Richard Emile Anka

Following dismissal of a motion for production of documents, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered allegations made by the moving party against opposing counsel and a physician defendant, including claims of document alteration and misleading the court.

The court found the allegations unsupported and characterized them as serious and scurrilous.

Applying the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that such unfounded allegations justified substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded against the plaintiff in favour of the physician defendant on a substantial indemnity basis and modest costs to another defendant.

In an action concerning an alleged conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of her share of her late father's estate, the plaintiff moved for further production of pre-2004 medical records from the defendant doctor and the federal government regarding her father's shock therapy in 1969 or 1970.

The defendant Birch also moved to compel the plaintiff to answer a refusal to obtain records from Bell Canada regarding an alleged wiretap.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the plaintiff's production requests lacked relevance and violated the principle of proportionality, and that Birch's motion for Bell Canada records was also disproportionate given the minimal relevance and alternative remedies available.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

Prior to the determination of the appeal, the parties reached a settlement.

In accordance with the agreed terms of settlement, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay costs of $5,000 to the plaintiff respondent and $5,000 to the other respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim to reverse a 1988 conveyance on the grounds of fraud.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant's execution of a 1996 quit claim deed reflected her intention to show true ownership, rendering the claim against the 1988 conveyance bound to fail.

Furthermore, any claim for damages was barred by the two-year limitation period, as the appellant discovered the alleged fraud in 2004, and obtaining corroborating expert evidence later did not delay discoverability.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff sued his nephew and sister for an unpaid loan of $142,307.21, alleging the nephew borrowed the money and the sister guaranteed it as executrix of their mother's estate.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions, arguing the claim was barred by a mutual release executed to settle a decade of prior estate litigation.

The court granted the sister's motion, finding the broad release extinguished the claim against her.

However, the court dismissed the nephew's motion, concluding there was a genuine issue for trial because he was not a party to the release and the parties did not intend to extinguish his personal debt.

The defendant brought a motion seeking relief from forfeiture and to set aside a foreclosure order on the basis that he had not received notice of the foreclosure proceedings and that the mortgaged property was sold below market value.

The court found that the statement of claim had been properly served under Rule 16.03(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and accepted the process server’s affidavit of service as credible.

The court also held that the purchasers of the property were bona fide purchasers for value and that expert appraisal evidence supported the sale price.

No exceptional circumstances or defects in the foreclosure or sale process were established to justify equitable intervention.

The motion for relief from forfeiture was therefore dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 21.01(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process.

The claim contained lengthy narrative allegations relating to historic family litigation and alleged defamation, privacy breaches, and Charter violations but failed to plead material facts necessary to support any recognized cause of action.

The court held that the pleading did not satisfy Rule 25.06(1) and failed to plead essential elements of defamation, including the allegedly defamatory words and compliance with statutory notice requirements.

Finding the action frivolous and vexatious in light of a long history of litigation between the parties, the court struck the statement of claim and dismissed the action.

The court further declared the plaintiff a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, requiring leave of the Superior Court before instituting further proceedings.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to set aside an order granting summary judgment and dismissing her application for guardianship of her father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that because the father had died, the guardianship application had no prima facie merit as the claim died with him.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment that dismissed her application for guardianship of her father and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the respondent.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by proceeding in the absence of her counsel and that the costs award was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the guardianship application was moot because the father had died 14 months prior, and finding that the appellant's counsel failed to maintain a proper office system to be aware of the hearing.

The court found no error in the discretionary costs award.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal orders removing their solicitor of record and awarding costs.

The motion judge considered the test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for granting leave to appeal.

The underlying orders were based on a conflict of interest arising from a solicitor’s prior solicitor-client relationship and the potential use of confidential information, applying the principles from Martin v. MacDonald Estate (Gray).

The court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the original decision removing counsel and awarding costs.

Leave to appeal was refused and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs of the motion.

The moving defendants sought leave under Rule 29.02(1.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to issue a third party claim against an alarm monitoring company in an action alleging failure by insurance brokers to obtain adequate insurance coverage for stock spoilage.

The plaintiff opposed the motion on the basis that adding the third party would cause delay and prejudice.

The court held that leave should be granted unless the plaintiff would suffer meaningful prejudice, and found no evidence that witnesses or documents had been lost due to the delay.

The court also held that limitation period concerns were not determinative at the leave stage because the discoverability provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002 might postpone the running of the limitation period.

Leave to issue the third party claim was granted and service by courier on the proposed third party was validated.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that awarded them damages against two respondents for a serious assault but dismissed the action against several other respondents.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the involvement of certain respondents, the assessment of damages, the refusal to award punitive damages, and the refusal to make a Bullock or Sanderson order for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and holding that the damages and costs awards were within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of her medical negligence claim regarding the administration of the Energix B vaccine.

The trial judge found that the nurse did not breach the standard of care, as the risk of serious neurological damage was not known in 1994, and that the appellant would have consented regardless.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, concluding that the trial judge's findings on standard of care, informed consent, and causation were unassailable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against a solicitor and other defendants, as well as the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility regarding the solicitor.

The court also rejected the claim against the other defendants, noting that any vendor's lien was extinguished when the bank exercised its security.

The award of substantial indemnity costs was upheld due to the appellant's attack on the respondent's character.

The appellants purchased property under an agreement that required them to pay a bonus if they obtained a density increase in 'final form'.

The municipality approved an Official Plan Amendment increasing the density, but the implementing zoning by-law included a holding provision under s 36 of the Planning Act.

The appellants argued the bonus was not payable until the hold was removed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment for the respondents, finding the agreement unambiguous and that the density increase was granted in final form when the Official Plan Amendment was approved, regardless of implementation issues.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages and costs award following a finding that they breached a three-year fixed-term employment contract with the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly quantified damages based on the contract rather than tort principles, and correctly accounted for the respondent's mitigation efforts.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's Sanderson order, which directed the unsuccessful corporate defendant to pay costs directly to the successful individual defendant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against a corporate officer and director.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the grounds that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action and that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding negligent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim did plead sufficient facts to support the claim and that there were genuine issues for trial on the evidentiary record.