Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-23-477 Date: September 3, 2025 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

His Majesty the King

and

Muzammil Ahmed (Defendant) Ali Almheini (Defendant) Mohanad Ahmed Khanjar Khalifi (Defendant)

Counsel:

• A. Orlov, for the Crown
• J. Brown, for Defendant Ahmed
• B. Neufeld, for Defendant Almheini
• J. Prosser, for Defendant Khalifi

Heard: November 4, 13, 20, 2024; January 28, February 20, 28, June 12, 2025

Reasons for Sentence

Justice M. B. Carnegie

Introduction

[1] On December 29, 2021, Mr. Elio Campbell was working in association with the Children's Aid Society, supervising a 14-year-old female in care at a hotel in London, Ontario. In the early morning hours, Mr. Campbell heard noises coming from his charge's room, knocked in an effort to remove apparent third parties who were apparently engaged in sexual activity, and was then attacked by multiple parties in the hotel hallway. He retreated to and was pursued into his room, where the attack continued. He was pushed, punched, kicked and stomped upon during this confrontation, his assailants totalling as many as seven persons. The attack culminated in five stab wounds to the back and leg, with lacerations to his stomach and palm.

[2] This was an appalling group attack upon a victim who was merely doing his job, trying to protect an at-risk child. Mr. Campbell is lucky he survived. His resulting physical and psychological wounds have had a significant impact upon him and his family.

[3] On June 26, 2024, after an eleven-day trial, a jury found Muzammil Ahmed, Ali Almheini and Mohanad Khalifi guilty of aggravated assault. Only these three assailants were on trial. These defendants contested identity and the respective roles of each participant during the trial.

[4] The Crown advanced a party liability theory which was obviously accepted by the jury. The Crown seeks a finding that Mr. Khalifi, found upon arrest in possession of a knife, was in possession of the knife used to stab Mr. Campbell repeatedly. This position is inconsistent with the evidence of the victim at trial, who identified Mr. Ahmed as the stabber.

[5] Given the same narrative involved, I will here engage in a sentencing analysis for each offender, noting where appropriate the individualized features of each offender which contributes to their particular disposition.

Factual Background

[6] Over the course of this jury trial, identity and the scope of individual party liability were the primary issues. As a result, much of the evidence respecting the narrative went unchallenged.

Circumstances of the Offence

[7] Mr. Campbell, 54 years of age, was working in behavioural assistance supporting the Children's Aid Society. Throughout his career he offered services to assist children with behavioural issues, particularly those in care in group home settings. On December 29, 2021, he was supporting/supervising a client who was being sheltered at a hotel, who had a history with human trafficking. Another colleague was also at this hotel supporting another child in care.

[8] From late December 28th through the early morning hours of December 29th, this female client, 14 years of age, left and returned to her room without leave on a number of occasions. His room was located across the hallway from hers. Early in the morning of December 29th, after 5 am, Mr. Campbell heard a commotion across the hallway and investigated. His female client was not permitted visitors in her room, yet he could hear numerous persons inside her room. He knocked on the door announcing that she was not permitted visitors. He heard males respond negatively to that effect that they were in the midst of an "orgy" and that he was to "get out". Mr. Campbell called out to his colleague, Mr. Babatunde, who was on the same floor, for assistance. He asked his colleague to retrieve the hotel manager for assistance and he left to do so.

[9] Mr. Campbell then heard a male voice announcing he was coming out. A male exited the room and immediately confronted Mr. Campbell, pushing him backwards. At trial Mr. Campbell described this individual and identified Mr. Ahmed as this assailant. A second male then entered the hallway. Mr. Campbell briefly observed 3 – 4 other males and a couple of females still in his client's room. This second assailant then punched him in the mouth, "bursting his upper lip" and loosening a tooth.

[10] Mr. Campbell managed to stagger back to his suite but was followed by a growing number of assailants. He described them as coming at him in a "pack". More punches followed as he attempted to gain access to his room while the group prevented him from sheltering inside by pushing on his door. He was spat on by two females in the group, not his client, and the group overpowered him and pushed open his room door.

[11] A protracted attack then ensued. Multiple individuals entered and began punching the side of his head until he was grounded in the main area of his suite. He received repeated blows all over his body and describing being "punched, kicked in my head, back, face, chest, all over my body." This encounter upended his desk chair and lamp. He heard one of the assailants announce loudly that "they" were going to "fuck you up here tonight". He then described a "rain of punches and kicks" upon him. As he tried to get up, he was stabbed with a "blunt object" in his back and shoulder. He received two stab wounds in this main desk area of the suite.

[12] He was able to retreat further into the suite towards the kitchenette area. There, he was stabbed again, repeatedly, in the back as he tried to escape this area towards his bedroom. He received four stab wounds to this point.

[13] To this point, he described all the males in the room participating in the attack. None of them where observed to do anything to separate him from the knife wielding attacker, or to stop the assaults in general.

[14] Once in the bedroom, Mr. Campbell was punched and hit repetitively causing him to fall down on the ground where his head was then "stomped on", with persons kicking his body. He managed to get up again and received another punch to his face causing him to fall onto his bed. While others continued the strikes, the assailant he identified as Mr. Ahmed then came with a knife and stabbed him on his right thigh, and then tried to cut his stomach. Mr. Campbell grabbed the knife and cried out: "are you going to kill me for doing my job"? While this was occurring, the other assailants were standing around the "stabber" and his bed.

[15] As the attack on the bed continued, Mr. Babatunde and the hotel manager arrived outside the suite. At that point, the assailants all fled out of the suite and left the hotel – some using the elevators, others the stairs. They described "4 – 5 kids" run past them in the hallway. Hotel video surveillance video captured segments of the flight from the hotel from various parties said to be Mr. Campbell's assailants. Mr. Campbell was found by his colleague and the hotel manager in a pool of blood. 911 was called.

[16] Police responded first to the scene. Officers noted Mr. Campbell "bleeding profusely" with multiple distinct stab wounds. They applied pressure to the wounds and tourniquets to effected areas pending EMS arrival. The thigh injury was noted as severe. Mr. Campbell was in and out of consciousness and the officer's feared he may not survive. EMS arrived, and Mr. Campbell was rushed to hospital for immediate trauma intervention.

[17] Police then received a dispatch to later return to the same hospital advising that a possible suspect had arrived at the hospital with a hand wound. As police returned, they noted two individuals walking from the emergency room, one later identified as Mr. Khalifi. They were detained, became "passively resistant" and then were secured. Searched incident to arrest, Mr. Khalifi was found to be in possession of a knife which did not match some of the descriptors offered by the victim. Because of this, police did not forensically test this weapon in an effort to link or exclude it from involvement in this offence.

