ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-0455-00
DATE: 2020 11 05
BETWEEN:
DAVID BACCHUS
Norman Groot for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff
- and -
SARA LORRAINE MUNN,
JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and DOE CORPORATIONS
Howard Cohen, Carolyn Gandy and Sabrina Waraich for the Defendants
Defendants
HEARD: In Writing
REASONS FOR DECISION
LEMAY J
[1] The Plaintiff and Defendant were in a relationship of some nature. The nature of the relationship remains to be determined. Both parties agree that the relationship started out with the Defendant providing sexual services to the Plaintiff. The Defendant says that the relationship never changed. The Plaintiff says that the relationship did change, and that they were planning a life together, but that life together fell apart when the Defendant defrauded him of considerable amounts of money.
[2] I am case-managing this action and have been since August 2020. As part of the case management process, a discovery plan has been imposed, and discoveries were scheduled to take place today and tomorrow.
[3] The Plaintiff has moved under Rule 21 and Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, to strike a series of allegations that the Defendant has made in her pleadings about the sexual relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant as well as the Plaintiff’s alleged sexual proclivities. The Plaintiff asserts that these allegations are scandalous, vexatious or frivolous within the meaning of Rule 25. In the alternative, the Plaintiff alleges that these allegations disclose no reasonable defence, and should be struck out under Rule 21.
[4] The Defendant argues that these allegations provide context to the relationship between the parties, which goes to the heart of the Plaintiff’s claim. In addition, the Defendant argues that removing these pleadings would create an artificial set of facts and remove facts that are essential to the Defendant’s defence.
[5] For the reasons that follow, I am dismissing this motion under both Rules 25 and 21. There is nothing frivolous, scandalous or vexatious in the Defendant’s pleadings. Further, I agree with the Defendant that the impugned paragraphs go to the heart of her explanation as to the nature of this relationship. The Defendant should be permitted to explore these facts through the discovery process.
[6] I hasten to add that I make no finding as to whether either side’s facts are true. Indeed, that is a key point behind my ruling. At this stage in the process, there is no basis to limit the Defendant from advancing these issues because I do not know whether her facts are true or false. Particularly for the Rule 21 motion, I must assume that the facts advanced by the Defendant are true.
[7] I have set out my reasons for my conclusions below.
Overview of the Issues and Impugned Pleadings
[8] There is a series of pleadings relating to details of the sexual relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that the Plaintiff seeks to strike from the Defendant’s Statement of Defence and Counterclaim.
[9] The impugned paragraphs from the Statement of Defence state as follows:
During their encounters, Munn was instructed to alter her appearance with the aid of particular costumes, including a school uniform and low-heeled shoes, consistent with the attire of an adolescent female, and was instructed to perform various sexual acts upon the Plaintiff.
Bacchus also demanded that Munn act as though impressed by the size of his penis, notwithstanding the fact that his penis is demonstrably small. Bacchus would demand Munn put on a high-pitched voice to make her seem like a young girl. In this high-pitched voice, Munn would be forced to constantly exaggerate the size, shape and look of the Plaintiffs penis. The Plaintiff would also demand that the Defendant constantly exaggerate the rigidity of his penis, despite the fact that Bacchus had trouble achieving a full erection.
Bacchus insisted Munn refer to him as “Daddy” during the performance of sexual acts.
During roleplay, the Plaintiff would demand that Munn tell him, “all the girls at school would consider her lucky to be with him.”
When the Plaintiff and Munn began engaging in overnight stays, the Plaintiff typically required Munn to wear children’s pyjamas. In the beginning, Bacchus required that Munn watch schoolgirl pornographic videos to demonstrate the type of behaviour the Plaintiff expected of Munn.
Munn never achieved fulfilment or satisfaction during the course of any of her sexual encounters with the Plaintiff. On approximately 20-30% of encounters with the Plaintiff, Munn felt obliged to feign an orgasm, for the satisfaction of the Plaintiff and with the primary objective of terminating the sexual encounter.
Due to a physiological issue stemming from the irregular development of cervical cells, Munn did not maintain a birth-control regimen.
During public outings with one another, Munn observed Bacchus’ sexual attraction towards adolescent girls.
[10] The impugned paragraphs from the Defendant’s Counterclaim state as follows:
Munn’s professional relationship with Bacchus was centered around satisfying Bacchus’ adolescent schoolgirl obsession.
