Carolyn Gandy

The court acquitted TM of all charges, including assault, sexual assault, and assault with a weapon, after a judge-alone trial.

The decision turned on significant credibility and reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies, omissions, and changes over time, as well as a lack of corroboration.

The court also found that the evidence supported a plausible case of self-defence in relation to the alleged assault causing bodily harm to CW.

The ruling provides a detailed analysis of the law on credibility, reasonable doubt, and self-defence, and addresses the impact of trauma and racial context on the assessment of post-offence conduct.

The court sentenced Sukhraj Singh, who pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, to two years less a day to be served as a conditional sentence in the community, followed by two years of probation.

The decision reviews the relevant sentencing principles, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the applicable case law, ultimately finding that a conditional sentence is appropriate given the offender’s background, addiction, and compliance with strict bail conditions for four years.

The Superior Court of Justice provided reasons for two evidentiary rulings made during a criminal trial for aggravated assault and assault.

First, the court granted the Crown's application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow a witness, Jaskeerat Singh Mann, to testify by videoconference, finding it appropriate given his personal circumstances, cost implications, and the nature of his evidence, which primarily involved introducing videos.

Second, the court permitted Samneet Guraya to give identification evidence from trial videos, determining that a Leaney Application was not required as she had a pre-existing relationship with the accused, placing her in a better position than the jury to identify them.

The applicant, charged with serious offences, sought to exclude a statement made to police while incarcerated, arguing violations of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel and the common law voluntariness rule.

The court found no s. 10(b) violation as there was no change in jeopardy, but determined the statement was involuntary due to police trickery.

The police deliberately failed to give the primary caution, conducted the interview in English despite knowing the applicant's primary language was Punjabi, and exploited his vulnerability by interviewing him in jail after two weeks of incarceration.

The court disbelieved the officers' testimony that they "forgot" to give the caution.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.

The accused, Jasgeen Singh, was charged with robbery under section 344 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown alleged that Singh stole a vehicle and used violence against a passenger, Bhawana, to overcome her resistance to the theft.

The defence challenged the identification of Singh as the perpetrator and argued that the violence occurred after the theft was complete.

The court found the identification evidence, including surveillance video and a key fob found on the accused, to be overwhelming.

It also determined that the struggle for a cell phone and the physical push of Bhawana from the vehicle constituted sufficient violence, occurring contemporaneously with the theft.

Singh was found guilty of robbery.

The accused, Mr. Singh, was charged with possession of stolen property and dangerous driving.

The court considered two main issues: identification for the dangerous driving charge and knowledge/control for the possession charge.

The Crown had to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the identification evidence for dangerous driving unreliable due to its generic nature, the fleeting opportunity for observation, and the delay in the officer's note-taking, leading to an acquittal on that count.

For the possession charge, despite the doctrine of recent possession and the accused providing a false name, the court found no evidence that Mr. Singh had control over the stolen vehicle, as he was merely a passenger.

Consequently, Mr. Singh was acquitted on both counts.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion for a Mareva injunction.

The Plaintiff had brought a second Mareva injunction motion, which was largely resolved on an uncontested basis.

The parties disagreed on whether the resulting order was on consent and who should bear the costs.

The Plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, while the Defendant sought costs against the Plaintiff, including personally against his counsel, alleging improper transfers of funds.

The court found the Defendant to be the successful party on the motion, though with mixed success, and awarded her $7,500.00 in partial indemnity costs from the Plaintiff.

The court declined to order costs against the Plaintiff's counsel personally, emphasizing the high threshold for such awards.

The court fixed costs for a successful motion to strike brought by the plaintiff.

The defendant sought full indemnity costs, but the court limited the award to partial indemnity, finding no conduct warranting enhanced costs.

Considering the motion's simplicity, discrete issues, and some duplication in counsel's work, the court awarded the amount the plaintiff was prepared to pay, $3,606.50, as reasonable partial indemnity costs.

The court fixed costs for a pre-discovery document production motion in a case-managed proceeding.

The defendant, who sought additional document production, was deemed the more successful party, though not entirely successful.

The plaintiff's unreasonable positions regarding document relevance and production obligations were found to have lengthened the motion.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments against a costs award based on the informal, letter-based process or the defendant's prior unpaid costs orders.

Partial indemnity costs of $1,000.00 were awarded to the defendant, with the possibility of set-off against any costs owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.

In a case management motion regarding pre-discovery production, the defendant sought various financial, communication, and personal records from the plaintiff.

The underlying action involved allegations of fraud and breach of contract arising from a relationship that began with the defendant providing sexual services to the plaintiff.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce bank statements, credit card statements, communications records, and tax notices of assessment from 2014 to 2019, finding them relevant to the disputed timeline of the relationship.

Requests for broader financial records and documents relating to the plaintiff's separation from his wife were narrowed or deferred.