[18] Another two individuals were located in the hospital parking lot and detained, later identified as Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Almheini. Mr. Almheini was noted as having an obvious hand wound that had been treated and wrapped. Mr. Almheini was returned to hospital for further treatment as his hand injury was actively bleeding from a 2-inch gash on his left palm.

[19] Forensic investigative efforts from the hotel scene and clothing and shoes from arrested parties, identified blood samples that could not exclude Mr. Almheini as the source. Mr. Khalifi could not be excluded as a DNA source from a beer bottle found on the hotel hallway outside the victim's room. Mr. Campbell's DNA could not be excluded from blood found on various assailants' clothing, including on the right shoe of Mr. Khalifi.

[20] As noted, video surveillance was seized and reviewed from the hotel. Seven suspected assailants were ultimately identified in the associated groups, with consistent clothing and generalized descriptions from Mr. Campbell and the other witnesses.

Circumstances of the Offenders

[21] The flip side of the proportionality coin requires consideration of the personal circumstances of each offender.

Muzammil Ahmed

[22] Mr. Ahmed is 24 years of age and was 20 years old on the offence date.

[23] He was born in Pakistan and is the eldest of four children to his now separated parents. He reports a positive familial upbringing that was scarred by life-threatening sectarian violence due to religious prejudice that his family suffered as a result of their Muslim faith while in Pakistan. His parents separated in 2016 and he cut off communication with his father and paternal side.

[24] In 2019, Mr. Ahmed emigrated with his siblings and mother to Canada as refugees to escape the increasing threats and violence. His immigration status as a refugee was confirmed by the Pre-sentence Report author, and he was found a "Convention Refugee" in 2022, allowing him to remain in Canada as a protected person – I am advised that this is analogous to permanent residency. He has applied formally for permanent residency based upon the protected person class and his application is still pending determination due to the pending nature of this legal proceeding. He has also been issued a study and work permit. As the eldest male child, he reports a cultural obligation to support his family financially and emotionally.

[25] Since his arrival, he and his family have resided in multiple homes in London. He established a small group of friends and works full time to provide financial assistance to his family. His mother receives government financial assistance and attends adult learning for English language training. One of his sisters is in college, the other two are in elementary school. He has had an on and off relationship for four years with a female partner.

[26] Mr. Ahmed's mother has reported that her son is kind, caring and loving, providing "great help to her and her children as the eldest male in the family." She is not working and cares for her children. She relies upon Mr. Ahmed to help her with the family finances through his income and provide other supports respecting his siblings.

[27] Mr. Ahmed attended secondary school in London for three years before leaving to obtain full time employment to support his family. He is five credits short of a diploma. He was employed fulltime in a fast-food restaurant between 2019 – 2021 and then began working in the construction industry, namely in roofing, painting and renovation work. His employer confirmed this subcontractor employment since February of 2024. He was described as providing quality work, is pleasant, punctual, motivated and has a good work ethic. His work for this employer has taken him across Ontario.

[28] Many of the same characteristics were described by the Pre-sentence Report author. He was punctual, polite, respectful and cooperative. He expressed empathy for the victim and regret respecting his involvement in this matter. Troubling, however, is his characterization of his role in the offence. He reported that he does not accept responsibility for harming the victim, that he instead accepts that he was "in the wrong place at the wrong time". Of course, he is entitled to dispute the jury's finding respecting his, at a minimum, aiding and/or abetting party status. However, Mr. Ahmed went further advising the Pre-sentence Report author that "had he known at the time of the offence that the victim had been harmed he would have tried to help the victim." While vague to some extent, on the narrative made clear during this trial, I cannot accept that any of the involved parties in this group attack could or would have been ignorant of the injuries caused to the victim, over and above the ongoing and brutal nature of this attack.

[29] For purposes of this sentencing, Mr. Ahmed is a first-time youthful adult offender. I note that in March 2024, he was found guilty of a breach of his release order and received a fine. While on release for this offence, counsel acknowledges that his conditions were not particularly stringent meriting sentencing mitigation.

Ali Almheini

[30] Mr. Almheini is 22 years of age and was 18 years old on the offence date.

[31] He was born in Syria but he and his family ultimately fled to Lebanon as refugees amidst a civil war. His family's business was destroyed during the war and members of his extended family were killed. They lived in a refugee camp for three years, where he reports living in a tent and experiencing abuse, racism and discrimination. He emigrated with his family to Canada when he was 13 years old. He is a permanent resident having entered Canada under refugee status. He reports that his experience in Canada has been positive, and he advises that he has not faced racism or discrimination, having been accepted in his community and schools.

[32] Mr. Almheini's father worked in construction but is presently receiving disability benefits due to a work-related injury. His mother works in the home supporting the family. Mr. Almheini is the eldest of five siblings. All reside in the family home. He reports positive relations with his entire family.

[33] Mr. Almheini has worked to support his family from an early age. At eleven, he left school to work on a farm. He resumed schooling when he came to Canada, attending elementary and secondary school in London. He graduated high school and then re-entered the workforce but has a desire to attend college to learn a skilled trade, with an interest in being an electrician. He has worked since in construction, landscaping, various labour positions and at a bakery. Since mid-2024, he has worked as a concrete labourer fulltime where his employer reports that he has demonstrated "excellent skill and dedication to his role". His positive work ethic and professionalism was noted. He was described as a "good kid, an asset to the company…and has a lot of potential."

[34] He presented to the Pre-sentence Report author as polite and forthcoming. He reported that he "fell in with a group of peers who were negative influences" but has ceased associating with them since. While he expressed empathy for the victim and regret for associating with "the co-accused" and placing himself in what he described as the "wrong time at the wrong place", he does not take responsibility for the offence which, of course, is his right. He regrets "every single minute I walked with these people".

[35] His mother describes Mr. Almheini as "kind-hearted" and "compassionate". His father refers to his as "kind-hearted…helpful" and not a violent person. His parents emphasized that he is now very careful about who he befriends.

[36] Mr. Almheini is a first-time youthful adult offender and has not breached his release conditions.

Mohanad Khalifi

[37] Mr. Khalifi is 27 years of age and was 23 years old on the offence date.

