8 total
A 17-day delay in holding a bail hearing due to systemic court resource issues warrants a stay of proceedings.
The accused, Alaelddein Alhajsalem, brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to a 17-day delay in his bail hearing, arguing a violation of sections 7, 9, and 11(e) of the Charter.
The Crown conceded a breach of section 11(e) but argued against a stay.
The court found the delay was caused by systemic issues in the Newmarket Bail Court, not related to the pandemic, and that a judicial admonition or sentence reduction would be inadequate.
Balancing the seriousness of the charges against the persistent systemic problem and the flagrant Charter breach, the court granted a stay of proceedings.
The accused was found not criminally responsible for arson due to Bipolar Mood Disorder.
This judgment addresses the criminal responsibility of the accused, V.F.-P., for six counts of Arson Endangering Life under section 433 of the Criminal Code.
The sole issue at trial was whether the defence proved on a balance of probabilities that the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the offences, rendering her exempt from criminal responsibility under section 16(3) of the Criminal Code.
The court considered evidence of erratic behaviour, apparent intoxication (despite zero blood alcohol readings in prior similar incidents), and a history of mental health issues including suicide attempts and a diagnosis of Bipolar Mood Disorder.
Applying the holistic approach from R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, the court found that the accused's actions stemmed from an underlying mental disorder, not transient self-induced states, and that her condition presented a recurring danger.
Consequently, the accused was found not criminally responsible.
The court sentenced a father to time served and probation for abducting his daughter, prioritizing rehabilitation over deterrence due to his mental disorder.
The defendant was convicted of abduction, break and enter, two counts of assault, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, related to the abduction of his daughter.
The court rejected the Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defense but acknowledged the defendant's mental disorder played a significant role in the offenses.
The Crown sought a sentence of 3.5 to 4 years less pre-trial custody, while the defense argued for a non-custodial sentence.
The court, emphasizing rehabilitation over deterrence due to the mental disorder, imposed a sentence of time served (credited at approximately 15 months), a three-year probation order with strict conditions, and a two-year driving prohibition.
Custody Case allowed
The defendant, Mario Rodrigues, was charged with two counts of assault, break and enter, abduction of his daughter, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.
The central issue at trial was whether he was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.
The court considered conflicting expert psychiatric opinions regarding the defendant's mental state and capacity to understand the moral wrongfulness of his actions.
The court found that the defendant failed to prove his NCR defence on a balance of probabilities, concluding that he knew his actions were both legally and morally wrong.
Consequently, convictions were entered on all five counts.
Accused's hospital bed statement to police ruled voluntary and admissible despite assertions of right to silence.
The Crown sought an admissibility ruling for a statement given by the accused to police while he was handcuffed to a hospital bed recovering from injuries sustained in a house fire.
The accused, charged with first-degree murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, argued his statement was involuntary due to police persistence, oppression, and a breach of his right to silence.
The court found that the police conduct did not create a climate of compulsion or override the accused's free will.
The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible, with its probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect.
Relief denied decision
The Crown charged the accused with assault causing bodily harm arising from two separate incidents involving disputes over the accused's collection of mannequins.
In the June incident, the accused allegedly threw his wife to the ground, causing a broken leg and bruising.
In the April incident, the accused allegedly placed his hands around his wife's neck.
The accused claimed he was merely protecting his property and that his wife fell accidentally.
The court found the accused not credible, noting his dishonesty about the nature and purpose of his mannequin collection and the implausibility of his account of the incidents.
The court accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and consistent with the photographic evidence of injuries.
The court rejected the defence of property argument under section 35 of the Criminal Code as the mannequin was not damaged and the response was disproportionate.
The accused was found guilty on both counts.
Reasonable doubt required acquittals on all marital offence allegations.
In a judge-alone criminal trial arising from allegations made by an estranged spouse, the court considered counts of sexual assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and administering a noxious substance over the course of a multi-year marriage formed through an arranged marriage and immigration sponsorship process.
Applying the W.(D.) framework and a global assessment of credibility and reliability, the court found both parties gave plausible but sharply conflicting evidence, and identified inconsistencies and possible motive concerns in the complainant's account while finding the accused's evidence generally believable.
The court held the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual activity was non-consensual, that bodily harm from anal sex was established, that the complainant had been forcibly confined, or that any alcohol or energy drink constituted a proven noxious substance on the evidence.
Acquittals were entered on all four counts.
Application to reduce an intermittent sentence for time served on unrelated charges was dismissed.
The applicant sought to vary an intermittent sentence of 81 days by reducing it to account for time served in custody on unrelated charges.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the power to vary intermittent sentences is limited to the circumstances set out in section 732 of the Criminal Code.
The court further held that even if such variation were possible, it would not grant the remedy because the applicant had made a tactical choice to remain eligible for release rather than converting the intermittent sentence to straight time when arrested on new charges.