Seeta Scully

The accused was charged with 23 offences arising from four armed robberies at gunpoint and firearm possession charges.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of each robbery as similar act evidence to establish identity.

The court admitted the similar act evidence, finding striking similarities across all four robberies including the use of the same firearm, vehicle, clothing, and modus operandi.

The court convicted the accused of three counts of armed robbery, one count of attempted armed robbery, four counts of pointing a firearm, four counts of disguising face with intent to commit indictable offence, four counts of possessing a weapon for purpose of committing criminal offence, four counts of breaching a release order, and three firearm possession offences.

The accused was charged with four counts of assault, choking in the commission of an assault, sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and two counts of failing to comply with a release order.

The Crown's sole witness was the complainant, the accused's wife.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant was not a credible or reliable witness, with her evidence contradicted by multiple defence witnesses including the accused's cousin, sister, and mother.

The court accepted the accused's evidence and found the Crown had not proven any of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts, including the breach of release order charges, as the court found a lawful excuse existed given the accused's compromised medical condition following a motor vehicle accident and the complainant's deliberate breach of the release order by attending at the accused's residence.

The accused was charged with one count of assault and two counts of sexual assault.

The assault charge related to an incident on February 28, 2023, where the complainant alleged the accused made a threatening gesture toward her during an argument.

The two sexual assault charges related to alleged incidents in December 2006 and May-June 2013.

The trial proceeded by indictment before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding her reliance on "recovered memories" obtained through therapy sessions.

The court acquitted the accused on all three counts, finding that the Crown had not proven the essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

This endorsement clarifies a witness caution issued to the Crown's main witness, LSB, during an ongoing criminal trial for assault and sexual assault.

The caution restricted LSB from discussing her evidence with anyone except her criminal lawyer and therapist.

A motion for direction was brought by the accused's counsel, prompted by a Superior Court Justice's endorsement, seeking clarification regarding LSB's ability to discuss underlying events with her family law counsel for a separate, upcoming family law trial involving similar allegations.

The court declined to further modify the caution to specifically address family law proceedings, reiterating that LSB should seek independent legal advice for family law matters, and clarified the caution to explicitly prohibit LSB from discussing her criminal trial evidence with her family law counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice provided reasons for two evidentiary rulings made during a criminal trial for aggravated assault and assault.

First, the court granted the Crown's application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow a witness, Jaskeerat Singh Mann, to testify by videoconference, finding it appropriate given his personal circumstances, cost implications, and the nature of his evidence, which primarily involved introducing videos.

Second, the court permitted Samneet Guraya to give identification evidence from trial videos, determining that a Leaney Application was not required as she had a pre-existing relationship with the accused, placing her in a better position than the jury to identify them.

The applicant, charged with serious offences, sought to exclude a statement made to police while incarcerated, arguing violations of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and the common law voluntariness rule.

The court found no s. 10(b) violation as there was no change in jeopardy, but determined the statement was involuntary due to police trickery.

The police deliberately failed to give the primary caution, conducted the interview in English despite knowing the applicant's primary language was Punjabi, and exploited his vulnerability by interviewing him in jail after two weeks of incarceration.

The court disbelieved the officers' testimony that they "forgot" to give the caution.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.

The accused, N.B., was charged with sexual assault, exposing his genital organs to a person under 16, and sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose on the same complainant, A.W. N.B. pleaded not guilty and testified, denying the allegations.

The Crown argued that A.W.'s testimony was unshaken and corroborated.

The court found N.B. not credible but also identified significant inconsistencies and contradictions in the Crown's evidence, particularly A.W.'s account and the corroborating witnesses.

The court concluded that while "something bad" may have happened to A.W., the evidence was insufficient and unreliable to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

N.B. was found not guilty on all counts.

The applicant, Omar Al-Rubaye, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to a trial without unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 1762 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed periods of defence delay and exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

After deducting 574 days of defence delay and 450 days attributable to the pandemic, the remaining delay was 738 days (24.26 months), falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than reasonable, particularly given the impact of the pandemic on court operations.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant, M.A.M., was charged with multiple counts of assault and sexual assault against his wife and child.

