into the lane—could provide a defence to the strict liability offence if believed at trial.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought orders in the nature of mandamus directing a justice of the peace to render a sentencing decision within a reasonable time and to accept proposed guilty pleas in several Provincial Offences Act matters.

The justice of the peace had accepted a guilty plea in one matter but reserved sentencing for approximately nine and a half months, and reserved for nearly a year whether to accept guilty pleas in four other matters despite joint submissions between the prosecution and defence.

The court held that the delay in sentencing risked infringing the accused’s right under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be sentenced within a reasonable time.

It further found that the refusal to accept the proposed guilty pleas lacked a legal basis and did not reflect a proper judicial exercise of discretion.

Orders of mandamus were issued directing the justice of the peace to deliver the sentencing decision and to accept the proposed guilty pleas and enter convictions.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review after a justice of the peace quashed a certificate of offence for a Highway Traffic Act charge on the court’s own motion during an early resolution proceeding.

The issue was whether the justice of the peace committed a jurisdictional error by quashing the certificate without a motion from the defendant.

The court held that under s. 36 of the Provincial Offences Act, objections to defects on the face of a certificate must be raised by the defendant through a motion to quash, and that the justice of the peace had no authority to initiate such a motion where the defendant was present.

The decision to quash the certificate was therefore a clear error of law and contrary to established precedent.

Orders of certiorari and mandamus were granted, restoring the proceeding and directing that a new early resolution meeting be scheduled.

The applicant, owner and operator of a licensed body rub parlour in Vaughan, sought a declaration that sections of the City of Vaughan By-law 315-2005 regulating hours of operation and dress code requirements for body rub parlours were ultra vires the municipality.

The court found that the impugned provisions, which restricted hours of operation and mandated specific clothing requirements, were in pith and substance criminal legislation regulating prostitution and nudity, matters within exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The court quashed sections 13.0(1)(h), 13.4, 13.0(1)(o), and 13.0(1)(p) of the by-law as ultra vires.

The prosecutor sought to admit written statements from three absent tenants during a trial for Fire Code violations regarding an alleged illegal rooming house.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, assessing necessity and reliability.

The court found all statements met the reliability threshold, but only one met the necessity threshold because the prosecutor failed to make adequate efforts to locate and subpoena the other two witnesses.

Consequently, one statement was admitted and two were excluded.