[38] He was born in Iraq and, while refusing to detail, described his childhood there as "terrifying and horrible". At 10 years of age, he and his family became displaced by an ongoing war and regional conflicts. He lost a brother during these conflicts. They moved to Syria and then Lebanon to escape. In 2016, as a young adult, his family was sponsored by a church in Aylmer, Ontario, and they came to Canada as refugees. He expressed gratitude to the Pre-sentence Report author that his family was welcomed, felt safe, and "life was good".

[39] Mr. Khalifi is the third eldest of ten children, he has six brothers and three sisters whom he has very close relationships with. He was very complementary of his parents, but there has been conflict in their relationship leading to separation after their arrival in Canada. His father reflected upon the negative impact that their time in Iraq and the loss of his brother had upon Mr. Khalifi, in particular respecting his mental health.

[40] Mr. Khalifi made friends in school in Canada, particularly with others who immigrated as refugees. He acknowledges becoming involved with a negative peer group who engaged in criminal behaviour but advises that he has now distanced himself from them. His parents believe that negative peers "corrupted" their son and have cautioned him.

[41] Mr. Khalifi fell a few credits shy of completing his secondary school requirements and plans to complete his education when he is able. Most of his education was before his arrival in Canada which he described as "poor" and hampered him. He left school after a year in Canada to begin working to support his family. He has attended some adult education programs to advance towards his diploma. He reports being regularly employed with various painting companies since 2018. He emphasized the value of his employment and supporting his family to the Pre-sentence Report author and advised that his employer is aware of his legal circumstances and will welcome him back to work once he is released from custody.

[42] Mr. Khalifi denied any problems with substance abuse, rarely using alcohol or drugs acknowledging that his cultural beliefs forbids substance use. His father believes that substance abuse was a feature of the negative peer group associations.

[43] Since the trial, Mr. Khalifi has been in custody since June 27, 2024 on unrelated matters that are pending trial. To this point, he has been in custody for 433 days.

[44] Mr. Khalifi presented himself as polite and cooperative to his Pre-sentence Report author. He declined to discuss offence related events. He takes pride in his commitment to his culture, religion and family and showed some insight into his personal mental health struggles. In particular, he was diagnosed with psychosis four years ago and has been hospitalized as a result. This 2020 diagnosis predates this offence, and it was noted by his consulting psychiatrist that his capacity to follow through with his own oral medical treatment regime was questioned. He now receives regular treatment injections. He commented that he is "afraid of his psychosis" and will sometimes "do bad things unconsciously". His cognitive capacity has been noted by family and doctors as declining. He acknowledged self harm ideation/attempts in the past and previous struggles with anger management. His institutional healthcare team confirmed his ongoing psychiatric treatment and that he is presently diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.

[45] Mr. Khalifi is a described by his father as a devoted Muslim. His short-term goals upon release include returning to work, re-establishing his family life and disconnecting with negative peer influences. His father plans to provide "extensive support" to Mr. Khalifi upon his release, including with his healthcare needs. Mr. Khalifi has expressed concern about being deported back to Iraq.

Victim Impact

[46] On December 29, 2021, Mr. Campbell was working as a social worker, protecting a vulnerable child in need of protection. Confronted with a scenario that put her at risk, he did his job an attempted to intervene. He asked the trespassers to leave. He was "swarmed" and beaten and almost killed for this decision.

[47] The physical and psychological trauma resulting from this incident has been and continues to be profound. The immediate aftermath of this attack was difficult. He had suffered critical life-threatening injuries and had lost a significant amount of blood. But for substantial medical intervention this event could have been fatal. The wounds, in particular his leg wound, required substantive daily physical wound care and therapy and he suffered through "excruciating pain" for many months. He laments his disfigurement as a perpetual reminder of the event. He required physical therapy, pain management and walking assistance through 2022.

[48] Psychologically, Mr. Campbell's world view and his place in it has changed. He was a confident spouse, father and grandfather and a strength for his family. This confidence has now been completely shaken, his vulnerability enhanced and exposed. He struggles with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and is constantly on guard for his and his family's safety. The installation of a costly security system at his home is now but one manifestation of the effects of this attack. He continues to relive the event and psychiatric assistance is required. His resiliency, a former strength, has eroded. His children fear his return to work.

[49] The financial impact of this event for his family has been enormous. Beyond the uncovered medical expenses, as an independent contractor he had little support to fall back on. He was the "main bread winner" for the family but his wife now has had to make up as much possible for the lost familial income because he has not been able to return to work. The family's income has taken a major blow. Given the years he invested in building his career, another career is not a viable option at this stage of his life which continues to create trepidation and a conflict between his financial responsibilities and his psychological needs.

[50] The trial was difficult for Mr. Campbell and his family. Reliving the trauma and excoriating details set him back. Ms. Frith-Campbell, his wife, has supported him throughout this proceeding. She notes that their Christian faith has been a source of strength. She has reflected on the "chilling numbness" this event created for them, and her resulting "simmering outrage" that this could happen to "one of the good guys". Unsurprisingly, while loving and supportive of her husband, she mourns the loss of her self-assured husband who now continues to struggle with PTSD. Her observation that Mr. Campbell's participation in this trial was demonstrative of how strong a man he is, or in the words of their children "somewhere between Hercules and Superman", is a hope filled expression that better days are ahead for their family.

Legal Framework

[51] Section 718 of the Code highlights that "the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society…and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions." To achieve this purpose, the following relevant objectives and principles are noteworthy:

(1) s. 718 highlights denunciation, deterrence, the separation of offenders from society when necessary, rehabilitation, reparation for harm done and the promotion of a sense of responsibility and acknowledgment of the harm done;

(2) s. 718.04 notes that the court should give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence when an offence involves the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances;

(3) s. 718.1 highlights that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender;

(4) s. 718.2(a) emphasizes the importance of increasing or decreasing a sentenced based upon an assessment of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and deemed aggravating circumstances include:

(i) s. 718.2(a)(iii.1) where there is evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation,

(5) s. 718.2(b) highlights the importance of parity in sentencing so that similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances receive similar sentences; and

(6) s. 718.2(d) notes that an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances bringing into focus the important principle of restraint, even where, as here, imprisonment is a reality.

[52] The principle of proportionality is fundamental and has been characterized as the cardinal principal of sentencing requiring the court to consider the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. As the Supreme Court said in R v Lacasse, "the more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender's degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be." This fundamental principle is central to the maintenance of public confidence in the criminal justice system. It demands that the punishment "speaks out against the offence and punishes the offender no more than is necessary." In so doing, it seeks to balance the principle of restraint with the importance of holding offenders accountable for their actions. The moral blameworthiness of the offender is important. Offenders who intentionally cause harm should be subjected to a greater punishment than those who did not intend the harm that flowed from their conduct. Sentencing must remain, however, a highly individualized task.

