Rose Carolyn Branton

During a murder trial, counsel for one co-accused renewed an application to recall two witnesses to testify about the deceased's general reputation for violence and aggression, arguing that the evidentiary basis had changed since both co-accused had now testified.

The court had previously permitted specific Scopelliti evidence of the deceased's prior acts of weaponized intimidation but denied broader character evidence.

The court found that the law and reasons from its prior ruling continued to apply and denied the renewed request, noting that unlike the other co-accused who had established an air of reality for self-defence, the moving co-accused had not satisfied that threshold.

The applicant, Joshua Belovari, sought to sever counts of dangerous driving and criminal harassment, which arose from two separate incidents about a month apart, into separate trials.

The Crown opposed the severance, indicating an intention to bring a similar fact application.

The court denied the severance application, finding that the interests of justice did not require it.

Despite a thin factual nexus, the unique manner of the alleged dangerous driving created a legal nexus supporting a similar fact application.

The court prioritized the societal interest in efficient proceedings and avoiding multiplicity, noting that a single judge-alone trial would mitigate prejudice and prevent inconsistent rulings on similar fact evidence.

This criminal trial concerned charges of sexual assault and sexual interference against the defendant, B.(G.), involving his 10-year-old niece.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant's and defendant's testimonies, as there was no independent corroborating evidence.

The court found the complainant's evidence to have inconsistencies, though not necessarily undermining her truthfulness, and the defendant's testimony, despite some confusion and a criminal record, did not lead to a conclusion of untruthfulness.

Applying the principles of reasonable doubt, the court determined that the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, dismissed the charges.

The defendant, S.C., was sentenced after being found guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, M.C., who was 14-15 years old at the time.

The offences involved multiple incidents of sexual interference during driving lessons and a sexual assault in the family home.

The court applied the sentencing principles for child sexual offences, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives, as guided by R. v. Friesen.

Aggravating factors included the abuse of a position of trust, the prolonged nature of the abuse, and the significant emotional and psychological harm to the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of prior record, strong support network, and rehabilitative potential.

The court imposed a global sentence of two years less a day jail, followed by three years probation, a 10-year s. 161 order, a 20-year SOIRA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused, Aaron Enwright, was charged with failing or refusing to comply with an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand under the Criminal Code.

At a RIDE check, he initially questioned the police's authority and asserted the demand was unconstitutional.

However, immediately upon being arrested and handcuffed, he offered to provide a sample.

The police officer refused to administer the test, believing the opportunity had passed.

The court found that while the ASD demand was valid, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Enwright unequivocally refused.

His offer to provide a sample, made immediately upon arrest, was deemed genuine and part of a continuous transaction, leading to an acquittal.

Thomas Swiston pleaded guilty to assault and assault bodily harm.

The court accepted a joint submission for 21 days (enhanced to 32) of pre-sentence custody and two years of probation.

The primary issue was the amount of restitution for the complainant's lost tooth.

The complainant sought $21,075.42, but the court, applying the "readily ascertainable" standard under s. 738(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, only ordered $1,652.40 for out-of-pocket dental expenses, rejecting claims for lost time, future care, and other undocumented losses.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal harassment and breach of probation, marking his fifth conviction for criminal harassment.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for an 8-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the joint submission, finding it inadequate given the aggravating factors, including the accused's extensive criminal record for similar offences, the harassment of a witness to a criminal offence, repeated violations of warnings and trespass orders, and intimidation of the victim's child.

Emphasizing general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and victim safety, the court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence, followed by 3 years of probation, a lifetime s. 109 order, and a DNA order.

Scott Watson was convicted of careless driving causing death (s. 130(3) HTA) and careless driving simpliciter (s. 130(1) HTA) after a trial.

The court considered sentencing principles, legislative intent behind the new careless driving provisions, and the proportionality of the sentence.

