Christopher Zenko

Crown appeal of a Justice of the Peace's decision granting a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a provincial offences careless driving prosecution.

The central issue was whether the 11(b) clock commenced upon filing the certificate of offence or upon the defendant's election to proceed to trial after an early resolution meeting.

The court held the Justice of the Peace erred in calculating total delay from the date of filing; the period from charge to early resolution constitutes implicit defence waiver, as the defendant was pursuing resolution rather than trial.

Deducting that period reduced net delay to approximately 7 months, well below the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Regional Municipality of Halton appealed a section 11(b) Charter stay of proceedings granted by a Justice of the Peace in a provincial offences matter.

The appeal court found that while the Justice of the Peace had jurisdiction to hear the Charter motion, she erred procedurally by requiring the prosecution to respond immediately without proper notice or transcripts, and by failing to consider the impact of COVID-19 related court backlogs on delay.

The stay of proceedings was overturned, but the prosecution subsequently withdrew the charges.

The applicant, charged with an owner liability red-light camera offence under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of her s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The respondent argued that s. 11(b) did not apply to such offences or, alternatively, that the delay was reasonable.

The court found that s. 11(b) does apply to these quasi-criminal proceedings, as they possess the indicia of criminal prosecutions and the penalties are penal in nature.

However, upon calculating the delay, the court determined that the net delay, after accounting for defence delay, fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

Consequently, the applicant's motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for using a cell phone while driving, arguing that the Justice of the Peace reversed the burden of proof and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Justice of the Peace did not err in noting the absence of defence evidence for speculative alternatives, and that the verdict was reasonable given the officer's credible testimony.

Victoria Saunders appealed three speeding tickets, arguing her decision to pay the fines was uninformed because she was unaware of the associated demerit points, which led to her driver's license suspension.

The court considered whether her waiver of Charter rights was fully informed.

It found that information about demerit points was reasonably available to her through the tickets and court website.

The court also held that demerit points are administrative sanctions, not part of the judicial sentence, and thus not information required for a valid waiver of Charter rights when pleading guilty to a regulatory offence.

Her appeals were dismissed.