Joseph F. Kenkel

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud exceeding $5000 and sought credit for pre-sentence custody served in another jurisdiction on other charges.

The court applied the Barnett exception, which allows credit if there is a proven link between the detention and the outstanding charges.

The court found that the accused did not seek release on the other charges in part because of the outstanding charges before this court, and the Crown opposed bail for the same reason.

The court concluded there was a sufficient link to permit the time served to be credited towards the current sentence.

The offender, a support worker at a group home, pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon after assaulting a non-verbal resident with severe autism.

The Crown sought 30 days in jail, while the defence requested a conditional discharge.

The court emphasized the need for denunciation and deterrence given the victim's vulnerability and the offender's breach of trust.

A 90-day conditional sentence was imposed, followed by one year of probation, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The defendant was serving a conditional sentence when he was charged with new offences.

At the breach hearing, the Crown sought to rely on the supervisor's report, which was served on the defence only one day prior.

The defence argued this did not constitute reasonable notice under s. 742.6(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that because the underlying police information attached to the report had been fully disclosed well in advance, the defence was not taken by surprise.

The court found that reasonable notice had been given and admitted the report.

Sentencing for a school teacher who pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation arising from abuse of a student in a position of trust.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, finding numerous aggravating factors including grooming, secrecy, planning, persistence after protests, and significant harm to the complainant and community confidence in schools.

The offender's mental health evidence did not mitigate sentence because no causal link was established between any illness and the offences, and the defence expert's recidivism opinion was given limited weight due to inaccurate self-reporting.

A global sentence of three years' imprisonment was imposed together with mandatory and discretionary ancillary orders.

The accused was stopped by police after an Automated License Plate Reader flagged his vehicle.

He was charged with operating a conveyance while prohibited, as his license was suspended following a prior conviction for impaired driving.

At trial, the accused conceded he knew he was prohibited from driving but argued a potential breach of his right to counsel.

The court found no Charter breach, noting the accused understood his rights and chose to be released at the roadside to contact a lawyer.

The accused was found guilty.

The offender pleaded guilty to dangerous operation causing death and dangerous operation causing bodily harm after driving at high speed through a red light and striking another vehicle.

The court found that the offender's actions were directly caused by an active episode of bipolar disorder, which significantly diminished her moral culpability.

While the Crown sought a 4-year penitentiary sentence, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day with strict house arrest, followed by two years of probation.

To protect the public, the court also imposed a 12-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit after his truck was found in a ditch.

The central issue at trial was the identity of the driver, which relied on the admissibility of the accused's statements to police at the roadside and to the breath technician.

The court found that the accused was not detained at the roadside when he admitted to driving, and that police questioning prior to the breath test did not constitute trickery or oppression.

Both statements were ruled voluntary and admissible, establishing the accused's identity as the driver and resulting in a finding of guilt.

The offender pleaded guilty to uttering a death threat and domestic assault.

The threat was motivated by homophobia against a stranger, while the assault involved dragging and confining his 17-year-old intimate partner in the presence of their infant.

The court rejected a conditional discharge for the threat, imposing a suspended sentence to emphasize denunciation and deterrence.

For the assault, the court accepted a joint submission of five months' custody, satisfied by pre-sentence custody credit, followed by 18 months of probation with counselling and no-contact conditions.

The accused was found sleeping in the driver's seat of his parked vehicle with signs of impairment and a blood alcohol concentration over 80mgs/100ml.

At trial, he argued that police lacked reasonable grounds for arrest, breached his right to counsel due to a language barrier, and that he was not operating the vehicle because he was waiting for his wife.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the accused understood English and the officers had reasonable grounds.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as incredible and found he failed to rebut the presumption of operation.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge, with the impaired operation charge stayed under the Kienapple principle.

Sentencing of a first offender convicted at trial of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a threat to cause death, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The accused attacked his sister's husband with a box cutter knife in the family home, inflicting deep cuts requiring 70 stitches, and also cut his own father who intervened.

The accused absconded and was sentenced in absentia after his counsel was removed from the record.

The court found the stated intent to kill was a significant aggravating factor beyond the mere utterance of a death threat.

While acknowledging the Crown's proposed range of 3.5 to 4 years was below what the circumstances warranted, the court imposed a global sentence of 4 years' custody, with ancillary orders including DNA, a firearms prohibition, a no-contact order, and restitution of $26,338.