Positions of the Parties

[53] The Crown seeks a totality range of 3 ½ to 4 years imprisonment for these offenders alongside ancillary orders including DNA, a weapons prohibition and non-association with the victim and various other parties while serving their sentences. It is submitted that only this range of sentence can adequately address the sentencing priorities of denunciation and deterrence.

[54] As noted, with respect to Mr. Khalifi in particular, the Crown seeks a 4-year term of imprisonment to reflect the aggravating factor of being in possession of the knife used in the attack at the time of his arrest. If I conclude otherwise, a 3 ½ year sentence would be proportionate for each offender.

[55] The defendants all acknowledge that a custodial sentence is required, but submit that a conditional sentence is available and can adequately satisfy the principles of sentencing once various mitigating circumstances are taken into account, including collateral consequences for each, in particular their immigration consequences, the employment ramifications of an in carceral disposition, and for Mr. Khalifi, consideration of his pre-sentence custody and its related harsh conditions, as well as a s. 24(1) Charter remedy for a breach of his privacy interest respecting the release of medical history records sought from the jail by the Crown. In addition to a conditional sentence order, they invite consideration of community supervision and do not oppose the ancillary orders requested by the Crown.

Analysis

[56] First, I must consider whether I can find that any of these offenders was the principal involved in the stabbing? At trial, Mr. Campbell identified that assailant as Mr. Ahmed. On this narrative, a finding that one of these offenders was this assailant would, necessarily, put them into a more aggravating category of offender. I say this acknowledging that parties who instead aid or abet can, perhaps especially in group related attacks such as this, all be found to be equally culpable for the seriousness of the offending conduct, if not for its moral culpability.

[57] On this evidentiary record, I am not satisfied that any of these offenders have been proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be the knife wielding offender. This finding is based upon concerns over the reliability of the victim's evidence respecting the identification of who attacked him repetitively with the knife, including the following factors:

1. while Mr. Campbell positively described Mr. Ahmed as the knife wielding assailant at trial that description was inconsistent with his previous identification related statements. He described having a good opportunity to see his attacker from start to finish. At trial, he described this attacker as "Persian" yet in a previous police statement and during his preliminary inquiry evidence he described him as "Somalian". Further, he selected two different persons who were not Mr. Ahmed (or another defendant) as his attacker in two separate police photo lineups;

2. with only one knife and one knife wielding assailant described, it was Mr. Almheini who was found injured with a two-inch gash to his left palm, not Mr. Ahmed;

3. of the three offenders on trial, only one, Mr. Khalifi, was found to be in possession of a knife. Another defendant, not here tried, was noted to have been arrested in proximate possession of a knife which did not remotely match the physical characteristics described by the victim. The pocketknife in Mr. Khalifi's possession, over an hour later upon arrest, bore some consistency with the victim's description – a description that could have been reasonably encumbered by the "dim" lighting conditions of his hotel suite;

4. the hotel manager was unable to identify the assailant in possession of a knife while leaving the suite, nor could he identify the knife in his possession; and

5. the hotel surveillance video does not show any probable assailant in possession of a knife, though an assailant matching the arrest description of Mr. Khalifi appears to be placing something in his jacket pocket.

[58] As a result, on this evidentiary foundation, I have a doubt respecting who was the principal knife wielding attacker throughout this encounter. That said, none of this is a criticism of the victim's evidence. Mr. Campbell was subjected to a brutal attack and was left to fight for his life in the face of this group attack. Given the raucous unanticipated circumstances, his evidentiary reliability on this identification issue is both understandable and predictable. However, that does not yield to simply a finding that these offenders were mere passive abetters. Mr. Campbell made it plain during his evidence that each assailant actively participated in the violence inflicted upon him – they had all been actively involved in the pushing, punching, kicking, and stomping over and above their presence within a group setting making escape for this victim impossible.

[59] The Crown submits that in the face of uncertainty respecting the principal knife wielding assailant, I can nevertheless be satisfied that these offenders either all actively participated in the physical violence or that, by their group presence, enabled it to be carried out. They all were in a clear position to appreciate the significance of the violence being inflicted upon Mr. Campbell and the disarray depicted within the hotel suite bears that out, including multiple areas where substantial bloodletting occurred within the suite. Given the narrative as presented, it is unnecessary to further parse out individual involvement as active and/or supportive participation merits consistent findings respecting the seriousness of the offence and the moral culpability of the offenders. I find this reasoning persuasive.

[60] Supporting it persuasiveness are the findings of Chief Justice Fraser of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v MacIntyre wherein, faced with a group assault upon a single victim, he commented:

It is true that because of the manner in which the evidence evolved, it is impossible to determine which of the four individuals involved, if any, caused the blow to Devereaux's left leg which ultimately figured prominently in his death. But when individuals act as part of a group or gang and perpetrate criminal acts, this gang-like feature of their activities does not permit each individual to offer his individual involvement alone, ignoring for sentencing purposes, the seriousness of their collective actions. When a person acts in concert with other members of a group or gang to victimize a single victim, that person must accept the consequences, which flow from this group action. Each member of the group must be taken to know that by committing individual assaults upon a victim, he advances, and even encourages, the violence of the others.

There, not unlike here, the defendants and two others had committed as a group assaults upon the victim, each taking a turn in the victims' beating. The Court emphasized the group action taken to inflict injuries upon the victim taking a view of the whole of the collective attacks as opposed to adopting a "stop-action" individual role approach: "committing criminal offences as part of a group is properly regarded as a significant aggravating factor."

[61] Citing MacIntyre, the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R v Nikkel agreed and summarized that it is "inappropriate to draw fine distinctions between one member of a gang carrying out a co-ordinated activity in pursuit of the aims of the gang from another member of the gang engaged at the same time in roughly the same activity carrying out the aims of the gang."

Identifying Whether the Knife Involved Was in the Possession of Mr. Khalifi

[62] The Crown seeks a finding of fact respecting whether Mr. Khalifi was in possession of the knife used to cause Mr. Campbell's injuries. They do not suggest that this necessarily implicates him as the principal stabber, but that it implicates him as suppressing evidence which it claims is an aggravating feature on sentencing. In essence, he must have known given the circumstances of the offence that this knife was used upon the victim yet maintained possession of it after the fact, concealing it in his jacket.

[63] The Crown relies upon the evidence called at trial to establish whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, I can be satisfied that this aggravating fact has been proven.