As outlined in the Plaintiffs Statement of Defence, Munn was forced to remain in the role as an adolescent girl for much of the time she spent with the Defendant, including outside sexual interactions. Such occasions include being forced to wear children’s pyjamas to bed, or having to pretend her voice was unnaturally high-pitched, to sound like a child.
These sexual practices, that became routine for Munn in order to please Bacchus’ fetish, inflicted damage on Munn that will likely take years of counselling to ameliorate.
Munn was the victim of a serious sexual assault when she was 12. Bacchus’ fetish had a particularly negative impact on Munn’s psyche.
That is, to say, Munn began taking notice of Bacchus’ proclivities. Habitually, he would exhibit signs of sexual attraction to adolescent girls when they were out in public. This would include Bacchus openly leering at young girls in the mall, making no effort to hide his behaviour from Munn, despite her reaction of disgust. The Plaintiff would bring Munn to “Pink” (a retail store tailored to adolescent girls and young women) on shopping expeditions. While Munn shopped, the Plaintiff would follow young girls around the shop observing them while they shopped for lingerie, swim and loungewear.
Munn reassured herself that by playing the role required of her, she was preventing Bacchus from seeking out girls that were under the age of consent.
Bacchus was aware of Munn’s traumatic childhood, including the fact that she was raped at the age of 12, and insisted on her fulfilling his fetish anyway.
[11] Having set out the impugned pleadings, I now turn to the relevant background. In setting out the background summary, I am not intending to find facts. I am simply setting out what the pleadings say, and what appear to be the issues between the parties in this action.
Background
a) The Parties and the History of the Relationship
[12] In my reasons on a motion on pre-discovery production (2020 ONSC 6548), I set out some of the underlying allegations in this case. I will review some of the key allegations in order to provide context for the issues on this motion. I note that these are only allegations from the pleadings, and I am not making any findings of fact.
[13] I start with the parties. The Plaintiff is a businessman, and is in his mid-50s. At the time the relationship started, he was married. He has two children. The Plaintiff alleges that he was having marital difficulties prior to the commencement of the parties’ relationship.
[14] The Defendant is in her early 30s, and worked in the sex trade when she met the Plaintiff. The Defendant alleges that she had a difficult childhood, including having been sexually assaulted when she was twelve years old.
[15] The parties have a dispute about when their relationship started. The Plaintiff says it was sometime in 2017, while the Defendant says it was sometime in 2014. The parties agree, however, that the relationship started with the Plaintiff paying the Defendant for sexual services.
[16] The Plaintiff alleges that the relationship quickly turned into a traditional relationship. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant told him, in mid-2017, that she had fallen in love with him and wanted to leave the escort business. The Plaintiff alleges that he had proposed to the Defendant in 2018 and provided her with an engagement ring, and that the Defendant had accepted this proposal.
[17] The Defendant alleges that, at some point in 2017 or 2018, the Plaintiff asked for an exclusive relationship and agreed to pay the Defendant an annual wage, plus expenses, for that exclusivity. The Defendant claims to have agreed to this exclusivity as it provided her with some stability. As a result of this arrangement, the Defendant gave up her other escort clients. With respect to the engagement ring, the Defendant alleges that she never wore it and that she ultimately rejected the Plaintiff’s proposal. In other words, from the Defendant’s perspective, the relationship remained a business transaction.
[18] The Plaintiff alleges that, once the parties entered into an exclusive relationship and agreed to eventually be married, he provided the Defendant with a series of what he refers to as specific purpose loans. The total sum of money that was allegedly loaned by the Plaintiff to the Defendant is in excess of $800,000.
[19] These funds included sums towards the purchase of a property in Stoney Creek. The purchase of the property closed this summer. The Plaintiff says that the Stoney Creek property was intended for both of them to live in and that they were both to be on title to the property eventually. The Defendant says that the Stoney Creek property was never intended to be shared with the Plaintiff.
[20] The Defendant alleges that, after the proposal in 2018, the Plaintiff became more aggressive towards her. Specifically, the Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff had begun to engage in non-consensual physical and verbal aggression towards the Defendant during sexual relations, including choking. The Defendant alleges that this behavior continued to get worse over a period of time shortly before the beginning of 2019.
