Michael F. Brown

The appellant, convicted of manslaughter, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal seeking an order to examine a juror for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant's mother, Chair of a district school board, asserted that a juror, a vice-principal within the same board, may have been influenced by this professional connection.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding the claim speculative and lacking a sufficient credible foundation to warrant an examination.

The Court emphasized the strong presumption of juror impartiality and the sanctity of jury secrecy, reiterating that an examination cannot be used to create the foundation for such a challenge.

This is an appeal from a bankruptcy order against River Green (Thunder Bay) Inc. The appellant, John Beals, a shareholder, argued that the bankruptcy application by BNL Contracting Ltd. was brought for an improper purpose, relying on section 43(7) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the rejection of the improper purpose allegation as speculative.

The court emphasized the highly deferential standard of review for discretionary decisions under section 43(7) and noted the appellant's failure to cross-examine the respondent's principal on the alleged conspiracy.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl and appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in jury instructions.

The appellant contended that the judge improperly instructed the jury to assess the complainant's evidence from an adolescent perspective and used value-laden language to characterize her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions, viewed holistically, did not suggest a less stringent standard for the complainant's evidence and that the characterization of her testimony occurred within the summary of the Crown's position, which was clearly delineated for the jury.

The defendant, Ethan Eckstein, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging the validity of a tracking warrant and search warrants, and seeking to exclude evidence obtained from these searches under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the tracking warrant was valid, as the Information to Obtain (ITO) provided reasonable grounds based on compelling, credible, and corroborated confidential informant information, despite minor drafting errors.

The court also found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched unit, thus no s. 8 Charter violation occurred regarding those searches.

Even if Charter breaches had occurred, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of state conduct, impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Abdul Shahin, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from searches of his apartment unit (595 Proudfoot Lane, unit 808) and police observations in the building's common areas.

The court found that Shahin had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unit, but not in the common areas (eighth-floor hallway).

The general warrant and subsequent search warrant were deemed valid, and no Charter breaches occurred.

Even if s. 8 Charter breaches had occurred, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, considering the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Tang Hien Quanh, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from his arrest and subsequent searches of his person and a Toyota RAV4.

The defendant argued violations of his s. 9 (arbitrary detention) and s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) Charter rights.

The court found no s. 9 or s. 8 Charter breaches, concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and that the searches were lawful, including the RAV4 search conducted under a valid warrant.

Even if breaches occurred, the court determined that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on the defendant's rights, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

This pre-trial ruling addressed the admissibility of the defendant's statement to the police.

The court found the statement to be voluntary, rejecting arguments of exhaustion, physical discomfort, mental state, or police trickery.

However, the court determined that the defendant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated in two ways: first, when the defendant expressed confusion about whether he had spoken to a lawyer, triggering a duty for police to offer a second consultation; and second, when the police questioning shifted to a significantly more serious offense (murder) without re-advising the defendant of his right to counsel.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing state conduct, despite not being in bad faith, was serious and had a significant impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests.

On balance, the admission of the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, leading to its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused brought an application for a change of venue in a criminal proceeding.

The written reasons for decision were subject to a publication order and therefore omitted from the publicly available decision.

However, the court issued an order under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code directing that the trial be moved from Barrie to another location.

The precise location of the trial was to be determined by the Regional Senior Justice pursuant to the protocol of the Council of Regional Senior Justices of the Superior Court of Ontario.

The accused applied to adjourn a scheduled murder trial pending an intended appeal to the Court of Appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial.

The applicant argued that the appeal raised significant issues regarding constructive murder and the requirement of subjective foresight of death.

The court held that an accused’s right to appeal does not automatically entitle them to an adjournment of a scheduled murder trial, particularly where there was insufficient evidence that the applicant had taken all reasonable steps to expedite the appeal and funding arrangements.

The court also considered the interests of co-accused who had been in custody for over two years and the public interest in timely trials.

Balancing these factors, the court declined to exercise its discretion to adjourn the proceedings.