[64] The jury's findings of guilt did not, by implication, necessitate a finding that any of these offenders were the principal in the knife wielding attack. At trial, the Crown relied upon a R v Thatcher instruction allowing the triers to disagree upon the form of culpability of each offender, be it principal or party. On the evidence presented, as will be highlighted, it is entirely possible that the jury found none of these offenders to be the principal knife attacker.

[65] Recently, in R v I.M., the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that, pursuant to s. 724(2), a sentencing judge in a jury trial, where the factual implications of a jury's verdict are ambiguous, "the judge may find any other relevant fact disclosed by the evidence to be proven…[t]he Crown must prove any disputed aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt for them to be relied upon at sentencing." This reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in R v Gardiner and, in particular, with its reasoning in R v Ferguson where the Court instructed:

… when the factual implications of the jury's verdict are ambiguous, the sentencing judge should not attempt to follow the logical process of the jury, but should come to his or her own independent determination of the relevant facts : Brown; R. v. Fiqia , (1994), 1994 ABCA 402 , 162 A.R. 117 (C.A .) . In so doing, the sentencing judge "may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven" (s. 724(2)(b)). To rely upon an aggravating fact or previous conviction, the sentencing judge must be convinced of the existence of that fact or conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; to rely upon any other relevant fact, the sentencing judge must be persuaded on a balance of probabilities ... It follows from the purpose of the exercise that the sentencing judge should find only those facts necessary to permit the proper sentence to be imposed in the case at hand. The judge should first ask what the issues on sentencing are, and then find such facts as are necessary to deal with those issues .

[66] In making my own determination on this contested aggravating fact, I must not arrive at a finding that is inconsistent with that which was necessary to the jury verdicts rendered. Here, I am satisfied that the jury could reasonably have concluded that all three offenders were parties, as aiders and/or abetters, not principals to the stabbing of the victim. Indeed, they were invited to do so. Whether a non-principal stabber later pocketed the knife and removed it from the scene would have been immaterial, or at least unnecessary, to this conclusion.

[67] When Mr. Khalifi was arrested, he was found in possession of a pocketknife, which had a silver blade and a black "marbled" finished grip. These other offenders were not found in possession of a knife. Another involved party, arrested weeks later, was also found in possession of a knife with a yellow handle. Neither of these knives matched exactly the description offered by Mr. Campbell of his assailant's weapon: a 5 – 6-inch knife with a black metal handle and black metal blade. But for the blade colour, the knife found on Mr. Khalifi was a relatively close match considering that the attack took place in a relatively dark hotel room, described as "dim" by Mr. Campbell, and the handle, though marbled, is upon my observation predominantly black in colour. Regardless, because no blood was immediately visible on the blade investigating officers apparently dismissed this weapon as being involved and it was not forensically tested to assist in linking or excluding it to the offence.

[68] The Crown's theory that Mr. Khalifi was knowingly in possession of the involved knife is premised first upon him being in possession of a pocketknife and, second, that the knife is generally consistent with the weapon described by the victim. I have considered a number of features from the trial evidence which I believe inform this determination, including:

1. as already described, the uncertainty of the victim's evidence respecting the knife wielding assailant;

2. as described, the laceration injury to Mr. Almheini's hand;

3. that the knife found on Mr. Khalifi, as noted, did not have a black coloured blade as described, nor did police observe any blood on it. As noted, in a "dim" hotel room in the early morning hours, the reliability of the weapon's description is reasonably in question. The Crown believes that it "matches to a good and meaningful extent";

4. that the hotel manager's inability to describe the knife, which hand it was in, or the assailant in possession of it while fleeing the suite;

5. hotel surveillance video appears to show a party, who I am satisfied meets the description of Mr. Khalifi based upon his arrest appearance and, in particular, his clothing, putting or concealing something in his pocket. What that something is, however, is not discernible;

6. that no forensic testing upon this knife was performed to include or exclude its involvement in the offence;

7. that Mr. Khalifi was arrested in possession of this knife approximately an hour and a half after the attack; and

8. another defendant, not on trial here, was arrested weeks later with a yellow handled knife found in the vehicle he was in that. I agree with the Crown that this finding was irrelevant to the offence related weapon involved. While Mr. Campbell's evidence had understandable reliability issues, a yellow handled knife is, in context, beyond a reasonably allowable inconsistency.

[69] On the totality of this evidence, I am not satisfied that the knife found in Mr. Khalifi's possession was the knife used against Mr. Campbell, let alone that he was intentionally concealing it. Any finding associating this pocketknife to the weapon used would be primarily grounded upon the reliability of Mr. Campbell's evidence, which here is lacking. Of course, that is no criticism of the victim. He was in the midst of a struggle for his life. That the police did not forensically test this knife is inexplicable. In sum, there is simply insufficient evidence to satisfy me, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this pocketknife is the weapon used in this offence.

Range of Sentence for Aggravated Assault in Stabbing Related Cases

[70] The statutory range of sentencing for aggravated assault is broad and includes a maximum period of imprisonment of 14 years. Offences that involve stabbing, however, usually demand substantial periods of incarceration and prioritize both deterrence and denunciation as predominant sentencing principles.

[71] Here, I must sentence these offenders on the basis of a stabbing related incident. That approach is in keeping with the jury's findings. While their findings were ambiguous respecting the degree of participation of each offender, the use of a knife causing significant wounding injuries was clear. By finding each offender guilty of aggravated assault, the jury must have been satisfied that each had either been a principal or a party by aiding and/or abetting this wounding, maiming or endangering of life. The Crown's aggravating assault theory emphasized the knife wounding conduct, not something less than that, and lesser included offences were introduced and available for the jury's consideration. No lesser offences were found.

[72] As a result, ranges of sentence for knife related aggravated assaults, not merely punching, kicking and stomping activity, must drive the proportionality analysis respecting the serious of the offending conduct. The key to ultimately determining a fit sentence from a seriousness of the offence perspective will be distinguishing whether the principal or party status plays a significant role.

[73] When assessing where a particular aggravated assault narrative falls into the broad range of available sentences, Justice Code in R v Tourville reviewed the sentencing jurisprudence and provided helpful categories for consideration. First, he identified an "exceptional" category which involves an unusual degree of mitigation permitting a sentencing court to deviate from the usual significant custodial disposition. Second, a mid-range where cases generally involve first time offenders with a factual element of a consensual fight during which excessive force is used. These scenarios often attract high reformatory range sentences. Finally, the high-end cases often falling in the 4 – 6 year range and usually involving recidivists involved in unprovoked or premeditated assaults with no element of consent or self-defence.

