Dean Allison

Henry Morales was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder of his wife, Malena Morales, committed in 2006.

The court imposed a mandatory life sentence and determined the parole ineligibility period.

The Crown sought 16-18 years, while the defence argued for 12 years, reduced from 13 due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court considered aggravating factors, including domestic violence, abuse of trust, the presence of children during the murder, and post-offence conduct (staging the scene, flight to Mexico).

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, genuine remorse, pro-social behaviour while in Mexico, and participation in rehabilitation programs.

The court also extensively discussed whether harsh pre-sentence custody conditions could be a mitigating factor for parole ineligibility, concluding they could.

Ultimately, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 15 years, commencing February 20, 2020.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to determine the voluntariness of two statements made by the accused to police.

The first statement was made to patrol officers investigating a trespass complaint prior to the murder, and the second was a six-hour interview following the accused's arrest by a tactical unit.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found no evidence of inducements, oppression, lack of an operating mind, or police trickery.

Both statements were ruled voluntary, with the first admissible in the Crown's case in chief and the second admissible for cross-examination.

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his wife and the attempted murder of his daughter following a stabbing in the family home.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on first-degree murder based on planning and deliberation, as well as constructive murder via unlawful confinement.

The Crown also sought committal for attempted murder.

The court found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation based on the accused's internet searches and statements prior to the offence.

The court also found sufficient evidence of unlawful confinement of both the deceased and the daughter.

Finally, the court found sufficient evidence of specific intent to kill the daughter.

The accused was committed to stand trial on first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, possession for the purpose of publication of child pornography, and sexual assault of a young child.

The offences occurred between May 7 and May 23, 2017.

The accused, who was the father of the victim, took photographs of his young son's genitalia and distributed them online.

The court imposed a sentence of three years and six months imprisonment, with ancillary orders including a lifetime SOIRA registration, a ten-year section 161 order, forfeiture of electronic devices, and a five-year firearms prohibition.

The court emphasized the serious breach of trust inherent in the offences and the vulnerability of the young victim.

The Respondent husband brought a motion to vary a temporary spousal support order and to seek child support from the Applicant wife.

The court dismissed the motion to vary spousal support, finding that the issue was res judicata as the arguments had been previously considered by Justice Trimble, and in any event, no material change in circumstances had been established.

The court emphasized the high onus required to vary interim orders.

The Applicant wife agreed to pay child support for the two children of the marriage, and an order was issued for $266 per month, without prejudice to future adjustments at trial.

The accused was charged with four counts of assault, two counts of recruiting and holding a person offering sexual services, one count of obtaining financial benefit from sexual services, and two counts of human trafficking.

The Crown narrowed its case to seek conviction on one assault charge (October 31, 2014) and two human trafficking charges.

The trial involved significant credibility issues between the complainant's videotaped police statements (November 2014) and her trial testimony.

The court admitted the police statements under the KGB exception to the hearsay rule and found them ultimately reliable.

The court concluded that the complainant was assaulted on October 31, 2014, and that the accused committed human trafficking by exercising control over the complainant's movements and exploiting her through threats and violence to provide strip club services and surrender her earnings.

The court found the accused received material benefits from the trafficking offence.

The accused, facing multiple charges including assault and sexual assault, elected to be tried by a judge and jury and obtained an order under section 530 of the Criminal Code for an English-speaking jury.

The accused subsequently brought an application to challenge prospective jurors for cause regarding their English language competency pursuant to section 638(1)(f) of the Code.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the statutory provisions do not create an automatic right to challenge jurors on linguistic competency without empirical evidence demonstrating a need for independent evaluation beyond the standard pre-screening mechanisms.

Dion Bacchus and Stephen Motoo brought an application for a stay of charges, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter rights due to an approximately 41-month delay between being charged and the impending trial date.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated the total delay, subtracted defence-attributable delay, and found the net delay for both applicants exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances, particularly regarding a significant delay in DNA evidence disclosure.

The court found the applicants' s. 11(b) rights were infringed and stayed the charges.

Following a successful application to rectify a will, the court determined the appropriate costs allocation among the parties.

The estate trustee sought costs against two respondents, while one respondent sought costs against the estate or the drafting solicitor.

Applying Rule 58.06 and Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the successful party principle, settlement offers, the conduct of the parties, and proportionality.

The court concluded that the litigation arose from the testator’s own actions and therefore reasonable costs should be borne by the estate.

Costs were awarded to the estate trustee and one respondent from the estate, while another unsuccessful respondent was denied costs.

The applicant estate trustee sought to rectify the deceased's secondary will, which dealt solely with her house.

Due to a drafting error by the solicitor, the secondary will omitted a residue clause and duplicated bequests made in the primary will, which would have resulted in a partial intestacy benefiting estranged children.

The estranged children opposed the application, arguing the will should be interpreted as written.

The court found that the drafting solicitor made a clerical error that did not reflect the testator's intentions, and ordered the will rectified to include the residue clause and remove the duplicated bequests.

The offender pleaded guilty to attempted murder after attacking her adult daughter with an Exacto knife and a kitchen knife, slashing the victim’s throat and stabbing her before being interrupted by the victim’s boyfriend.

The victim survived but suffered severe and lasting physical and psychological consequences.

The court considered the broad sentencing range for attempted murder and emphasized denunciation and deterrence, particularly given the planned nature of the attack and the domestic relationship between offender and victim.

Although the offender had no criminal record, pleaded guilty, and expressed remorse, the offence involved deliberate planning, abuse of familial trust, and serious injury.

The court imposed an 11‑year penitentiary sentence, with enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody and ancillary orders.