J. Patrick Brown

Three young men were convicted by jury of aggravated assault following an unprovoked group attack on a social worker protecting a vulnerable child at a hotel in London, Ontario on December 29, 2021.

The victim was stabbed five times and suffered multiple injuries.

The court sentenced the offenders to terms of imprisonment, considering their youth, refugee backgrounds, family support systems, and immigration consequences, while emphasizing the serious nature of the group violence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking various relief concerning the estate of the late Dean Joseph Costanza, including a suspensory order under the Succession Law Reform Act, a Mareva injunction, and an order to deposit life insurance proceeds into trust.

They argued that the $500,000 life insurance payout, designated to the minor defendant, should be deemed part of the deceased's net estate for dependant support purposes under s. 72(1)(f) of the Act.

The court dismissed these requests, finding that the life insurance proceeds, already paid out pursuant to a prior unappealed court order, were not subject to clawback under s. 72(1)(f) due to the application of s. 72(7) and because they were no longer "payable." The court further held that the plaintiffs' requests constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the prior order and an abuse of process.

The Mareva injunction was also denied as the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case or a genuine risk of asset dissipation.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful summary judgment motion brought by the City of Hamilton, which resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

Following the parties' agreement on costs, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the City of Hamilton an all-inclusive amount of $200,000 for the action and summary judgment motion.

The City of Hamilton moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for injuries sustained while cycling on an off-road path adjacent to Stone Church Road East.

The plaintiff, Otto Bello, suffered complete tetraplegia after riding into a culvert.

The City argued the claim was barred by s.44(8) of the Municipal Act, 2001, as the accident occurred on an untravelled portion of a highway.

The court found that clearly marked bicycle lanes were available, and the plaintiff chose an informal, untravelled path.

The court concluded that it was not reasonably foreseeable that cyclists would use the off-road path instead of the provided bicycle lanes, thus granting summary judgment to the City and dismissing the plaintiff's action.

In this family law dispute, both parties brought motions concerning support arrears, property payments, and financial disclosure.

The primary contested issue was the amount of child and spousal support arrears, with the applicant seeking over $21,000 and the respondent proposing approximately $9,900.

The court fixed the arrears at the respondent's proposed amount of $9,927.32 as of December 31, 2023, finding the applicant's higher claim included disputed section 7 expenses and property taxes not covered by existing orders.

The court also made orders regarding mortgage payments, property taxes, and the production of income tax returns.

To manage the long-standing litigation, the court ordered that no further motions could be brought without leave and directed the parties to arrange a trial management conference to move the matter to trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to determine the admissibility of a post-surgery photo of the plaintiff's head and a pre-operative CT scan for use in their opening address to the jury in a liability-only trial.

The defendants objected on grounds of relevance and prejudice.

Applying the four-part test from Whitford v. Swan, the court allowed the photo, finding it relevant to explain the plaintiff's lack of memory and not unduly prejudicial, provided it was proven at trial.

However, the CT scan was disallowed due to its narrative commentary and embellishments, which were deemed prejudicial and of low probative value given that damages were settled.

The parties settled damages in a motor vehicle accident where a pedestrian was struck.

The defendants brought a motion to vary the usual order of presentation at trial, arguing they bear the onus of disproving negligence under s. 193(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff still bears the burden of proving at least one issue on liability, such as that she was struck by the defendants' vehicle, and therefore there was no basis to depart from the usual order of presentation.

Jamie Gibson applied to strike his guilty plea to one count of possessing child pornography, arguing it was not informed or voluntary, made on the spur of the moment, and under pressure from former counsel.

The court found his evidence inconsistent and untruthful regarding the voluntariness and timing of the plea.

The court accepted the evidence of his former counsel, Ms. Bracken, and found that the plea was valid, voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, meeting the requirements of section 606(1.1) of the Criminal Code.

The application to strike the guilty plea was dismissed.

The appellant, seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident, sued her insurer for bad faith in handling her statutory accident benefits (SABs) claim, seeking punitive and exemplary damages.

The insurer had failed for approximately three years to advise the appellant or her parents that her injuries qualified as a catastrophic impairment or to inform them of available benefits.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding that the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) had exclusive jurisdiction under section 280 of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the dispute resolution provisions of the Insurance Act apply broadly to disputes concerning SABs entitlement and administration, regardless of whether the claim is characterized as one for bad faith.

The defendant banquet hall brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against it.

The plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury in a motor vehicle accident caused by an intoxicated driver who had just left a Christmas party hosted at the defendant's premises.

The defendant argued it had no reason to intervene as the driver showed no visible signs of intoxication and it had standard alcohol service protocols in place.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a jury could conclude the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to properly monitor alcohol consumption and track patrons leaving the premises.

The plaintiff sued her insurer for bad faith, negligence, and fraud in the administration of her statutory accident benefits claim following a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant insurer brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the statement of claim, arguing the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) had exclusive jurisdiction under section 280 of the Insurance Act.

The court agreed, finding that the essential character of the dispute concerned the denial of accident benefits, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LAT regardless of how the claim is legally characterized.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

The court ruled on the admissibility of expert toxicological opinion evidence regarding blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels and signs of intoxication during a trial.

The expert was deemed qualified to testify on BAC levels and their physiological effects based on assumptions.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion on whether an individual exhibited signs of intoxication or others' ability to detect impairment, holding that these are matters of common knowledge for a jury and do not require expert testimony.

The court also cautioned against experts developing hypotheses and sifting through evidence to support them.

The plaintiff was injured in a multi-car collision.

The defendants admitted liability, and the case proceeded to a jury for damages.

This ruling addresses a threshold motion brought by the plaintiff to determine if her claim for general damages is barred by s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, which requires a "permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function." The court applied the three-part test from Meyer v. Bright and found that the plaintiff's impairments to her ability to work and attend school were permanent, important, and serious, thus meeting the statutory threshold.

Following a jury verdict finding the plaintiff 100% liable for injuries arising from a motor vehicle collision, the successful defendants sought substantial costs.

The court applied the reasonableness and proportionality principles governing costs awards under the Rules of Civil Procedure and appellate guidance.

While the defendants were entitled to partial indemnity costs because they succeeded at trial, the court reduced the quantum significantly due to excessive and duplicative claims, unnecessary prolongation of the proceedings by the defendants, and improper inclusion of certain items such as voluntary mediation costs.

Arguments by the plaintiff that costs should be denied due to hardship, alleged disclosure failures, or Rule 49 offer acceptance were rejected.

The court fixed a reduced costs award reflecting fairness and proportionality.

The accused was convicted of six offences arising from a home invasion robbery committed with a co-accused, including robbery while armed with a shotgun, forcible confinement, possessing a firearm while prohibited, and using a firearm while committing an indictable offence.

The accused also was convicted of uttering threats to a corrections officer while in custody.

The accused pleaded guilty to all charges and accepted responsibility.

The sentencing court imposed a 49-month federal penitentiary sentence on the main charges and a concurrent five-month jail sentence on the threatening charge, with a lifetime firearms prohibition and DNA order.

The court applied Gladue principles and granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio.