S. Gill

The accused, Paljinder Bhatti, faced a charge of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude evidence (breath samples and observations) or stay the charge.

The court dismissed the section 10(b) application, finding that the police adequately informed the accused of her right to counsel and provided a reasonable opportunity to exercise it, including the choice of duty counsel.

The court also dismissed the section 8 application regarding cell video surveillance, concluding that police took reasonable steps to protect the accused's privacy.

However, the Crown conceded a section 8 breach regarding the roadside Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, as the device was not readily available at the time of the demand, consistent with R. v. Breault.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court found that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, citing the low seriousness of the police conduct, minimal impact on the accused, and strong societal interest in adjudicating impaired driving cases on their merits.

Consequently, all Charter applications were dismissed, and the breath samples and observations were admitted into evidence for the trial.

The applicant sought an urgent case conference after the respondent purported to evict the applicant and changed the locks, contrary to a prior court order barring eviction.

The respondent claimed he had not received the prior order.

During the conference, the respondent confirmed receipt of the order and agreed not to take further steps to evict the applicant until a motion to vary the order is heard.

The court directed the respondent to schedule a motion to vary the order, to be heard alongside the applicant's motion for contempt, and permitted the applicant to change the locks to reopen for business.

The accused was charged with multiple firearms and threat-related offences after confronting tenants in his home with what appeared to be a handgun.

The central issue at trial was whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the unrecovered item was a real firearm rather than an imitation, relying on video evidence and witness testimony.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, particularly witness descriptions of the bullets, proved the item was a real firearm.

The accused was found guilty of possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose, pointing a firearm at one tenant, uttering a death threat to that tenant, possessing a firearm while prohibited, and possessing a loaded firearm without a licence, but acquitted of the remaining charges.

The accused was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a head-on collision in Ajax on September 19, 2017.

The victims, an elderly couple, sustained significant injuries including broken hands and a fractured vertebra.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was between 147-192 mgs per 100 mls of blood.

The court imposed a 9-month custodial sentence followed by 15 months probation and a 3-year driving prohibition, considering the serious injuries to the victims, the accused's first-offender status with mild intellectual disability, and the collateral consequences of COVID-19 pandemic conditions in custody.

The plaintiff, operating as Carey Industries, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from carrying on business under the name 'Steve's Welding & Sandblasting Inc.' The plaintiff had previously operated under the trade name 'Steve's Welding & Sandblasting' for nearly 30 years before changing its name.

The individual defendant, a former owner and employee of the plaintiff, incorporated the competing business shortly after his departure.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found a serious issue to be tried regarding passing off, noting the identical trade name and evidence of actual customer confusion.

The court concluded the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm to its goodwill and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The plaintiff creditor brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to set aside a transfer of real property from a judgment debtor and his spouse to the spouse alone as a fraudulent conveyance.

The transfer occurred after a default judgment had been obtained and after the debtor failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The court considered the badges of fraud under section 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, including a transfer between close relatives for nominal consideration during circumstances of insolvency.

The respondents argued the transfer was intended to protect the transferee as a legitimate creditor.

The court held that the transfer constituted either a fraudulent conveyance or an improper preference and that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Following a motion in which the defendant successfully obtained an order setting aside a default judgment, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

The default judgment had arisen after the defendant failed to attend an examination for discovery, leading to the striking of the statement of defence, a noting in default, and enforcement proceedings.

Although the court exercised its discretion under Rules 37.14, 19.03, and 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the default proceedings in the interests of adjudicating the case on its merits, it found the defendant largely responsible for the procedural failures that caused the default.

The court held that the relief granted constituted an indulgence and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s enforcement costs on a substantial indemnity basis and additional costs of the motion.