Brian G. Puddington

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operating a conveyance with blood alcohol exceeding 80mg after being observed acting bizarrely in a courthouse and driving erratically in the parking lot.

An Assistant Crown Attorney who witnessed the conduct in court reported his suspicions to police, who arrested the accused after observing slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and an improperly parked vehicle.

The accused advanced Charter applications under ss. 7, 8, and 9, arguing that his compelled courthouse attendance rendered his in-court conduct protected by the principle against self-incrimination, and that the police lacked reasonable grounds for detention and arrest.

All Charter applications were dismissed: the accused's conduct was not compelled, the police stop was connected to a highway safety purpose, and the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds.

As the merits of the charges were conceded if the Charter applications failed, findings of guilt were entered on both counts.

Crown appeal of a Justice of the Peace's decision granting a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a provincial offences careless driving prosecution.

The central issue was whether the 11(b) clock commenced upon filing the certificate of offence or upon the defendant's election to proceed to trial after an early resolution meeting.

The court held the Justice of the Peace erred in calculating total delay from the date of filing; the period from charge to early resolution constitutes implicit defence waiver, as the defendant was pursuing resolution rather than trial.

Deducting that period reduced net delay to approximately 7 months, well below the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The accused was charged with multiple counts including theft of mail, damage to a Canada Post mailbox, possession of tools for break and enter, possession of someone else's driver's license, and assault on a police officer.

The Crown proceeded on seven counts.

The trial involved six Crown witnesses, including two civilians and four police officers.

The defence called no evidence.

The court found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed any of the offences, primarily due to inadequate identification evidence.

The only identification of the accused at the scene came from an officer who pointed to the accused in court 3.5 years after the incident, without providing any description of the person arrested or establishing continuity of custody.

The accused was charged with publishing, distributing, or transmitting an intimate image of his wife without consent contrary to section 162.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused sent photographs of his wife via Snapchat to an unknown male, including one photograph of her in a bra and another digitally altered image with her head placed on a nude body.

The accused brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The court found that neither photograph met the statutory definition of "intimate image" under section 162.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The photograph of the wife in a bra did not depict her as nude or with her breasts exposed, and the digitally altered photograph was not of her actual body.

The motion for a directed verdict was granted and the accused was acquitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery and possession of Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking arising from a home invasion on December 5, 2022.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 4.5 years imprisonment.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day followed by 3 years probation, with conditions including house arrest (with limited exceptions), electronic supervision for the first year, 50 hours of community service, and participation in counselling and rehabilitative programs.

The court considered the accused's youth (19 at time of offence), lack of prior criminal record, 981 days on strict bail conditions with GPS monitoring, systemic racism and anti-Black racism, prospects for rehabilitation, and the seriousness of the offences including the presence and discharge of a firearm and the significant quantity of Fentanyl.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Douglas Irwin to 6.5 years (78 months) imprisonment for possession of 56.2 grams of Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, with an additional consecutive 1-month sentence for failing to attend court for judgment.

The court considered the serious nature of the offence, the high monetary value and quantity of Fentanyl involved, and the opioid crisis impact.

Mitigating factors included Mr. Irwin’s addiction, his willingness to seek treatment, and his personal circumstances.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition under section 109 of the Criminal Code, DNA sampling, and forfeiture of seized items.

The decision reflects the balance between denunciation, deterrence, and individualized sentencing principles.

This case involves a police officer, Kevin Arnem, charged with assault causing bodily harm and using a weapon (his K-9 dog, Nitro) in committing the assault, contrary to section 267(b) and 267(a) of the Criminal Code, respectively.

The incident occurred during the arrest of Ramanpreet Singh, who was found in a stolen vehicle.

The central issue was whether the deployment of the K-9 dog was a reasonable use of force under section 25(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found Mr. Singh's testimony unreliable but relied on video evidence and other police officers' accounts.

Applying a modified objective test, the court concluded that Officer Arnem acted on reasonable grounds and used necessary force given the high-risk nature of the arrest, the suspect's non-compliance, and the limited time to react.

Officer Arnem was found not guilty on both counts.

The accused, Paljinder Bhatti, faced a charge of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude evidence (breath samples and observations) or stay the charge.

The court dismissed the section 10(b) application, finding that the police adequately informed the accused of her right to counsel and provided a reasonable opportunity to exercise it, including the choice of duty counsel.

The court also dismissed the section 8 application regarding cell video surveillance, concluding that police took reasonable steps to protect the accused's privacy.

However, the Crown conceded a section 8 breach regarding the roadside Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, as the device was not readily available at the time of the demand, consistent with R. v. Breault.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court found that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, citing the low seriousness of the police conduct, minimal impact on the accused, and strong societal interest in adjudicating impaired driving cases on their merits.

Consequently, all Charter applications were dismissed, and the breath samples and observations were admitted into evidence for the trial.

This is an application by the young person, Y.D., for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from the laying of the information to the anticipated end of the trial was 764 days (approximately 25 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued that the complexity of the case and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The court found no defence delay and determined that the Crown failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the case's complexity or the pandemic justified the additional 7 months of delay beyond the ceiling.

The court noted a lack of concrete steps by the Crown to minimize delay, including frequent changes in Crown attorneys and a general "culture of complacency." Consequently, the application was granted, and a stay of proceedings was entered.