Nazampal Jaswal

The court considered whether Charles Duku was criminally responsible for arson and mischief, following a trial in which he was found guilty.

After conviction, the Crown sought a verdict of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) under section 672.34 of the Criminal Code, based on psychiatric evidence that Mr. Duku was suffering from active psychosis at the time of the offence.

The court accepted the expert evidence and the respondent’s consent, finding that Mr. Duku was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder.

Inderdeep Singh Kandola pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing the death of Gita Jagpal.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3 to 4 years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 18 months to 2 years less a day.

The court considered the principles of sentencing, including deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, alongside mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, and strong community support.

The judge also took into account the conditions in provincial correctional facilities.

Ultimately, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day, followed by 30 months of probation, a five-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order, finding this sentence proportionate and effective in achieving sentencing objectives without immediate incarceration.

The accused, Charles Duku, was charged with intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire (arson) contrary to s. 434 of the Criminal Code, and mischief contrary to s. 430(3) of the Code, following a fire in his high-rise apartment.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including testimony from firefighters and an expert fire investigator who classified the fire as "incendiary." The defence did not call evidence.

The court found that the accused was the sole resident, was seen entering and exiting the apartment around the time of the fire, and possessed the means to set it.

The evidence indicated the fire was not accidental.

The court concluded that guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The defendant, Avardeep Soni, brought an application to stay proceedings for two counts of assault and two counts of sexual assault, alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, deducting defence-attributable delay (18 days for delaying JPT to pursue resolution) and exceptional circumstances delay (30 days for COVID-19 backlog and new scheduling procedures).

The net delay was calculated at 16.56 months, which is below the presumptive ceiling for provincial court.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite proceedings and that the case markedly exceeded what was reasonably required.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

He challenged the admissibility of breath readings, alleging Charter violations under ss. 8 (unreasonable search) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found the defendant was the driver beyond a reasonable doubt.

While breaches of ss. 8 (untimely breath demand) and 10(b) (delayed access to counsel) were established, the court applied the R. v. Grant test and determined that admitting the breath sample results would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired operation.

The accused, Marcus Lyons, was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault.

In this sentencing decision, the court addressed whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused administered THC to the victim, finding it was not proven due to inconclusive expert testimony.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the presence of the victim's two-year-old son during the assault and the accused's prior convictions for violence, alongside mitigating factors such as his good work record and family ties.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed an 18-month term of incarceration, a 20-year sex offender registration order, an order to provide DNA samples, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The defendant, Meryem Iftikhar, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The defense raised a Charter application alleging a breach of her section 10(b) right to counsel and a "regurgitation defense" regarding breath samples.

The court dismissed the regurgitation defense, finding no evidence of mouth alcohol.

However, the court found that Constable Alszegi violated Ms. Iftikhar's right to counsel of choice by waiting only six minutes before offering duty counsel and by steering her towards duty counsel based on his personal practice, rather than providing other means to contact her chosen lawyer or another lawyer.

Despite Ms. Iftikhar having spoken to duty counsel, the breach was deemed serious due to institutional issues.

Applying section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The applicant, Kim Tran, sought a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the total delay of 25 months and 20 days exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

The Crown attributed the delay to a discrete event (unavailability of a police witness due to health reasons) but failed to demonstrate that it took reasonable steps to mitigate the resulting delay.

The court found that the Crown did not meet its constitutional obligation to bring the accused to trial within a reasonable time, granted the application, and stayed the charge.

The defendant was charged with driving while disqualified.

The court addressed two main issues: the defendant's knowledge of the disqualification and whether the police stop and subsequent vehicle search violated sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to racial profiling.

The court found the Crown proved the defendant's knowledge of the disqualification.

However, the warrantless search of the vehicle was deemed an unreasonable search (s. 8 violation) and tainted by racial profiling.

This racial profiling was also found to have tainted the initial traffic stop (s. 9 violation).

Consequently, the evidence obtained (defendant's self-identification) was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The defendant was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The trial involved a Charter application challenging the roadside breath screening, the arrest based on an approved screening device (ASD) result, and the breath demand.

The court found reasonable grounds for the roadside screening.

However, it found violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter due to insufficient evidence regarding the functionality and proper operation of the ASD, leading to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

Despite these breaches, the court applied the s. 24(2) Grant test and decided not to exclude the breath readings, finding the breaches of modest seriousness and minimal impact on the defendant's Charter interests, while society's interest in adjudication on the merits was strong.

Separately, the court ruled that photocopies of the Certificate of Qualified Technician and Intoxilyzer Printouts were inadmissible due to lack of authentication.

Ultimately, the court had a reasonable doubt about the defendant's blood alcohol concentration and acquitted him.