Seeta Scully

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with failing to stop and provide his name and address at the scene of an accident contrary to section 252 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called evidence from a civilian witness, three police officers, and an expert toxicologist.

The accused testified and raised Charter violations.

The court found no Charter breaches, rejected the accused's evidence regarding post-accident drinking as fabricated, and found the Crown proved the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court acquitted on the section 252 charge, finding the accused provided his cell phone number and did not intend to escape liability.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident to avoid civil or criminal liability.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised a bolus drinking theory, arguing that the accused consumed a large quantity of alcohol immediately before driving, such that his blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of operation.

On the failure to remain charge, the issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the scene with intent to escape liability.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, accepting his evidence regarding the timing and pattern of alcohol consumption and finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent in leaving the scene, particularly given his voluntary return within 35 minutes.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over .08 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a motion alleging breaches of her Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the applicant's right to counsel of choice under section 10(b) was breached when the police officer failed to inform the applicant of a third option to contact any lawyer and instead "foisted" duty counsel upon her without providing resources such as a lawyer's directory or internet access.

The court found that the officer's failure to comply with the informational component of the right to counsel of choice deprived the applicant of making a fully informed choice.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, finding that exclusion best served the long-term repute of the administration of justice, and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving).

He brought a motion to stay proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been breached.

The matter was arrested on July 2, 2015, with trial initially scheduled for June 16, 2016, but rescheduled to May 15, 2017 due to the defence's decision to call expert evidence regarding the approved instrument.

The total delay was 22 months and 10 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that even after deducting periods of defence delay, the total time to trial exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The court determined that the rescheduling was not caused solely by defence conduct and that the Crown's delayed disclosure of maintenance records contributed to the delay.

The court found a breach of section 11(b) and stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at the close of its case.

The trial proceeded on the failure to remain charge.

The Crown and defence conceded that the actus reus was established.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's conduct was accompanied by an intention to escape civil or criminal liability.

The court found that the accused's post-accident conduct—including parking behind a building, driving away from the scene, passing by a police station without stopping, and continuing to drive away—demonstrated an intent to escape liability.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he had changed his mind and intended to return to the scene.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80', arguing the trial judge erred by not excluding breathalyzer results under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach and that samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that failing to take breath samples as soon as practicable deprives the Crown of the statutory presumption of identity but does not automatically violate s. 8 of the Charter.

The court upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding the impact of the breach was minimal and society had an interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appeal was dismissed.

A 17-year-old accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference after engaging in sexual activity with a 12-year-old complainant.

The sole issue was whether the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age pursuant to section 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused asked the complainant her age and she stated she was 16.

The complainant presented herself as older through her appearance, behavior, social circle, and online presence.

Upon learning her true age, the accused immediately terminated the relationship.

The court acquitted the accused on both counts, finding he had taken reasonable steps to ascertain age and the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not meet his obligations under section 150.1(4).

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood following a traffic stop on May 11, 2012.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on three grounds: (1) that video surveillance of his consultation with duty counsel violated his Charter right to private consultation; (2) that there was insufficient evidence the breath samples were taken pursuant to a demand under section 254(3); and (3) that there were insufficient grounds for arrest and the breath demand.

The court found no Charter violation regarding the video surveillance, rejected the demand argument, and found reasonable grounds for the arrest.

However, the court concluded that while the evidence supported conviction on the exceed 80 charge, it fell short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the impaired driving charge.