D.F. McLeod

This decision addresses a Charter challenge to the validity of a search warrant issued under section 487 of the Criminal Code, focusing on whether the affiant met the duty of full, fair, and frank disclosure in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court analyzed material omissions and misstatements in the ITO, including failure to disclose surveillance results, geographic origins of IP addresses, and pending production order results.

The affiant’s conduct was scrutinized for good faith, with the court finding that while there was no deliberate intent to mislead, the cumulative omissions undermined the integrity of the warrant process.

The warrant was ultimately quashed, and evidence excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter to preserve the justice system’s integrity.

This decision concerns the sentencing of J.B., a young Black male, for serious offences stemming from a pharmacy robbery.

The court applied principles from the Youth Criminal Justice Act and general sentencing principles, with a particular focus on the impact of anti-Black racism and the role of Enhanced Pre-Sentence Reports (EPSRs).

The court considered aggravating factors such as the seriousness of the offence and harm to victims, alongside mitigating factors including J.B.'s troubled upbringing, exposure to systemic racism, and his newfound role as a father.

Despite the Crown seeking a custodial sentence, the court imposed a non-custodial sentence of 24 months probation with various conditions, emphasizing rehabilitation and reintegration while acknowledging the systemic barriers faced by racialized individuals.

The defendant, Upkaran Sandhu, pleaded guilty to some counts and was acquitted on others, including the main charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found Mr. Sandhu's testimony credible, accepting his explanation that he was a heroin addict who supported his habit with a substantial inheritance.

Despite the presence of drugs and paraphernalia, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession was for trafficking, as the evidence was consistent with personal use by an addict with financial means.

The accused, Malik Ahmad, was charged with manslaughter following a physical altercation at a mall that resulted in the death of Mr. Baig due to a catastrophic head injury.

The Crown alleged a consent fight where Ahmad pushed Baig, causing him to fall and hit his head.

The defence argued insufficient evidence of an unlawful act or intent to cause serious bodily harm.

The court found that while an altercation occurred and Baig's death was caused by hitting his head, there was no conclusive evidence to determine what precipitated the fall (e.g., push, punch, slip).

The court also gave less weight to the expert medical testimony regarding certain facial injuries due to a lack of information on medical intervention at the scene.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused the death unlawfully and acquitted him.

The defendant was charged with assault perpetrated on his girlfriend.

The Crown sought to rely on a 911 call made by the complainant as evidence, as the complainant did not testify at trial.

The court considered whether the 911 call fell within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and whether the necessity criterion was met.

The court found that while the call was made under stress and related to the alleged assault, there was insufficient evidence to establish that there was little or no possibility of concoction or fabrication.

Additionally, the Crown failed to establish that the necessity criterion was met, as no evidence was presented regarding efforts to secure the complainant's attendance at trial.

The court excluded the 911 call and acquitted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample analysis results.

The defendant challenged the positioning of the police cruiser, the placement of the defendant in the police vehicle for testing, and the adequacy of the right to counsel.

The court found no Charter violations regarding the cruiser positioning or placement in the vehicle.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to produce the required certificate from an analyst attesting to the accuracy of the alcohol standard solution used to calibrate the breathalyzer device.

Without this certificate, the court could not rely on the breath sample readings and entered an acquittal.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, possession for the purpose of publication of child pornography, and sexual assault of a young child.

The offences occurred between May 7 and May 23, 2017.

The accused, who was the father of the victim, took photographs of his young son's genitalia and distributed them online.

The court imposed a sentence of three years and six months imprisonment, with ancillary orders including a lifetime SOIRA registration, a ten-year section 161 order, forfeiture of electronic devices, and a five-year firearms prohibition.

The court emphasized the serious breach of trust inherent in the offences and the vulnerability of the young victim.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop on a highway.

The defence alleged that the stop was based on racial profiling and constituted an arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the officer was honest in her testimony, the evidence demonstrated an absence of objective grounds for the detention and that the stop was motivated by non-conscious racial bias.

The court concluded that the officer's perception of the accused—a Black male driving early in the morning wearing a hooded sweatshirt with out-of-province license plates—unwittingly triggered non-conscious racial stereotyping.

The court excluded the breath analysis evidence as a result of the arbitrary detention.

The accused was charged with drug and driving-related offences arising from his interaction with a co-accused.

