Gregory Tad Alexander Gryguc

The appellant, an auto mechanic, appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claims to a beneficial interest in a property through express trust, resulting trust, purchase money resulting trust, or constructive trust.

The property had been purchased by one respondent and titled in another respondent's name while the appellant lived there under an oral arrangement.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's fact-finding, holding that the appellant was merely inviting the court to reweigh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits but the cost awards below were reduced by 20% because the trial judge had erroneously found the respondents completely successful, overlooking that their counterclaim had been dismissed.

The appellants commenced an action against the respondent, a personal injury lawyer, for damages arising from the non-payment of referral fees allegedly owed under an oral contract spanning 1984 to 2018.

The appellants claimed entitlement to 10% of gross settlements or awards on over 130 referred lawsuits.

The respondent denied the existence of any contract and brought a summary judgment motion relying on denial of contract, alleged illegality, and limitation defences.

The motion judge found genuine issues requiring trial regarding contract existence and legality but granted partial summary judgment on limitation grounds, dismissing claims for lawsuits settling before December 10, 2017.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in characterizing the contract and in failing to recognize that the cause of action did not arise until the relationship ended in 2018.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly determined that the cause of action accrued when each referred lawsuit settled and payment was not made, regardless of whether the full extent of damages was known.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion by Peoples Trust Company (PTC) to partially lift the automatic stay of a penalty order requiring PSP Services Inc. (PSP) to pay $1,998,612.07 into court, pending appeal.

The court reviewed the context and the three-part test for lifting a stay, finding that all factors weighed in favour of granting the motion.

The stay was lifted, and PSP was ordered to pay the funds into court.

Costs were set at $7,500.

The moving parties, John Duca and Joseph Duca, sought an order requiring the appellant, Massimo Conti, to post security for costs and pay outstanding costs orders as a condition of proceeding with his appeal.

The appeal concerns the dismissal of Mr. Conti’s claim for an ownership interest in a residential property.

The Court of Appeal ordered Mr. Conti to post security for costs in the amount of $6,700, payable in installments, and awarded costs of the motion to the moving parties.

The decision addresses the application of Rules 61.06(1) and 56.01(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the merits of the appeal, and the circumstances justifying security for costs.

The court considered the appropriate penalty for PSP Services Inc.'s contempt of court for failing to cooperate with an audit as required by contract and court orders.

The court found repeated, prolonged, and unremedied contempt, and ordered the appointment of Ernst & Young as investigative receiver, required PSP to pay increased audit costs into court, and awarded substantial indemnity costs to Peoples Trust Company.

The court granted the application of the Sunset Lakes Owners Association (SLOA) for a mandatory injunction requiring the respondents, Todd and Erika Gingras, to remove a fence and shed that encroached on SLOA-owned property and an easement.

The decision addresses whether the respondents had approval to build, whether the structures constituted actionable encroachments, and whether the restrictive covenants were enforceable.

The court found that the respondents did not have approval, the structures substantially interfered with SLOA’s easement rights, and the restrictive covenants were valid and enforceable.

Costs were awarded to SLOA.

The plaintiff, Peoples Trust Company, brought a motion for a finding that the defendant, PSP Services Inc., was in contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders requiring cooperation with an audit and the deconversion process following the termination of their Acquiring Services and Sponsorship Agreement.

The court found that PSP intentionally frustrated and delayed the audit process, failed to comply with orders to provide documentation, and did not cooperate with the deconversion process.

The court found PSP liable for civil contempt, declined to appoint an investigative receiver at this stage, and reserved the issue of penalty and costs to a later hearing.

This decision addresses motions by plaintiffs (M.A. and C.S. et al.) to lift stays of proceedings against Christine Ramgulam-Rafiq (under a consumer proposal) and Kishen Vicky Doon (in bankruptcy) pursuant to section 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The underlying civil actions seek damages for torts including voyeurism, negligence, and intrusion upon seclusion, stemming from incidents at a spa.