[21] At the beginning of 2019, while waiting for the Stoney Creek property to close, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant told him she would be working for Carnival Cruise Lines in Miami on a one year contract. During 2019, the Plaintiff and the Defendant did not see each other in person more than once or twice. During this time, the Plaintiff alleges that he continued to cover expenses for the Defendant. There is also an allegation by the Plaintiff that the Defendant was added to his credit card in 2019, and then proceeded to charge significant unauthorized expenses to his credit card.
[22] In the fall of 2019, the Plaintiff concluded (apparently correctly) that the Defendant was not working for Carnival Cruises. The Defendant alleges that she had feared for her safety and had decided that she wanted to distance herself from the Plaintiff for the reasons described above. As a result, she told the Plaintiff she was working for Carnival Cruises when she was actually still living in Hamilton.
[23] However, during the course of 2019, the Defendant continued a long-distance relationship with the Plaintiff. This long-distance relationship included continuing to see each other through videoconferencing on a regular basis, including (according to the Defendant) engaging in sexual acts during internet video conferences. The relationship ended shortly after the Plaintiff discovered that the Defendant had not been working for Carnival Cruises out of Miami and had been continuing to reside in the Hamilton area.
[24] The Plaintiff is claiming damages in fraud or, alternatively, in breach of contract on the basis of the Defendant’s false representations respecting their relationship. In particular, the Plaintiff alleges that the significant monies that he provided to the Defendant between 2017 and 2019 were loans, and that the purchase of the property in Stoney Creek was for their mutual benefit.
[25] In essence, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant engaged in a “nefarious and years-long campaign of a fake and false relationship…. to extract significant funds from him”. The claims the Plaintiff advances are based on fraud and presumably fraudulent misrepresentation. There are a whole series of other causes of action, both in tort and in contract, that are advanced by the Plaintiff in his claim. In particular, the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive, exemplary and aggravated damages is based on the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendant extracted money from him “through a malicious manipulation of the Plaintiff’s love for [the Defendant] and his intention to build a future with” her.
[26] The Defendant, on the other hand, claims that the relationship was purely a financial one throughout, and that the gifts that she received from the Plaintiff were either in the nature of services rendered or in the nature of actual gifts. As a result, the Defendant claims that these gifts and/or payments for services do not have to be repaid. As a result, she seeks to have the Plaintiff’s claim dismissed.
[27] The Defendant has also brought a counterclaim for the intentional infliction of emotional harm, anxiety and distress. This claim includes a claim for punitive and aggravated damages. In particular, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiff coerced her into undergoing breast reduction surgery to satisfy his “sexually aberrant proclivities”.
[28] In assessing the Defendant’s claim of “intentional infliction of emotional harm”, I have concluded (based on the supplementary submissions) that both parties acknowledge that this is really a claim for intention infliction of mental stress as defined by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care ((2002) 2002 CanLII 45005 (ON CA), 60 O.R. (3d) 474).
[29] The Defendant also claims negligence, although that is not specifically pled in her counterclaim. Finally, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiff has harassed her, and claims damages on account of that harassment. This is a claim in tort, and I will consider it as such.
b) The Procedure
[30] As I have noted, I am case-managing this action. We are working through various pieces of a discovery plan, and the parties have discoveries scheduled for the end of the first week of November.
[31] As a result, at the case management conference at the beginning of October, the parties acceded to my suggestion that the Plaintiff’s motion to strike portions of the Defendant’s pleadings should be dealt with in writing. The parties have provided me with various documents, and I have considered those in my decision.
[32] However, I should note that the Plaintiff originally sought to bring this motion only under Rule 21. Rules 25 and 21 are somewhat related. In addition, many of the allegations being advanced by the Plaintiff were focused on the alleged frivolous, scandalous or vexatious nature of the impugned pleadings. Therefore, I was of the view that the Plaintiff should be required to move under both Rules. As the case management judge, I was not prepared to permit the Plaintiff to attempt to bring two motions in respect of the pleadings.
