Elizabeth Stokes

The applicant, charged with historical sexual offences, brought a motion to admit expert opinion evidence from Dr. Tim Moore regarding the psychology of children's memory, including concepts like "imagination inflation" and "source amnesia," and how police interview practices might affect the reliability of a child complainant's testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed expert evidence did not meet the necessity criterion for admissibility.

The judge concluded that the concepts were within the common experience and knowledge of a jury and that the evidence risked intruding on the jury's role as the ultimate arbiters of credibility and reliability.

The accused, a licensed paralegal, pleaded guilty to attempting to defraud Aviva Canada Insurance of monies not exceeding five thousand dollars between September 21, 2015 and November 16, 2015.

She participated in an insurance fraud scheme operated by a chiropractor, Dr. Edward Hayes, whereby she assisted undercover insurance investigators in preparing fraudulent insurance claims and provided advice on how to maximize claims and avoid detection.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence with house arrest or jail time, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with one year probation, 100 hours of community service, $1,000 restitution, and a $100 victim fine surcharge, finding that the unique and cumulative mitigating circumstances warranted this exceptional outcome despite the serious breach of public trust.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his spouse, applied for judicial interim release.

The court found that the accused met his burden on the primary and secondary grounds, as he was not a flight risk and his proposed release plan mitigated safety and interference concerns.

However, the court denied bail on the tertiary ground.

Given the brutal nature of the domestic homicide, the very strong circumstantial case for the Crown, and the gravity of the offence, the court concluded that releasing the accused would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and his sentence of nine months' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying uneven scrutiny, failing to apply the W.D. framework correctly, and providing insufficient reasons.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the unprovoked nature of the attack and the appellant's prior record, though the sentence was varied to credit 74 days of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assaulting his child, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and based on a misapprehension of the evidence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s treatment of inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, reliance on corroborative evidence from a sibling witness, and acceptance of photographic evidence showing bruising that was not observed by police immediately after the incident.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered credibility and reliability, addressed inconsistencies, and was entitled to infer that bruising could develop after the incident.

The appellate court emphasized deference to trial findings of credibility and fact.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault entered after a judge-alone trial.

During the accused’s testimony, the trial judge asked improper questions requiring the accused to explain why the complainant would fabricate the allegation.

The appellate court held that such questioning is improper because it invites one witness to comment on another’s credibility and risks shifting the burden of proof.

The judge’s brief reasons failed to explain why the accused’s evidence was rejected or dispel concern that the improper questioning influenced the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The Crown cross-appealed the conditional sentence, arguing it was illegal due to a mandatory minimum.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge misapprehended significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the location and frequency of the alleged assaults.

As this misapprehension played an essential part in the trial judge's credibility assessment, the conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown's cross-appeal against sentence was dismissed in light of the successful conviction appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The Superior Court conducted a fresh analysis of the delays after finding that the trial judge had mistakenly omitted a two‑month period when calculating delay.

The court concluded that most delays were attributable to inherent time requirements of the case or institutional delay, with only one month attributable to the Crown.

The total unjustified delay of approximately eight months fell within the Morin guidelines and did not justify an inference of prejudice.

Balancing the limited delay, weak evidence of prejudice, and the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court found no Charter breach.

The appellant appealed a conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment after the Crown indicated it would seek to amend the Information to expand the timeframe of the alleged conduct, and that the refusal created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant also challenged the finding that the actus reus and mens rea of criminal harassment were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court held that decisions concerning adjournments attract deference and found no prejudice because disclosure of the earlier incidents had already been provided and the evidence would have been admissible regardless of the amendment.

The court further concluded that the trial judge correctly assessed the evidence establishing the complainant’s reasonable fear and the accused’s intent.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the trial judge erred in the analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The trial judge had improperly considered the potential value of legal advice that might have been provided during a second requested consultation with counsel.

The appeal judge agreed that this was an error in principle but conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis applying the framework from Grant.

The court held that the breach was not egregious, the impact on the accused’s Charter-protected interests was limited, and society’s interest in adjudicating impaired driving cases on their merits was strong.

The breath sample evidence was therefore admissible and the conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of five months' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the standard of proof to a credibility contest, failed to give sufficient reasons, and made errors in principle during sentencing, including failing to give sufficient weight to the likelihood of his deportation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles underlying the W.(D.) instruction, provided sufficient reasons, and correctly concluded that a discharge was contrary to the public interest despite the immigration consequences.