The Crown's case relied on intercepted phone calls, surveillance evidence, and the discovery of a large quantity of drugs in the accused's vehicle following a high-speed chase.

The central issues were knowledge and credibility.

The accused testified that he was unaware of any drugs being brought into the country, that he was merely assisting his friend's brother with accommodation and transportation, and that he believed he was being chased by dangerous individuals rather than police officers.

The court found the accused's testimony compelling and credible, and determined that the Crown had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge of the drugs or consent to their transportation.

An acquittal was entered on all counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing 7 kilograms of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

At sentencing, the court considered the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody endured by the accused, including 115 days of lockdown (approximately one-third of his custody time), double bunking, denial of religious accommodation, and significant mental health impacts.

The Crown sought 7 years and 5.5 months; the defence sought 6 years and 5 months with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 years and 10 months, applying enhanced credit of 29 months for pre-sentence custody conditions, resulting in a further sentence of 4 years and 7 months to be served in federal penitentiary.

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual assault involving minors.

The offences occurred over an extended period and involved multiple victims who were under the offender's authority as a coach and mentor.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 10 months for one count, 8 months as a conditional sentence for another count, and 5 months for the third count, all to be served consecutively.

The court emphasized that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the breach of trust, grooming behaviour, and vulnerability of the victims.

The offender was also subject to DNA sampling, sex offender registration for 20 years, a 2-year probation order with conditions including sex offender counselling, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused, a taxi driver, was charged with sexual assault against a woman with Cerebral Palsy during a specialized transportation service on July 1, 2013.

The complainant alleged the accused intentionally touched her breasts while ostensibly loosening her seatbelt.

The accused testified he accidentally grazed her chest while losing his footing while attempting to untangle a tangled seatbelt.

The trial judge found both witnesses credible but their accounts were in stark opposition.

With no independent witnesses, forensic evidence, or strong testimonial inconsistencies, the judge could not reach a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and entered an acquittal.

The defendant was charged with failing to provide a breath sample contrary to Section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant claimed the statutory defence of "reasonable excuse," arguing that his emotional state prevented him from complying with the demand.

The court found that while the defendant was nervous during the police interaction, his anxiety did not constitute a marked departure from that of a reasonable person in similar circumstances.

The court rejected the defence and found the defendant guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the admissibility of statements made to police at the accident scene, arguing they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible as a violation of the right to remain silent under section 7 of the Charter.

The court found that the accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he held an honest and reasonably held belief that he was required by law to report the accident.

The accused's testimony regarding his knowledge of the Highway Traffic Act was found to be not credible, and his statements were therefore admitted into evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood.

He brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 7 and 11(b) due to unreasonable delay.

The trial was scheduled approximately 14 months after arrest.

The court applied the Morin framework to assess the reasonableness of the delay, considering the length of delay, waivers, reasons for delay (including actions of the accused, crown, and institutional resources), and prejudice to the accused.

The court found that the accused's Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated and granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams in 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights to counsel were properly informed and whether the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was satisfied.

The Crown conducted an approved screening device (ASD) demand approximately 13 minutes after the initial traffic stop.

The defence argued that the accused was not provided with his rights to counsel at the roadside and that the delay in administering the ASD violated the forthwith requirement.

The court found that the accused had been informed of his rights to counsel and declined them, rendering the evidence admissible.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample to a peace officer.

The Crown alleged the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device (ASD) test, made the demand forthwith, and the accused refused to comply.

The defence argued the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, the demand was not made forthwith, and the accused was unable to use the machine properly due to inadequate instruction and anxiety.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the accused coming from a licensed establishment, odour of alcohol, and red watery eyes.

The court found the forthwith requirement was met.

Most significantly, the court found the accused eventually refused to blow into the device, which constituted the offence.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle on December 31, 2013.

The vehicle had mounted a snowbank after the accused swerved to avoid a collision.

When police arrived, the accused was found in the driver's seat with keys in the ignition.

The court examined whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle despite it being immobilized on the snowbank, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable as required by law.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging that the actions of PC Cooper were excessive and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The incident occurred in the cell area of a police station when the officer was removing the defendant's handcuffs.

The defendant tensed and pulled his arm, which the officer interpreted as a precursor to aggressive movement.

The officer then took the defendant to the ground using a choke hold.

The court found that the defendant's section 7 Charter rights were infringed, as the officer's use of force was excessive in the circumstances.

Evidence obtained as a result was excluded.