[74] In the context of stabbing cases, I found and was referred to few "exceptional" category cases. Instead, examples generally fell in the mid to high range categories, with some helpfully addressing party liability scenarios in group assault narratives.

[75] In the low range "exceptional" category, R v Peters presented an indigenous offender who pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for striking the victim over the head with a beer bottle as part of a bar altercation. The bottle broke causing significant laceration injuries and permanent scarring. A relatively youthful offender, her related youth criminal history was balanced against present Gladue factors, alcohol addiction and post offence progress while on bail. She was sentenced to a suspended sentence and probation which was not interfered with on appeal.

[76] In R v Kawerninski, the offender and a co-accused attacked the victim in a parking lot. The offender was armed with a knife and cut open the palm of the victim's hand, causing permanent damage and impairment. The victim was also stabbed in the back and temple, wounds that may have been inflicted by his co-accused, but did not diminish the offender's party culpability in the overall attack. The Court found that the applicable range of sentence was between 16 months and 6 years. This offender was indigenous, disadvantaged in his background, suffered systemic discrimination, and long-term drug and alcohol addiction. As a result, the Court found that there were "compelling Gladue considerations". Given the severity of the offending conduct, a deterrent and denunciatory sentence was required, but taking into account the "over-representation of Indigenous offenders in Canadian prisons", a reasonable alternative per s. 718.2 (e) of the Criminal Code was a punitive and restrictive conditional sentence order of 2 years less 1 day.

[77] In the mid-range category, Tourville presented an indigenous offender found guilty of aggravated assault after stabbing the victim multiple times in the context of a marginally provoked altercation. The injuries were serious but not life-threatening, inflicted upon the victim's face, head, and arm. The case was categorized as a mid-range matter. The application of Gladue principles, a remorseful offender and substantial Duncan mitigation resulted in a sentence of 21 months incarceration.

[78] In R v Kavinsky, the court faced a stabbing incident in the midst of a physical altercation. There, the 21-year-old first time offender attended a party and consumed alcohol. When the host's parents attempted to enforce a 'no drinking and driving' rule, a physical confrontation ensued during which the offender used a pocketknife and stabbed the victim parent repeatedly, including a wound to the chest necessitating a number of surgeries. The Court rejected a self-defence claim and determined that the primary sentencing objectives, particularly where a knife is used, was denunciation and deterrence. In particular, the Court noted a heightened need for denunciation and deterrence to address the "growing problem of people carrying and resorting to weapons, and knives in particular, with predictable violent and life-threatening consequences." Emphasizing the need not to impose a crushing sentence on a youthful offender, the offender was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment.

[79] Turning to the high-end category, in R v Parsons, a random attack upon a female victim was perpetrated by four adult males, including Mr. Parsons who was convicted of aggravated assault. In the early morning hours, they "stalked" the victim from a transit platform eventually corning her and stabbing her six times. Interestingly, Mr. Parsons was not found to be the stabber but was a party by aiding the offence with the others. In particular, he sprayed the victim with a beer can's contents during the attack. The stab wounds were not life-threatening but resulted in multiple days of hospitalized care. Mr. Parsons was indigenous with an "extremely dysfunctional" background attracting significant Gladue consideration. He was sentenced to 3 ½ years imprisonment minus enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody. This matter is noteworthy as it shares some relevant features to the matter before this court.

[80] In R v Ampong, the first-time offender pleaded guilty to stabbing a stranger at a library. Both were homeless and the offender had a history of schizophrenia. In a completely unprovoked attack, he approached from behind and inflicted multiple strikes upon the victim's head and neck. The offender was described as having a "blank" affect during the assault. The victim was saved by multiple surgical interventions but suffered some resulting paralysis. Accepting that this matter fell into the top end of the Tourville range, the Court recognized the many mitigating circumstances but nevertheless felt compelled to sentence the offender to 6 years incarceration.

[81] In R v Baker, the offender and two other men broke into the victim's apartment as part of a violent home invasion. The victim was repeatedly stabbed and was then robbed of cash and keys to his vehicle. He suffered significant injuries and serious trauma. The Court found him guilty as a party to the offence, satisfied that he was one of the three assailants participating in a common unlawful purpose. The Court was not satisfied, however, that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that this offender had wielded the knife and stabbed the victim. Mr. Baker had a criminal history inclusive of prior robbery and assault matters which yielded prison sentences and, despite his apologies, youthful age and drug addiction history, the Court questioned his rehabilitative prospects. He was sentenced to a totality of 8 years imprisonment minus credit for pre-sentence custody, 5 years (concurrent) of which was attributed to the aggravated assault offence on a party culpability basis. The Court noted that had Mr. Baker been found to be the principal knife wielding offender, more than 5 years would have been attributed.

[82] In R v Power, the offender stabbed the victim in the back in an unprovoked attack without any self-defence elements present. At the time, Mr. Power was on probation for an assault conviction and had a lengthy criminal record. But for compelling Gladue factors, the Court would have sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment but settled upon a 5 year penitentiary term less pre-sentence custody credit.

[83] Shifting to the group related conduct context, in R v Anderson, a group of two female and one male offender were found guilty of assault causing bodily harm and aggravated assault respectively after a jury trial. After a verbal exchange between the victim and the offenders turned physical, an unidentified party swung and hit the victim in the face with a metal pipe. This blow rendered the victim senseless and unable to defend himself. While grounded, the offenders, unsatisfied, continued the assault by inflicting punches to his head as they swarmed him. The male offender then picked up the discarded metal pipe and shattered the victim's ankle with it. The Court described this event as a group beating that was completely disproportionate to his verbal exchange and punch administered by the victim. The group nature of the attack made it more aggravating. The victim required surgery, spent considerable time in hospital and suffered significant, permanent physical and psychological injuries. The offenders, by and large, were youthful first-time adult offenders. The Crown sought 4–6-month long sentences for the female offenders and a 3 ½ to 4-year sentence for the male offender. The female offenders received 3- and 4-months jail sentences while the male was sentenced to three years incarceration for the aggravated assault.

[84] In R v Gagliardi, the Alberta Court of Appeal reviewed the sentencing of two youthful offenders convicted of aggravated assault that the trial judge characterized as "close to attempted murder". The offenders received 9- and 7-year penitentiary sentences. The first had "sucker punched" the victim rendering him immediately unconscious, and then kicked him about the head. The second offender had participated in kicking the victim. The blows were concentrated upon the victim's head resulting in severe brain injuries. The Court described this attack as "extraordinary in nature" involving extreme violence. It was worthy of an extraordinary sentence.

