Adam Justin Marchioni

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a December 2025 decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The plaintiffs hired the defendants for cottage interior finishing and landscaping, paying a $542,400 deposit specifically to pre-purchase and store armour stone.

The defendants failed to purchase the stone and concealed this fact from the plaintiffs.

Upon discovering the truth, the plaintiffs terminated the contract and sued for the return of the unearned funds.

The court found the defendants liable for fundamental breach of contract, breach of a Quistclose trust, and breach of the duty of honest performance.

The individual defendant was held personally liable for knowingly participating in the breach of trust, and the plaintiffs were awarded $474,819.97 in damages.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff sought damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation after a farmhouse on a property purchased from the defendants was destroyed by fire before closing.

The court found no contractual obligation for the defendants to insure the property, rebuild the farmhouse, or abate the purchase price, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wile v. Cook.

The misrepresentation claim lacked sufficient particulars as required by Rule 25.06(8).

The statement of claim was struck out, but with leave to amend.

The plaintiff brought a motion for directions on late production and admissibility of a project bid estimate that it had previously refused to produce during discovery.

The plaintiff argued the document was irrelevant until its expert relied on it for a loss of productivity claim.

The court found the document was always relevant and required leave under Rule 53.08 to be admitted.

The court granted leave, finding no non-compensable prejudice or undue delay, but ordered the plaintiff to produce the native file and submit to further examination at its own expense on a full indemnity basis.

The appellants, 1085638 Ontario Limited and Meadow Valley Garden Centre Ltd., appealed convictions under the Building Code Act and Planning Act related to the operation of a garden centre without proper permits and in violation of zoning.

The appeal focused on two issues: legal non-conforming use under s. 34(9) of the Planning Act and delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that for a legal non-conforming use, the activity must be in active operation on the day the zoning by-law was passed.

Regarding the s. 11(b) claim, the court found no error in the lower court's conclusion that the corporate appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice, applying the pre-Jordan test.

The applicants, five adult children of the deceased, brought an application against the deceased's spouse, the respondent, claiming that approximately $7,000,000 in assets held either in the respondent's name or jointly were held on a resulting trust for the deceased's estate.

The court found that the deceased had a history of placing assets in others' names to avoid creditors.

The respondent failed to comply with court orders to produce financial records to prove she contributed to the assets, leading the court to draw adverse inferences against her.

The court concluded that the deceased funded the assets and did not intend to gift them to the respondent, declaring all disputed assets to be held on a resulting trust for the estate.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their counterclaim as statute-barred.

The counterclaim arose from a dispute between parties involved in waste disposal and transportation businesses from 2011 to early 2014.

The respondents claimed over $350,000 in damages and sought a declaration that the appellants had no beneficial interest in their companies.

The appellants counterclaimed for landscaping services and a declaration of beneficial interest.

The motion judge found the counterclaim was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The tolling period under section 11 of the Act, which suspended the limitation period during attempted third-party resolution, ended on February 3, 2014 when the respondents unequivocally terminated the resolution agreement.

The counterclaim was issued March 3, 2016, well beyond the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.

The applicant, Mayor Justin Altmann, sought to quash parts of a by-law passed by the Town of Whitchurch-Stouffville, arguing they were ultra vires and beyond Council's authority under the Municipal Act.

The by-law imposed sanctions on the Mayor for failing to issue an apology as previously directed by Council, following an Integrity Commissioner's report on harassment complaints.

The court found that certain terms of the by-law, which restricted the Mayor's communication with staff and access to municipal facilities, constituted unauthorized penalties not permitted by the Municipal Act or the Town's Code of Conduct.

Consequently, these "offending terms" were declared ultra vires and quashed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant to answer a refusal given during an examination in aid of execution and to require the defendant's representative to re-attend the examination.

The refusal concerned the production of the defendant's electronic QuickBooks bookkeeping data files.

The court ordered the production of the files, finding them relevant under Rule 60.18(2), subject to conditions protecting the personal information of employees.

The court also ordered the representative to re-attend the examination in person and awarded costs of $1,500 to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's action and the defendant's third party claim arising from a failed real estate transaction were dismissed on consent following a summary judgment motion.

The court was tasked with determining liability for and the quantum of costs.

Applying the principles from Milina v. Bartsch, the court found that the third party claim naturally and inevitably flowed from the plaintiff's action, justifying a departure from the normal rule that a defendant pays the costs of a third party it brings into the litigation.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of both the defendant and the third parties.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis at $20,000 plus HST and disbursements for each, as the amounts claimed were disproportionate to the complexity of the proceeding.

The appellant cashed a bank draft for a mortgagor who turned out to be a fraudster.

The appellant sued the mortgagee and the solicitor who drew the draft.

The trial judge dismissed the claims.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to allow an amendment to the pleadings after closing arguments, and in failing to recognize a new duty of care owed by the solicitor to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the discretionary refusal to amend pleadings and affirming that no new duty of care should be recognized in the context of bills of exchange.

The plaintiffs sought an adjournment of a defendant's motion to dismiss the action for failure to post court-ordered security for costs.

The court noted the plaintiffs' repeated failures to comply with court orders and the apparent overlap with another related proceeding, raising a possible abuse of process concern.

The adjournment was nevertheless granted because counsel represented that the jailed plaintiff's evidence was necessary to respond to the motion, and the court found little prejudice in a short delay.

The dismissal motion was adjourned peremptorily to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were barred from taking further steps until the security ordered had been posted.

Costs thrown away of $2,500 were ordered payable forthwith to the responding defendant.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim to reverse a 1988 conveyance on the grounds of fraud.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant's execution of a 1996 quit claim deed reflected her intention to show true ownership, rendering the claim against the 1988 conveyance bound to fail.

Furthermore, any claim for damages was barred by the two-year limitation period, as the appellant discovered the alleged fraud in 2004, and obtaining corroborating expert evidence later did not delay discoverability.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to set aside a default judgment.

She argued the judgment was signed irregularly before the 20-day service period elapsed and that she had a defence on the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the judgment was signed irregularly, the appellant suffered no prejudice, and relief against the irregularity was granted under Rule 2.01.

Furthermore, the appellant had no defence on the merits as it was undisputed she received $600,000 from the sale of her property.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants for the monetary value of a 5% ownership interest in a radio station and for the return of capital injections she made to the station.

The defendants argued she lacked standing because the funds were advanced via corporate cheques from her companies.

The court rejected this defence, finding the defendants knew they were dealing with her personally.

The court awarded the plaintiff $83,915.75 against the corporate defendant.

The corporate defendant's cross-claim against the former owner for indemnity was granted.

Claims against the individual defendants were dismissed.