The court granted the Crown's application under s. 475 of the Criminal Code, found the accused had absconded, and held it was necessary in the interests of justice to proceed with sentencing in absentia.

The court relied on the prolonged failure to appear, unsuccessful efforts to locate the accused, victim-impact timing concerns, and the public interest in timely sentencing for serious violence.

The Crown applied under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code for the disposition of 14 firearms and ammunition seized from the respondent's residence following an accidental shooting.

The firearms belonged to the respondent's deceased husband, and no one in the home was licensed to possess them.

The respondent failed to appear at the hearing or arrange a transfer to a licensed owner.

The court ordered the firearms and ammunition forfeit to the Crown for destruction, granting a final 30-day window for the respondent to lawfully transfer non-prohibited firearms to a licensed holder.

The Crown applied to admit a video statement of a deceased complainant under the principled exception to the hearsay rule in a historical sexual assault case.

The court found the statement lacked procedural reliability as it was not under oath and the complainant was not warned about the consequences of lying.

Substantive reliability was also lacking due to the complainant's mental health issues, potential motive to fabricate, and implausible details.

The corroborative evidence from siblings and the accused was insufficient to overcome the hearsay dangers.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while holding a hand-held communication device, arguing that his vehicle was stopped in a live lane of traffic when he took a photograph of a collision.

He sought to introduce fresh expert evidence to prove the vehicle was not moving and argued the trial justice erred in failing to apply the W.(D.) framework to conflicting evidence on this point.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, holding that the word 'drives' in the Highway Traffic Act does not require the vehicle to be in motion.

Because the vehicle's motion was immaterial to the offence, the fresh evidence was irrelevant and the trial justice did not err in declining to apply W.(D.).

The applicant sought a review of a Justice of the Peace's decision refusing to release a digital audio recording of a court proceeding he observed.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction under the Provincial Offences Act to hear appeals of collateral administrative decisions.

The court noted that such an application for supervisory or prerogative relief must be brought in the Superior Court of Justice.

The defendant was charged with driving while suspended under the Highway Traffic Act.

During his trial, the presiding Justice of the Peace referred the matter to a judge under s. 44 of the Provincial Offences Act due to concerns about the defendant's capacity to conduct his defence, specifically regarding his references to 'aliens'.

The court found that while the defendant appeared oriented and understood the charges, his recent involuntary hospitalization and the nature of his delusions warranted further investigation.

The court ordered a psychiatric examination to assist in determining his fitness to stand trial.

The accused was charged with obstructing a peace officer after refusing to identify himself and physically resisting arrest.

Police approached the accused, who was sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle, after an automatic license plate reader indicated an unlicensed driver was associated with the vehicle.

The accused stepped out of the vehicle and attempted to walk away, refusing to provide his name.

The court found the detention and subsequent arrest lawful under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court also upheld the search of the vehicle incident to arrest, which yielded the accused's driver's license, and dismissed allegations of Charter breaches and police assault.

A finding of guilt was entered.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The Crown's case relied on a citizen's report of an erratic driver and subsequent police investigation at a plaza.

The court found the Crown failed to prove the identity of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the complainant's observations and circumstantial evidence.

Although the court found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel due to delay during investigative detention, it held the evidence would not have been excluded under section 24(2).

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance after a damaged vehicle was abandoned in a parking lot.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver and was impaired by alcohol.

The court dismissed Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 11(b).

Although the court found a minor breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel due to an 8-minute delay, it declined to exclude evidence under section 24(2).

A finding of guilt was entered.

Accused charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80mg/100ml pursuant to s 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a 911 report of an impaired driver.

The court dismissed Charter challenges under ss 9, 8 (ASD demand), and 10(b), finding no arbitrary detention, a lawful screening device demand, and no breach of right to counsel where the accused failed to exercise that right with reasonable diligence.

Although the Crown conceded a s 8 breach for failure to make the approved instrument demand as soon as practicable under s 320.28(1), the court declined to exclude the breath test evidence under s 24(2), finding the breach was largely attributable to the accused's own obstructive conduct.

The court applied s 320.31 conclusive proof provisions and s 320.31(4) read-back calculations to establish a BAC of 140mg/100ml within the two-hour window, entering a finding of guilt.