Gregory Tad Alexander Gryguc

A law firm sought to collect $5,458.44 in unpaid fees from a former client.

After facing a three-year delay for an assessment hearing under the Solicitors Act, the firm moved for leave to stay the assessment and proceed in Small Claims Court.

The court interpreted section 23 of the Solicitors Act, concluding that it only bars actions on alternative fee arrangements (such as contingency or block fees) and does not prevent a solicitor from suing on a standard hourly retainer agreement.

The court granted the firm leave to bring an action in Small Claims Court.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the terms of a draft order.

A defendant sought a declaration that one or more insurers had a duty to defend her in a personal injury action arising from an incident involving a hydraulic lift on a rented truck.

The court analyzed whether coverage was available under multiple automobile policies and a homeowner’s policy, and the priority between them.

Applying the pleadings rule for the duty to defend and the statutory framework under the Insurance Act, the court found that the claim arose from the use or operation of the rented vehicle.

The insurer of the rental truck was held to have the primary duty to defend, while the homeowner’s policy was excess and the other automobile policies did not afford coverage.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a Certificate of Assessment and declare Minutes of Settlement void.

He argued that he did not understand the terms of the agreement and lacked independent legal advice.

The Divisional Court heard the matter de novo based on the motion record.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to provide his own affidavit evidence to support his claim of non est factum, and that independent legal advice is not a strict legal requirement for an agreement to be enforceable.

The successful plaintiff sought an award of costs following litigation against multiple defendants.

The court considered the factors set out in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including reasonableness and proportionality of the costs claimed.

Finding that the plaintiff was substantially successful, the court exercised its discretion to award costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff $44,312.35 in costs, inclusive.

The applicant lawyer brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff’s claim in professional negligence arising from the drafting of an affidavit used in mortgage transactions allegedly connected to a fraud.

The plaintiff alleged the lawyer failed to investigate the truth of statements made by the affiant and thereby facilitated fraudulent mortgages.

The court held the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the lawyer owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, had no retainer with the plaintiff, and had no obligation to verify the truth of affidavit contents.

The court further held that commissioning or drafting an affidavit does not constitute a representation by the lawyer that its contents are true.

As the plaintiff conceded no other viable cause of action existed, the claim against the lawyer was struck without leave to amend.

The plaintiff general contractor brought an action against a roofing contractor and its principals for breach of contract and negligence arising from the installation of a flat roof on a Toronto property.

Expert evidence established that the roof installation failed to comply with manufacturer guidelines and industry standards, lacked a required cover board, and allowed water infiltration into the building.

The defendants alleged that the document signed was merely an estimate and that subsequent leakage resulted from design changes and damage caused by other contractors.

The court found a binding contract existed and accepted expert evidence that the roof was improperly installed and in a failed condition.

Damages were awarded for roof replacement, interim repairs, crane costs, and documented cleanup expenses.

The appellant, a former estate trustee, appealed a summary judgment granted in a mortgage action against the estate.

The appellant argued the mortgage should be set aside under the Family Law Act as the property was a matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant lacked standing as he was no longer an estate trustee and was not sued in his personal capacity.

Furthermore, the court upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to prove the mortgagee had actual or constructive notice that the mortgagor was a spouse and the property was a matrimonial home.

The appellant mortgagor appealed a judgment granting the respondent mortgagees $876,797.55 owed under a mortgage agreement.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by granting judgment instead of directing an accounting, as the amounts were contested.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge had sufficient evidence to substantiate the claims and the appellant failed to provide evidence to confirm the amounts owed.

The court noted that any arithmetical errors should have been addressed by returning to the motion judge for directions.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing a motion to set aside a Consent Certificate of Assessment and Minutes of Settlement regarding $7,500 in legal fees owed to the respondent.

The respondent argued, and the appellant conceded, that the appeal lay to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 19(1.2)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the order was for a single payment of not more than $50,000.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following a motion to review an order dismissing a motion as abandoned.

Costs were fixed at $3,000 all inclusive in favour of the respondents.

The moving parties sought a review of an order dismissing their motion as abandoned, claiming it had been adjourned and should not have been on the list.

The Court of Appeal found that regardless of what happened on the return date, the underlying motion lacked merit because a previous request for an extension of time to appeal had already been denied, there was no appeal pending, and the properties had already been sold.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff contractor sued a corporation and its director for breach of contract arising from unpaid plumbing and drainage services.

The parties had orally settled the debt by reducing the amount owed and arranging repayment through a loan amortization schedule, but no written settlement agreement or personal guarantee was executed.

The plaintiff alleged the director personally guaranteed repayment of the corporate debt.

The court found the evidence did not establish that the director promised a personal guarantee.

In any event, any such oral guarantee would be unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds because it was not in writing and signed.

The appellants, former counsel for the respondent in family law proceedings, appealed an order and a subsequent costs endorsement.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error of fact or law in the motions judge's findings regarding the advancement of funds.

The court also determined that leave was not required to appeal the costs endorsement under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, and found no error in the motions judge's exercise of discretion.

The appeals were dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that found a cohabitation agreement invalid but upheld the validity of subsequent Minutes of Settlement regarding spousal support.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Minutes were negotiated with independent legal advice and were not unconscionable.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also refused, as the trial judge properly exercised her discretion considering divided success and the parties' financial circumstances.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for specific performance requiring the transfer of property pursuant to a first right of refusal and an agreement of purchase and sale.

They also sought leave to appeal the costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings that there was no first right of refusal and that the agreement of purchase and sale was unenforceable due to the improbability of obtaining severance.

Leave to appeal costs was also refused.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court Deputy Judge's decision to halt a judgment debtor examination because the debtor was receiving social assistance.

The Divisional Court found that there is no authority in the Small Claims Court Rules to prevent an examination on this basis.

The purpose of the examination is to gather financial information, which may include uncovering assets unknown to social assistance agencies.

The application was allowed, the Deputy Judge's order was set aside, and a new examination was ordered before a different judge.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a prescriptive easement over the respondents' parking spaces.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellant's affidavit evidence failed to establish 20 years of continuous use prior to the property's transfer to the land titles system in 2002, as it did not comply with Rule 39.01(5).

Furthermore, the Court agreed that the use of the parking spaces was a matter of mutual convenience rather than 'as of right'.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiffs sought specific performance of an alleged oral right of first refusal for a 123-acre property, or alternatively, specific performance of a written agreement of purchase and sale for a 10-15 acre severed parcel.

The court found no oral agreement existed for the right of first refusal, and even if it did, it was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as the plaintiff's property maintenance did not constitute part performance.

The court also declined to order specific performance of the written agreement because expert evidence established that obtaining the necessary land severance was highly improbable.

The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the defendant's counterclaim to validate the transfer and remove certificates of pending litigation was granted.

The plaintiff, a former residential tenant, brought an action against his former landlord for damages resulting from a rat bite and poor maintenance of his unit.

The defendant landlord brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court dismissed the action, finding that under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, the Landlord and Tenant Board has exclusive jurisdiction over claims relating to a landlord's failure to maintain a residential unit.