Gianfranco Gesue Piccin

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal concerning the interpretation of an easement.

The primary issue was whether an easement for "vehicular and pedestrian access and egress" included the right to park.

The application judge had ruled it did not.

The appellant (Friuli Long Term Care) argued the application was speculative and that parking rights were ancillary or an easement of necessity.

The cross-appellant (Primont (Castelmont) Inc.) sought an additional declaration regarding redevelopment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, affirming the application judge's finding that the easement did not include parking rights and that parking was a contractual matter.

The court also upheld the refusal of the additional declaration due to procedural issues.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, drive over 80, and dangerous driving on December 4, 2011, with the information sworn on January 6, 2012.

Following a trial that spanned over five years, eight months, and two weeks, the accused was convicted on all counts on September 19, 2017.

The accused subsequently brought a section 11(b) application alleging a breach of the right to trial without unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, exceptional circumstances justified the extended timeline, including a change in counsel, the illness of a defence expert, the accused's medical difficulties during cross-examination, a gross underestimation of trial time, and the transitional nature of the case occurring largely under the pre-Jordan legal framework.

The accused was charged with four driving offences: impaired driving, drive over 80, dangerous driving, and fail to remain.

The central issue was whether the accused voluntarily consumed alcohol or whether a drug was surreptitiously placed in her drink, rendering her intoxication involuntary.

The court rejected the accused's evidence that her drink was spiked and found that her alcohol consumption was voluntary.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation, drive over 80, and dangerous driving, but acquitted her of fail to remain due to reasonable doubt regarding her intent to escape liability.

The plaintiff's action and the defendant's third party claim arising from a failed real estate transaction were dismissed on consent following a summary judgment motion.

The court was tasked with determining liability for and the quantum of costs.

Applying the principles from Milina v. Bartsch, the court found that the third party claim naturally and inevitably flowed from the plaintiff's action, justifying a departure from the normal rule that a defendant pays the costs of a third party it brings into the litigation.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of both the defendant and the third parties.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis at $20,000 plus HST and disbursements for each, as the amounts claimed were disproportionate to the complexity of the proceeding.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order directing a trustee in bankruptcy to convey its interest in a joint venture agreement and a related lawsuit to the respondent, a discharged bankrupt.

The appellants also challenged the motion judge's decision to make the conveyance retroactive to a date when the respondent was still an undischarged bankrupt.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to return the property.

To address the retroactivity issue, the Court varied the absolute order of discharge to take effect on April 4, 2005, just prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, using its power under section 187(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.