[33] Once I received the parties submissions, I invited them to make further submissions on the decisions in Merrifield v. Canada (Attorney General) 2019 ONCA 205 and Saadati v. Moorhead 2017 SCC 28. In particular, I was interested in the parties positions on the tort of the intentional infliction of mental suffering, as well as the apparent overlap in the pleadings with the Defendant’s claim of harassment. I received further submissions dealing with these issues, as well as the issue of negligence. The Plaintiff also sought to strike other paragraphs of the Defendant’s pleadings in his supplementary submissions. Although those requests were procedurally irregular, I have determined that they should be addressed on their merits.
Issues
[34] There are two issues that present themselves in this case:
a) Should the impugned pleadings be struck out under Rule 25.11?
b) Should the impugned pleadings be struck out under Rule 21 as disclosing no reasonable defence?
[35] I will deal with each issue in turn.
Issue #1 – Striking the Pleadings Under Rule 25
[36] As I noted, the Plaintiff moved under this Rule in response to my invitation to do so at this point or lose his right to move under this Rule. Rule 25.11 states that a pleading may be struck out if it:
a) May prejudice or delay the fair trial of an action;
b) Is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or
c) Is an abuse of process of the Court.
[37] Rule 25.11 has been discussed in numerous cases. In Aviva Canada Inc. v. Lyons Auto Body Limited, 2019 ONSC 6778, 1 C.C.L.I. (6th) 60, at paras. 35-36, Perell J. summarized the uses and purposes of Rule 25.11 as follows:
[35] A claim may be found to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process when it asserts untenable pleas, is argumentative, contains insufficient material facts to support the allegations made, or is made for an extraneous or collateral purpose.
[36] For the purpose of rule 25.11, the term “scandalous”, includes allegations that are irrelevant, argumentative, simply inserted for colour or to impugn the behaviour or character of the other party unrelated to the issues in the litigation. A pleading that raises an issue that cannot influence the outcome of the action is scandalous. The pleading is struck out because it serves no purpose other than to add colour or argument and to disconcert or humiliate the opponent. The rule authorizing the court to strike out a pleading as prejudicial, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the process of the court is exercised only in the clearest of cases. [Citations omitted.]
[38] With these principles in mind, I now turn to an analysis of whether the impugned pleadings should be struck under Rule 25.11.
[39] The parties disagree over the nature of their relationship. That much is clear from the pleadings. The Plaintiff has one version of the relationship, while the Defendant has a different version.
[40] The Plaintiff, citing Seguin v. Van Dyke, 2011 ONSC 2566, [2011] O.J. No. 1931, per Master MacLeod, argues that the Defendant should not be permitted to unnecessarily defame him in her pleadings. While I accept the principles in Seguin, I do not view the Defendant’s pleadings as unjustly defaming the Plaintiff on their face.
[41] Instead, the Defendant is advancing her own understanding of the relationship. The intimate details of the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant may very well be relevant to the Court’s ultimate characterization of that relationship. For example, the Defendant’s description of the Plaintiff’s proclivities and desire for role-play as well as her intimate experiences with the Plaintiff, if accepted by the trier of fact, could be used as proof of the Defendant’s assertion that the parties had no more than a business relationship and that the Defendant always intended to keep the relationship at a business level.
[42] Similarly, the Defendant’s description of the intimate details of her relationship with the Plaintiff could be relevant to her claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering. In particular, the Defendant’s allegation that the Plaintiff knew that she had been sexually assaulted at the age of 12, combined with the impugned allegations set out above, could lead to a finding that the Plaintiff had intentionally inflicted mental suffering on the Defendant. I hasten to add, however, that I am making no finding that such a claim would succeed. At this stage, however, it is impossible to find that the impugned pleadings should be struck out under Rule 25.
[43] As a result, the Plaintiff’s motion under Rule 25 is dismissed.
Issue #2 – Rule 21
[44] Rule 21 requires the application of a different test. However, the underlying facts are the same. The Plaintiff moves under Rule 21.01(1)(b), which allows a party to move before a judge to “strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence.”
[45] The test for determining whether a pleading can be struck under Rule 21.01(1)(b) is to determine, assuming that the facts set out in the pleading can be proven, whether it is plain and obvious that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed. See Aviva Canada, at paras. 28-29; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, at p. 980; and Vaseloff v. Leo, 2014 ONSC 5227, 5 E.T.R. (4th) 84, at para. 10.
