Aaron M. Spektor

This judgment addresses the criminal responsibility of the accused, V.F.-P., for six counts of Arson Endangering Life under section 433 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the defence proved on a balance of probabilities that the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the offences, rendering her exempt from criminal responsibility under section 16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered evidence of erratic behaviour, apparent intoxication (despite zero blood alcohol readings in prior similar incidents), and a history of mental health issues including suicide attempts and a diagnosis of Bipolar Mood Disorder.

Applying the holistic approach from R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, the court found that the accused's actions stemmed from an underlying mental disorder, not transient self-induced states, and that her condition presented a recurring danger.

Consequently, the accused was found not criminally responsible.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically at high speed, including driving through a red light.

The defence challenged the reasonable grounds for arrest and the approved instrument demand, and alleged arbitrary detention contrary to section 9 of the Charter.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds based on the totality of the driving observations and physical indicia.

The court rejected the arbitrary detention argument, finding the delay in release was reasonably explained by station circumstances.

The court convicted the accused on the impaired operation count and stayed the Over 80 count.

The accused, a licensed paralegal, pleaded guilty to attempting to defraud Aviva Canada Insurance of monies not exceeding five thousand dollars between September 21, 2015 and November 16, 2015.

She participated in an insurance fraud scheme operated by a chiropractor, Dr. Edward Hayes, whereby she assisted undercover insurance investigators in preparing fraudulent insurance claims and provided advice on how to maximize claims and avoid detection.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence with house arrest or jail time, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with one year probation, 100 hours of community service, $1,000 restitution, and a $100 victim fine surcharge, finding that the unique and cumulative mitigating circumstances warranted this exceptional outcome despite the serious breach of public trust.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit (Over 80).

The Crown alleged the accused had consumed alcohol at a bar, was stopped for a sobriety check, failed an Approved Screening Device test, and was arrested.

Breath samples at the station showed readings of 157 mg/100ml and 148 mg/100ml.

The defence raised three Charter issues: whether the Approved Instrument demand was made "as soon as practicable" under s.254(3); whether the accused's right to be informed promptly of the reason for detention under s.10(a) was breached; and whether the accused's right to counsel under s.10(b) was breached due to insufficient duty counsel advice.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL following a traffic stop.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter based on alleged breaches of the right to counsel.

The court found that the accused's s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached because the officer failed to ensure the accused, who had limited English proficiency, understood his rights and failed to facilitate contact with counsel despite the accused providing a lawyer's name.

The court excluded the breath test evidence as a remedy for the Charter breach.

Additionally, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired based on the evidence presented.

The accused was charged with Fraud Over $5,000 contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused was arrested and charged on December 14, 2014, with trial scheduled to commence July 19, 2016, representing a total delay of 584 days.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, categorizing periods as intake time, inherent time, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

The court found that Crown and institutional delay totaled only 55 days, with the remainder attributable to necessary case management, disclosure, translation, and trial preparation.

The court concluded the delay was reasonable and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter based on insufficient grounds for arrest and the arbitrariness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired operation and should have instead demanded an approved screening device.

The court excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding the impairment charge based on the limited objective evidence.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol on June 18, 2014.

The accused did not deny the essential elements of the offence but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he was fleeing from an imminent threat of serious bodily harm.

After being assaulted at a social gathering by another guest, the accused ran to his vehicle and drove a short distance before losing control of his keys.

The court found that all three elements of the necessity defence were established: there was clear and imminent peril from the assault, no reasonable legal alternative existed given the circumstances and the speed of events, and the harm inflicted by the brief impaired driving was not disproportionate to the harm avoided.

The accused was acquitted.