[85] Having canvassed these offence relevant authorities, I remind myself of the Ontario Court of Appeal's comments in R v Ali, that I must always consider whether a conditional sentence can redress offences which mandate paramount consideration of denunciation and deterrence by "considering, and weighing, the ability of a conditional sentence to meet the deterrence and denunciation objectives and other relevant sentencing objectives, including restraint and rehabilitation." In Ali, the court highlighted that the restraint principle requires sentencing judges to consider all sanctions apart from incarceration: "It is an error, especially when sentencing a first offender, to focus exclusively on general deterrence and to fail to consider individual deterrence and rehabilitation: R v Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114 , 93 OR (3d) 643, at paras. 32 , 34." The Ali Court noted that where rehabilitative prospects are strong (evidenced by stable employment, familial supports), as noted in Proulx, a conditional sentence will "generally be more effective than incarceration at achieving the restorative objectives of rehabilitation, reparations to the victim and community, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender."

[86] Of course, the Supreme Court in Proulx also noted that there will be cases "in which the need for denunciation is so pressing that incarceration will be the only suitable way in which to express society's condemnation of the offender's conduct." I find that even despite the fact that, at a minimum, a penitentiary sentence is here required, this is a case where the predominant sentencing principles nevertheless require a sentence of imprisonment. While Mr. Ali and his brother were convicted of a group aggravated assault, the degree or level of violence inflicted upon their victim (punching, kicking to the head and back causing facial and eye injuries) paled in comparison to that present here. A reformatory range sentence was otherwise fit for that offence, and failure there to consider a conditional sentence was found to be an error. Here, the level of violence and resulting injury mandates otherwise.

[87] Having canvassed these authorities in circumstances relevant to this offending conduct, I conclude that this offending conduct falls into Tourville's high-end category of aggravated assault sentences. Given the nature of the offence itself, including the use of a knife in a group attack scenario, a sentencing range of 3 – 6 years is most appropriate.

A Fit Sentence for This Offence and These Offenders

[88] I now turn to a proportionality assessment that best individualizes a sentence for each of these offenders. To do so I must balance both the present aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

[89] There are significant and concerning aggravating features that must be accounted for, including:

1. the nature of the attack itself:

a. this was an unprovoked, group attack involving as many as seven assailants upon a defenceless unarmed victim;

b. the attack was persistent, unabated, and involved multiple forms of violence, including punching, kicking, stomping and stabbing, which foreseeably could have resulted in serious injury or death;

c. the attack involved a serious weapon capable of serious, life threatening injury;

2. the nature and extent of the injuries suffered:

a. the victim was stabbed five times, on his shoulder, back and thigh, of which, without timely medical intervention could have been fatal;

b. the victim received incise wounds to his stomach and defensive wounds to his hand, occasioned by his efforts to save himself;

c. the duration of the victim's convalescence and recovery, including the continuing psychological trauma has been profound;

3. the intent of the offenders. While the attack may not have been premeditated, their intention to significantly harm, if not kill, the victim was made clear by their actions and commentary;

4. the victim was attacked simply as a function of his employment. He was exercising his responsibility to keep safe a vulnerable and at risk child, made this role clear, yet was mercilessly attacked regardless. While not perhaps belonging to a protected class of public servants, his role is deserving of protection. Even his effort to clarify for his attackers this reality was ignored in their fury and swarming mentality;

5. that the offenders were not only trespassers at the hotel, with no legitimate purpose for being there, but they, in effect, engaged in a 'home invasion' like scenario by pursuing the victim into his suite; and

6. the impact upon the victim and his family has been profound. His physical recuperation has been prolonged, costly and agonizing for the entire family. The financial impact upon them all has been real and life-altering. This event attacked his very sense of profession and purpose. And the psychological impact for the entire family has and continues to be significant.

[90] By way of mitigating factors, there are also quite a few that will be listed and further outlined, including:

1. each offender are youthful, first-time offenders. While a traditional mitigating factor that invokes the principle of restraint and, therefore, prioritizes specific deterrence and rehabilitation, as well as serious consideration of all custodial alternatives, cases involving "very serious offences and offences involving violence" lessen its import. I understand that where a custodial sentence is nevertheless deemed necessary, a first sentence of imprisonment should be as short as possible and tailored to the individual circumstances of the offender rather than solely for the purpose of general deterrence;

2. each offender has their own history of varying degrees of personal and familial trauma, each suffered as refugees seeking a better and safer life in Canada;

3. Mr. Khalifi's cognitive functioning and mental health status is relevant and contextually helpful. While his noted cognitive deficits, on this evidentiary record, may support an undiscerning association with a negative peer group, it does not support the requested inference that he was unduly susceptible and/or naïve to peer influences thereby minimizing his moral culpability for this offending conduct, an issue that was not raised at trial from a culpability perspective. I have no opinion evidence speaking to any nexus between his mental health and this offence despite what counsel submits is implied in the medical professional reports. As contemplated in R v Okemow, I cannot conclude that Mr. Khalifi's cognitive limitations played a role in his criminal conduct and thereby impacted his degree of responsibility. The impact of an individual's disability is a fact-specific exercise and not an automatic rule;

4. each offender has a supportive familial network invested in their wellbeing which increases the prospect of their continuing rehabilitation;

5. both Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Almheini financially support their families in a responsible and substantive fashion demonstrating pro-social attributes and making live collateral consequences to incarceration to be further discussed;

6. each offender faces potentially significant immigration consequences, to be further discussed;

7. Mr. Khalifi's exposure to harsh institutional conditions in pre-sentence custody; and

8. Mr. Khalifi's privacy interests in his medical history and records were breached by the Crown's sentencing hearing investigation in response to a Duncan application.

[91] For purposes of clarity, I consider the qualified remorse expressed by some of the offenders as a neutral factor on sentencing. While each expressed "empathy" for the victim, both Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Almheini minimized their involvement as being simply in the "wrong place at the wrong time" in the company of the wrong associates. They are not required to endorse the jury's findings. Their lack of insight into their degree of involvement, however, arguably adversely impacts their prospects for rehabilitation.

[92] Further, assaulting a "Good Samaritan" has been identified as an aggravating feature. In R v Rai, the 24-year-old offender "sucker punched" a "Good Samaritan" trying to calm a confrontation between two groups. The blow resulted in permanent blindness and PTSD. The unprovoked assault upon such a victim was noted as aggravating and characterized as unnecessary and gratuitous. The offender was sentenced to a 2 year less one day period of incarceration.