Despite the defendant's health issues and belated expression of remorse, the court found his driving behaviour severely lacking and imposed a custodial sentence and a lengthy driving suspension, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

Devonte Skye-Davis, charged with manslaughter, brought an application alleging a conflict of interest within the Hamilton Crown Attorney's Office.

This arose because his former defence counsel joined that office.

The applicant argued that the office lacked proper procedures to protect confidential information at the time of the former counsel's arrival.

The Crown contended that safeguards were later implemented and no confidential information was discussed.

The court applied the two-part test from Macdonald Estate v. Martin, finding that while no actual disclosure occurred, the lack of institutional safeguards at the outset created an unacceptable appearance of injustice.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for a different standard for Crown offices.

The Hamilton Crown Attorney's office was found to be in a conflict of interest, and the prosecution was ordered to be continued by a Crown from outside that office.

This is an application by the young person, Y.D., for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from the laying of the information to the anticipated end of the trial was 764 days (approximately 25 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued that the complexity of the case and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The court found no defence delay and determined that the Crown failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the case's complexity or the pandemic justified the additional 7 months of delay beyond the ceiling.

The court noted a lack of concrete steps by the Crown to minimize delay, including frequent changes in Crown attorneys and a general "culture of complacency." Consequently, the application was granted, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

Omar Thomas was found guilty of five charges related to a convenience store robbery (robbery, disguise with intent, three probation breaches) and later pleaded guilty to possession of stolen property and failure to comply with a release order.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 52 months jail, while the Defence sought time served, arguing for Downes and Duncan credits.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the robbery, the use of a weapon, the vulnerable victim, and the offender's extensive criminal record with prior robbery convictions.

Mitigating factors included family support, traumatic childhood experiences, substance abuse issues, and expressions of remorse.

The court rejected Downes credit due to bail breaches and lack of evidence for employment seeking, but considered harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (Duncan credit) as a mitigating factor.

The final sentence was 4 years jail for the robbery-related offences, with the 4-month sentence for the later offences served concurrently, resulting in a global sentence of 4 years less pre-sentence custody.

The defendant, Omar Thomas, was charged with three convenience store robberies and related charges.

Identity was the central issue.

The Crown relied on video surveillance, circumstantial evidence including clothing and DNA, and text messages.

The court applied principles from R. v. Nikolovski regarding identification from video and the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of the April 25, 2020 robbery based on strong circumstantial evidence, including DNA on discarded gloves and incriminating text messages.

However, the court found him not guilty of the March 7 and April 8, 2020 robberies due to insufficient evidence to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to the extent of disguise and lack of sufficiently distinctive corroborating evidence.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence in a robbery trial against Omar Thomas, both for the three current charges (count-to-count) and for four prior robbery convictions from 2011, to prove identity.

The court applied the two-stage test for similar fact evidence, focusing on the degree of similarity and the objective improbability of coincidence.

The court found that the similarities between the current robberies were generic and lacked sufficient uniqueness, and that the nine-year gap and different modus operandi (e.g., use of bear/pepper spray in 2011, absence in 2020) made the prior convictions dissimilar.

Consequently, the Crown's application for the admission of similar fact evidence was dismissed.

The accused, C.I., was charged with criminal harassment, multiple counts of sexual assault (including with a weapon), and assault against his former intimate partner, M.P. The court dismissed the criminal harassment charge, finding that M.P.'s fear of reconciliation was not the type of fear intended by the legislation.

However, the court found C.I. guilty on all other counts of sexual assault and assault, largely based on M.P.'s credible testimony, corroborated by other witnesses and C.I.'s own inconsistent statements and admissions.

The judge rejected the defence's arguments regarding M.P.'s credibility and reliability, including the "spectre of motive to fabricate."

The accused brought a motion for a finding that his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was breached, and sought a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 608 days (19 months and 29 days).

After deducting defence delay of 42 days and a discrete event of 12 days, the net delay was 554 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling by 7 days.

The court found no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay and granted the motion for a stay of proceedings.