N. Jackson

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operating a conveyance with blood alcohol exceeding 80mg after being observed acting bizarrely in a courthouse and driving erratically in the parking lot.

An Assistant Crown Attorney who witnessed the conduct in court reported his suspicions to police, who arrested the accused after observing slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and an improperly parked vehicle.

The accused advanced Charter applications under ss. 7, 8, and 9, arguing that his compelled courthouse attendance rendered his in-court conduct protected by the principle against self-incrimination, and that the police lacked reasonable grounds for detention and arrest.

All Charter applications were dismissed: the accused's conduct was not compelled, the police stop was connected to a highway safety purpose, and the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds.

As the merits of the charges were conceded if the Charter applications failed, findings of guilt were entered on both counts.

The appellant, an Uber driver, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in law by using the complainant's 911 call as a prior consistent statement to corroborate her trial testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the trial judge's reasons indicated the 911 call was impermissibly used as powerful confirmatory evidence of the commission of the offence, rather than for a permissible purpose such as assessing demeanour.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused brought an application to sever charges of sexual assault and assault from charges of assault, mischief, and criminal harassment, all involving the same complainant.

The accused argued that trying the counts together would cause prejudice by inviting propensity reasoning.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were factually and legally intertwined, the evidence was not complex, and a limiting instruction to the jury would adequately address any risk of prejudice.

The accused applied for the production of third-party records from a school board and a children's aid society relating to two complainants.

Having previously found the records likely relevant, the court proceeded to the second stage of the O'Connor application to determine whether production should be ordered.

Applying the principles from McNeil, the court balanced the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainants' privacy interests.

The court ordered the production of the records, subject to redactions for plainly irrelevant and highly sensitive personal information.

The accused, charged with historical domestic violence offences, brought an application under the common law O'Connor framework for the production of third-party records relating to two complainants.

The records were held by a school board and a children's aid society.

The court found that the accused met the first-stage threshold of demonstrating that the records were likely to be relevant to the complainants' credibility, given the unfolding of the allegations and the potential influence of a school social worker.

The court ordered the records produced for judicial inspection.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.