[46] Although this motion has been brought after the delivery of a Statement of Defence, the failure to bring the motion sooner is not fatal to the motion. Generally, however, a Defendant should move to strike a claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) before delivering a Statement of Defence. See Arsenijevich v. Ontario (Provincial Police), 2019 ONCA 150, [2019] O.J. No. 1021, at para. 7. I am not persuaded that the Defendant’s pleadings, including the counterclaim reach the “facially deficient and largely incomprehensible” standard set out by the Court of Appeal in Arsenijevich. However, I will address the Rule 21 motion on its merits.
[47] The Plaintiff’s argument under this rule is, in essence, that the Plaintiff and the Defendant engaged in a willing sexual relationship. From the Plaintiff’s perspective, “the matter that is in dispute is the basis of [sic] which the Plaintiff provided funds to the [Defendant].”
[48] The problem with the Plaintiff’s position is that the basis on which the Plaintiff provided funds to the Defendant is an issue in dispute. The Plaintiff claims that it was because they were specific purpose loans provided because the Defendant misrepresented their relationship. The Defendant asserts, on the other hand, that the relationship was always a business transaction and, as a result, all of the money that she received was either monies earned for services rendered or gifts.
[49] When the difference between the parties is put this way, it is clear that the Defendant’s allegations are at least possibly relevant to the issues in dispute. The Defendant may be able to demonstrate that the monies she received were on account of services rendered.
[50] More importantly, the Plaintiff alleges that the parties had a mutually exclusive and permanent relationship. The Defendant’s allegations, if proven, would tend to support the conclusion that the Defendant had never intended to enter into anything other than a business relationship with the Plaintiff. To put it bluntly, the Defendant is asserting that the Plaintiff had fetishes that she found disgusting and that the Plaintiff was unable to provide her with any intimate pleasure. These assertions could support her view that the relationship was a purely business transaction.
[51] The Plaintiff also argues that the scope of the examinations of both parties might be substantially broadened if I do not strike these pleadings. That is possible, but it is a question to be determined if there are any refusals at discoveries. It is not a reason to preclude the Plaintiff from advancing these allegations, especially when they may be relevant to the claims advanced by both parties.
[52] I do not reach any conclusion on whether the Defendant’s assertions can be proven at trial or whether these allegations can be used to infer the points that the Defendant is arguing. Those are questions for the trier of fact. However, on this motion I conclude that it is not plain and obvious that the Defendant’s factual assertions cannot support the causes of action advanced by the Defendant in her counterclaim. Similarly, it is not plain and obvious that the Defendant’s assertions cannot be relied upon in her defence of the Plaintiff’s claims.
[53] In particular, there is the Defendant’s claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering. The requirements for establishing this claim were set out in Prinzo, supra (at para 48). A claimant is required to establish conduct that:
a) Is flagrant and outrageous;
b) Is calculated to produce harm; and
c) Results in visible and provable illness.
[54] A reading of the pleadings that the Defendant has set out might support the elements of this claim. Indeed, the Plaintiff states that he is not alleging that the Defendant has failed to properly plead her claim of intentional infliction of mental stress. This claim should, therefore, continue. However, once a finding is made that this claim should continue, much of the Defendant’s description of the relationship between the parties becomes at least arguably relevant to a consideration of this claim.
[55] This brings me to the Defendant’s claims for the tort of harassment. Counsel for the Plaintiff rightly points out that the decision in Merrifield, supra did not recognize the tort of harassment. The Plaintiff also argues that “the tort of harassment is not recognized in Ontario in any forum/any fact scenario.” This is a much broader interpretation of Merrifield than a reading of the decision supports.
[56] In Merrifield, the Court of Appeal was faced with a harassment case that arose out of the context of the employment relationship. The Court of Appeal found that the employment relationship was not the type of relationship that a tort of harassment should apply to, in part because of the similarity between the proposed tort of harassment and the tort of the intentional infliction of mental stress, which I have discussed above.
[57] The Court of Appeal then concluded (at para 53) that “we do not foreclose the development of a properly conceived tort of harassment that might apply in appropriate contexts.” The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is different than a typical employer-employee relationship. As a result, it is possible that the Defendant may be able to provide a different factual and legal basis for a Court to recognize the tort of harassment.
[58] I acknowledge the concern that, as in Merrifield, intention infliction of mental stress is being advanced in this case as well. However, the context of this relationship is sufficiently unique that I am not prepared to preclude the Defendant from advancing a claim for the tort of harassment at this stage of the litigation. It is not “plain and obvious” that the Defendant’s claim will not succeed.
