Carolyn Galin

The Regional Municipality of York appealed the dismissal of a speeding charge against the respondent, which was originally dismissed by a Justice of the Peace who found the certified statement evidence insufficient due to "unanswered questions" regarding the speed measurement device.

The appeal court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by relying on speculation rather than inferences reasonably arising from the evidence.

As the certified statements were deemed proof of facts in the absence of evidence to the contrary under the Provincial Offences Act, and no such contrary evidence was presented, the appeal was allowed.

The appellant, Ravid Dahan-Motek, appealed her conviction for driving with a handheld communication device.

Her grounds of appeal included claims that the Justice of the Peace (JP) misapprehended her evidence regarding not making a phone call and not touching her phone, and alleged bias on the part of the JP.

The appellate court reviewed the trial transcript and reasons for judgment, finding no evidence of bias and confirming that the JP's findings were supported by the evidence.

The court clarified that the JP did not accept the appellant's claim of not touching the phone, despite accepting she wasn't making a call.

The appeal was dismissed.

Isabelle Rodriguez appealed a victim fine surcharge imposed after she pleaded guilty to speeding, arguing there were no "victims." Her refusal to pay the surcharge led to a driver's license suspension and subsequent reinstatement costs.

The court dismissed the appeal, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to strike the victim fine surcharge, as it is an administrative procedure under Ontario Regulation 161/00 of the Provincial Offences Act, automatically applied to all provincial offence fines to support victim services generally.

The appellant, Ji-Hoon Kim, appealed a speeding conviction after paying the fine, arguing it was a mistake due to its impact on his insurance rates.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that insurance consequences are not legally relevant collateral consequences that would invalidate a guilty plea.

The court affirmed that drivers are responsible for inquiring about administrative and insurance impacts of convictions before pleading guilty, and a failure to do so does not render a plea equivocal, uninformed, or involuntary.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving without properly wearing a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on the officer's testimony that he observed the seatbelt not across the appellant's chest and flapping in the wind, despite the appellant testifying he was wearing the seatbelt at all times and wearing it when stopped.

The appeal court found the trial justice failed to properly apply the W.(D.) principles regarding burden of proof and credibility assessment, and that the officer's evidence was insufficiently reliable to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt given the fleeting observation period and other corroborating evidence.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered under section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act following her failure to appear at trial.

The appellant challenged the certificate of offence on the ground that the officer failed to check off the a.m./p.m. box next to the time of the alleged offence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the omission of the a.m./p.m. designation was a highly technical deficiency that could not cause prejudice to the defendant, as the time of the offence is not an essential averment and is not relevant to the defendant's decision whether to contest the charge.

The court emphasized that the section 9.1 procedure is intended to permit judges to decide cases on their merits and to avoid having proceedings invalidated because of technical objections having no prejudicial impact.