Frank Alfano

The appellant appealed her conviction for using a cell phone while driving, arguing that the Justice of the Peace reversed the burden of proof and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not err in noting the absence of defence evidence for speculative alternatives, and that the verdict was reasonable given the officer's credible testimony.

The appellant, Igor Iagolnik, appealed a speeding conviction under the Highway Traffic Act, arguing the Justice of the Peace erred by refusing an adjournment when the prosecution used certified statements and that the evidence was insufficient.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that certified statements under s. 48.1 of the Provincial Offences Act are admissible and sufficient proof in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

The court also clarified that pre-conditions for speed measurement evidence admissibility are no longer required for established technologies like RADAR/LIDAR, and speculation does not constitute evidence to the contrary.

The appellant, Andrew McNally, appealed his conviction for driving with a handheld communication device under the Highway Traffic Act.

He argued the trial Justice of the Peace misapplied the burden of proof or reached an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to adequately address the exemption under s. 14(1) of Regulation 366/09, which places the burden on the defendant to prove the exemption on a balance of probabilities.

As the trial judge's reasons did not clearly indicate whether this exemption was considered or how the conflicting evidence regarding the purpose of touching the device (GPS vs. answering a call) was weighed, the finding of guilt could not be upheld.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial involved conflicting testimony between the appellant and the sole prosecution witness regarding a motor vehicle collision at an intersection.

The appellant was convicted on August 12, 2016, following a trial heard on April 8, 2016.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the reasons for judgment were insufficient in law because they failed to meaningfully explain why his testimony was disbelieved.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's credibility analysis consisted of conclusions alone without meaningful reasoning, constituting an error of law.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The accused brought a motion seeking recusal of the Justice of the Peace, a declaration of mistrial, and costs against the Crown.

The motion alleged prosecutorial misconduct regarding disclosure vetting and content, as well as misapprehension by the Justice of the Peace regarding disclosure materials.

The accused was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court dismissed all grounds of the motion, finding that the accused failed to meet the high threshold required for recusal, that any disclosure errors were unintentional and remedied, and that the Crown's conduct did not constitute a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards warranting a costs award.

The accused was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act for speeding 173 km/h in a posted 100 km/h zone.

The defence brought a section 7 Charter application seeking disclosure of the full operational manual for the radar device used and GPS records from the officer's vehicle.

The Crown and OPP argued these were third-party records not in their possession or control.

The court determined the records were third-party records subject to the O'Connor disclosure regime and dismissed the application, finding the defence failed to establish that the requested records were "likely relevant" to an issue at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant drove his vehicle through a clearly marked emergency scene on the Queen Elizabeth Way, squeezing between pylons and a fire truck to enter the restricted area where emergency services were attending to a motor vehicle collision.

The trial justice found the appellant drove without reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway.

On appeal, the court upheld the conviction, finding the trial justice's decision reasonable and that the appellant's conduct fell below the standard of what a reasonable person would do in those circumstances and was worthy of punishment.

The defendant was charged with operating a motorcycle with handlebars exceeding the maximum height of 380 millimetres as prescribed by Ontario Regulation 596, section 10(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the regulation on grounds of vagueness and anachronism, arguing violations of sections 7, 9, and 26 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the regulation was not vague, not anachronistic, and did not violate the defendant's Charter rights.

The defendant was convicted after the prosecution proved the handlebars measured 830 millimetres above the seat.

The defendant was charged with speeding (134 km/hr in a 100 km/hr zone) under the Highway Traffic Act.

He brought an application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The overall delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated trial completion was 20 months and 18 days.

The court found that while 11 months and 22 days of this delay was attributable to institutional or systemic factors, the defendant failed to establish that he suffered actual or inferred prejudice as a result of the delay.

The application was denied.