The central issue was credibility.

The complainant was found to be an unreliable and evasive witness due to significant inconsistencies between her police statement and trial testimony, and her apparent willingness to minimize events.

While the defendant was also found not credible, the court could not make definite findings of fact due to the complainant's unreliability.

Consequently, all charges were dismissed as the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on three grounds: (1) breach of section 10(b) Charter rights to counsel; (2) failure to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code; and (3) loss of the presumption of accuracy under section 320.31(1).

The court found a breach of the right to counsel but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable despite a 14-minute delay at the police station.

The court found the breath test results admissible at common law and reliable, and convicted the defendant.

The accused was charged with numerous offences following a police investigation and arrest that led to the discovery of a loaded firearm and a substantial quantity of cocaine in a bedroom.

The defence applied for exclusion of the evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and found that the warrantless search of the residence by police violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the firearm and cocaine from evidence, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with being in care and control of a vehicle while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to exclude breath test evidence based on alleged Charter violations: improper wording of the caution under s. 10(b), delay in providing rights to counsel, failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice, and unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8.

The court found one Charter breach regarding the caution but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court also found the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, allowing reliance on the statutory presumption.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The global delay was 33 months and 6 days.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was caused by the applicant's own conduct, specifically breaching his bail conditions and intimidating the complainant, which necessitated new disclosure and an adjournment.

After subtracting the defence-caused delay, the net delay fell below the Jordan presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on a highway.

The defence alleged that the stop was based on racial profiling and constituted an arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the officer was honest in her testimony, the evidence demonstrated an absence of objective grounds for the detention and that the stop was motivated by non-conscious racial bias.

The court concluded that the officer's perception of the accused—a Black male driving early in the morning wearing a hooded sweatshirt with out-of-province license plates—unwittingly triggered non-conscious racial stereotyping.

The court excluded the breath analysis evidence as a result of the arbitrary detention.

The Crown applied for an order permitting witnesses residing outside Ontario to testify via video link in a sexual assault trial arising from an alleged incident on an international flight.

The defendant opposed the application, arguing it would be unfair to require him to attend in person while allowing prosecution witnesses to testify remotely.

The court granted the application for a secondary witness and an American witness but dismissed it for the complainant, finding insufficient evidence regarding technology quality and witness inconvenience, and concerns about the appearance of fairness given the defendant's out-of-province residence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with failing to stop and provide his name and address at the scene of an accident contrary to section 252 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called evidence from a civilian witness, three police officers, and an expert toxicologist.

The accused testified and raised Charter violations.

The court found no Charter breaches, rejected the accused's evidence regarding post-accident drinking as fabricated, and found the Crown proved the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court acquitted on the section 252 charge, finding the accused provided his cell phone number and did not intend to escape liability.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident to avoid civil or criminal liability.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised a bolus drinking theory, arguing that the accused consumed a large quantity of alcohol immediately before driving, such that his blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of operation.

On the failure to remain charge, the issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the scene with intent to escape liability.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, accepting his evidence regarding the timing and pattern of alcohol consumption and finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent in leaving the scene, particularly given his voluntary return within 35 minutes.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over .08 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a motion alleging breaches of her Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the applicant's right to counsel of choice under section 10(b) was breached when the police officer failed to inform the applicant of a third option to contact any lawyer and instead "foisted" duty counsel upon her without providing resources such as a lawyer's directory or internet access.

The court found that the officer's failure to comply with the informational component of the right to counsel of choice deprived the applicant of making a fully informed choice.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, finding that exclusion best served the long-term repute of the administration of justice, and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving).

He brought a motion to stay proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been breached.

The matter was arrested on July 2, 2015, with trial initially scheduled for June 16, 2016, but rescheduled to May 15, 2017 due to the defence's decision to call expert evidence regarding the approved instrument.

The total delay was 22 months and 10 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that even after deducting periods of defence delay, the total time to trial exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The court determined that the rescheduling was not caused solely by defence conduct and that the Crown's delayed disclosure of maintenance records contributed to the delay.

The court found a breach of section 11(b) and stayed the proceedings.