The court considered whether the debtors were necessary parties for complete adjudication, if the BIA's summary claim procedure was inappropriate for complex tort claims, and if the debts would survive discharge under section 178(1) of the BIA.

The court found that both debtors were necessary parties and that the summary procedure was unsuitable.

For Mr. Doon, the claims were found to potentially fall under section 178(1)(a.1)(i) (bodily harm intentionally inflicted) and section 178(1)(e) (false pretenses) due to his guilty plea to voyeurism.

For Ms. Ramgulam-Rafiq, the court found little prospect of success for claims under section 178(1) as the allegations were primarily negligence-based, not intentional torts, and she denied knowledge.

Despite the latter, the court granted the motions to lift the stays against both debtors, concluding there were sound reasons and material prejudice to the plaintiffs if the stays continued.

The appellant, Massimo Conti, appealed an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation, which was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the costs for the successful self-represented respondents, John Duca, Joseph Duca, and Daytona Auto Centre Ltd., and the intervenor, Sergio Grillone.

The court considered the principles for awarding costs to self-represented litigants, including claims for lost income and opportunity costs, and the general principle of indemnification.

The court found no evidence to support the respondents' claim for lost commissions or special costs due to the appellant's counsel's conduct.

However, acknowledging the time and annoyance caused by the appeal, the court exercised its discretion to award modest costs to both the respondents and the intervenor.

The appellant appealed an order vacating a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) from a property title.

The CPL was initially granted without proper notice to the respondents and based on materially incorrect factual representations by the appellant's counsel.

The court upheld the Associate Justice's decision to vacate the CPL, emphasizing the duty of full and fair disclosure in motions, particularly those effectively brought without notice, and the impact of inaccurate evidentiary records.

The court also affirmed the Associate Justice's discretion in allowing an intervener to participate.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment and specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a residential property, alleging the defendant breached the contract by failing to provide vacant possession and clear the garage on the closing date.

The defendant argued the APS, particularly an appended schedule, did not require vacant possession by the closing date.

The court interpreted the contract, giving precedence to the added schedule over the standard form, and found that the defendant was not obligated to provide vacant possession by the chosen closing date, as the Residential Tenancies Act's notice period extended beyond it.

Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding no breach occurred.

The defendant sought an urgent injunction to prevent the sale of a mortgaged property by the plaintiffs under a power of sale.

The defendant argued the property was unique, the notice of sale was deficient, and payments were not properly credited.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the property was not unique, the notice of sale was not void due to minor irregularities, and the balance of convenience favored the plaintiffs, who had a binding agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties.

The respondent had lent $6,000,000 to the appellant via a vendor take-back mortgage that matured on May 7, 2016.

Upon default, the respondent offered a settlement for $6,162,950.45, which included principal, interest, three months' interest compensation, receivership costs, and legal fees.

The appellant paid the full amount and received a discharge of the mortgage.

Three days later, the appellant disputed the amount charged and sought relief from certain costs.

The motion judge enforced the settlement, finding the terms were clear and the appellant had accepted them without condition or protest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the enforceability of the settlement agreement and rejecting arguments regarding unconscionability and violations of the Interest Act.

The solicitors brought a motion opposing confirmation of a Certificate of Assessment that reduced their legal account and awarded costs of the assessment hearing to the client.

The reviewing judge found no error in the assessment officer’s reduction of the solicitors’ fees on a quantum meruit basis.

However, the court held that the costs award to the self‑represented client was an error in principle because the result of the assessment was mixed and there was no evidence of costs incurred or opportunity costs lost.

The court emphasized that self‑represented litigants may recover costs only where supported by evidence of compensable loss or time beyond that ordinarily spent by a party to litigation.

The costs award was set aside while the reduced solicitor’s account was maintained.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action after trial, the defendant sought costs relying on a pre‑trial offer to settle served under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The offer proposed payment between $25,000 and $10,000 depending on the timing of acceptance, but it was not accepted.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the offer was merely a nuisance offer and found it constituted a genuine attempt to compromise the dispute.

Applying the principles governing Rule 49 offers where the result at trial is more favourable to the offeror, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.