[59] It is possible, as noted by the Defendant, that the Courts might apply the principles in Jones v. Tsige (2012 ONCA 32) and conclude that this is an area where there is an emerging acceptance of claims in a developing area of the law. The legal rights of sex trade workers in Canada have changed significantly in the past twenty years. A more robust record is necessary to determine whether the Defendant’s claim should (or should not) proceed.
[60] This brings me to the allegations of assault and battery, and the Plaintiff’s claims that paragraph 1(d) and (f) should be struck because they plead elements of battery. I see no reason why this should be done, as it does not change the case either party has to meet in any significant way. It is not the Court’s role to edit a party’s pleadings.
[61] Finally, there is the Defendant’s counterclaim for negligence. Counsel for the Plaintiff asks that “this Court’s endorsement expressly indicate that [the Defendant’s] claim does not include a negligence allegation.” There are two problems with this request.
[62] First, although negligence is not specifically pled by the Defendant, it is certainly (as she argues) implicit in much of her pleadings. For example, at paragraph 32 of the Counterclaim, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff “breached his duty of care by failing to consider…”. It is clear from this part of the pleading alone that the
[63] Second, if I make that finding, then the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly permit the amendment of a pleading unless prejudice would result that cannot be compensated for by costs or an adjournment (see Rule 26.01). Given my finding that negligence was clearly implicit in the Defendant’s pleadings, it is difficult to see what prejudice the Plaintiff has suffered at this stage of the action. In any event, however, any prejudice that exists can be addressed through the case management process.
[64] Specifically, the Plaintiff has indicated that he wishes to assert his defences to the tort of negligence. Specifically, he wishes to rely on the Negligence Act R.S.O. 1990 c N.1 and the defence of contributory negligence. I see no reason why the Plaintiff should not be permitted to amend his Statement of Claim to specifically address those issues if he wishes to do so.
[65] That being said, the pleading is not clear on its face and it should be. As a result, I am also requiring the Defendant to either amend her Counterclaim to specifically include a claim for negligence in the relief section of her claim.
[66] In light of all of the foregoing, the Plaintiff’s motion is dismissed on the condition that the Defendant amend her pleadings to specifically claim negligence. Once that amendment is made, then the Plaintiff may amend his claim to address the issues set out in paragraph 64, supra.
Conclusion and Costs
[67] For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s motion to strike portions of the Defendant’s pleadings under Rules 25.11 and 21.01(1)(b) is dismissed, subject to the requirements set out in paragraphs 65 and 66.
[68] This brings me to the subject of costs. The parties are encouraged to agree on the costs of this motion. Failing agreement, the timetable for costs is as follows:
a) The Defendant is to provide her costs submissions within ten (10) calendar days of the release of these reasons. Those costs submissions are to be no longer than two (2) single-spaced pages, exclusive of bills of costs, offers to settle and case-law.
b) The Plaintiff is to provide his responding costs submissions within ten (10) days of receiving the Defendant’s costs submissions. Those costs submissions are to be no longer than two (2) single-spaced pages, exclusive of bills of costs, offers to settle and case-law.
c) There are to be no reply submissions without my leave.
d) The parties are to file these submissions electronically with the Court office. In addition, a copy of those submissions is to be provided to my judicial assistant. The parties have her email address.
e) The deadlines for costs submissions may not be extended, even on consent, without my leave. If no costs submissions (or requests for extensions) are received in accordance with the deadlines set out above, there will be no costs.
f) Costs submissions are to be filed with the Registrar’s office through the electronic portal. The parties are also to ensure that my judicial assistant receives a copy of their submissions.
[69] The parties are reminded that this motion involved discrete narrow issues, and was completed based on the letters and other pre-existing documentation provided by counsel. I would not expect the costs of this motion to be particularly significant, and I would not expect the costs to include any of the preparation time for the larger file. Those larger preparation costs will be accounted for at the end of the action.
LEMAY J
Released: November 5, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-0455-00
DATE: 2020 11 05
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
DAVID BACCHUS
Plaintiff
- and -
SARA LORRAINE MUNN,
JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and DOE CORPORATIONS
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEMAY J
Released: November 5, 2020