[93] Finally, counsel have asked me to consider parity not just as against each of these offenders, but more specifically as it relates to the other offenders involved in this offence. First, I have been advised that both female parties pleaded guilty to lesser included offences of common assault and were sentenced to a suspended sentence and probation. The Crown notes that the factual nexus supporting their respective pleas, beyond their presence during the event, involved spitting at or upon the victim. This behaviour was noted by the victim in his trial evidence. While I must and do consider parity, another court sentenced these offenders on what appears to have been a much more mitigated factual narrative. As a result, I draw little persuasive value from offenders not having been found guilty of aggravated assault, as parties to that offence, but instead being found guilty on distinctive factual foundations.

[94] In addition, the final identified male party to this offence (who upon arrest weeks later was found in proximity/possession of a yellow handled knife) pleaded guilty on May 20, 2025, to a lesser included offence of assault with a weapon. On my review of the filed transcript of that proceeding, he acknowledged being a party to the attack upon Mr. Campbell, the person wielding the knife not having been identified. In coming to a sentencing recommendation, the Crown made clear to the sentencing court that it had taken into consideration the totality of pleas entered (this offender had also pleaded guilty to numerous break and enter and breach charges), the amount of judicial resources that would be required for all these matters, including preliminary inquiries and trials, the overall issues impacting the Crown's prospects of conviction, the fact that Mr. Campbell had already testified as part of this trial matter and would benefit from finality, and identification issues that were raised. The property matters yielded a joint submission for 2 years. This assault with a weapon finding resulted in a suggested consecutive 12-month jail sentence. With this offender's significant pre-sentence custody and applicable enhanced credit, the resulting recommendation was, in essence, a time served disposition which was accepted by the court. It is noteworthy that in reasons for sentence, Justice Hornblower commented that "The Crown is not in a position to establish your role, and therefore are taking the position that in the absence of being able to prove your role, it was a relatively minor role that you played" in this "extremely serious assault". The Court than continued:

"I am prepared to follow the joint position on that basis. If it had been proven that your involvement was anything beyond what I'm being told it was, there would be a significant penitentiary sentence imposed, by me, no ifs, ands or buts. The assault almost cost Mr. Campbell his life. But because of the difficulties with the prosecution, the Crown has agreed to a position – I'm not bound by it – but I will accept it in these circumstances.

The Crown has agreed to a position which certainly doesn't reflect the gravity of the offence from the point of view of whoever the perpetrator was. As a party, you could be seen as being as liable as that perpetrator, but the Crown is not asking me to do that. I recognize the reasons for that. As I indicated, if your involvement could be proven at some other level, the sentence would be remarkably different.

One of the benefits at least to this plea, is it completes the matter insofar as Mr. Campbell is concerned, although perhaps not with the outcome he might be expecting, although there are other matters pending before other courts. But at least insofar as you're concerned, it saves him the trouble of coming back to court and reliving that experience again."

On the limited evidentiary record that was available to Justice Hornblower, he expressed with clarity the realistic state of this matter. He relied simply upon that offender's presence with no defined party status role made out beyond the suggestion that he was "involved".

[95] I appreciate and endorse the role that parity plays in sentencing, particularly when it involves the same factual narrative. However, the results achieved by the offender sentenced by Justice Hornblower provides little guidance or persuasive support for parity in this sentencing. First, that offender pleaded guilty receiving the acknowledged mitigating benefit. Second, the plea was part of a totality resolution to numerous outstanding offences emphasizing the administrative benefit of finality. Third, by the time this offender addressed this matter, the victim had already been subjected to this jury trial leading the Crown to prioritize not compelling another reliving of these circumstances. And fourth, the Crown fashioned a joint submission with defence counsel, always a compelling consideration for the court, which negated a meaningful characterization of the extent of that offender's party status responsibility. Having considered this plea in its totality and proper context, I am unpersuaded that it merits parity reliance on this sentencing hearing, for these offenders.

[96] In summary, given the context of this group attack and the resulting injuries, it is fair to characterize this assault as unprovoked gratuitous violence. This was a collective act of cowardice inflicted upon the victim who was compelled to protect a vulnerable child, and in doing so made himself vulnerable at the hands of this mob. A strong deterrent and denunciatory message must be sent to address acts of such inexplicable violence and to protect those who for the public good place themselves in harms way.

Social Context Evidence

[97] On behalf of Mr. Khalifi, and informed by the Senate's Standing Committee on Human Rights report "Combating Hate – Islamophobia and its Impact on Muslims in Canada", counsel has raised the corrosive impact of Islamophobia said to be experienced subtly by this offender as a visible minority Muslim in a predominantly non-Muslim community who, also, was required to access with some difficulty mental health services in this community. While it is acknowledged that Mr. Khalifi, himself, has not raised any racism concerns from his experience in Canada, for which he was given the opportunity to comment by his pre-sentence report author, I am instead to infer concerns due to his demonstrated hesitancy in acknowledging even his language barriers and the impact of his cognitive impairments in his life. That he has expressed gratitude to Canada is not, it is submitted, to be taken at face value because this subjective assessment is to be compared only against the horrendous circumstances of his prior familial refugee-based trauma.

[98] While I am receptive to systemic racial discriminatory complaints of all varieties, as informed by the context of the studied Black Canadian experience highlighted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Morris, a nexus needs to be drawn between the discriminatory concern and the offending conduct for it to have a meaningful impact upon sentencing. Otherwise, recognition of generalized discrimination in the community risks creating a class of offenders deserving of sentencing mitigation based merely upon class membership. This was expressly rebutted in Morris. I have no evidence that Mr. Khalifi has experienced racial discrimination in Canada such that it formed any nexus to his offending conduct. As a result, such social context offers little if any qualitative mitigating input.

Collateral Consequences

[99] The immigration consequences stemming from this sentencing hearing will have a further impact on each of these offenders. That effect impacts each offenders' individual circumstances making the prospect of deportation a relevant sentencing consideration. In summary, being convicted of aggravated assault and facing a substantial period of incarceration puts at risk their immigration status in Canada.

[100] With respect to Mr. Ahmed, given his status as a Convention Refugee, upon conviction his immigration status will be reviewed. I am advised that Canada Border Service Agency is monitoring this case's progression. According to information provided to the Pre-sentence Report author, on a finding of guilt it is anticipated that Mr. Ahmed may be reported as inadmissible and that matters may be referred for a Minister's Delegate Review. Any resulting removal order would be held in abeyance without expiry until enforced by Border Services. If an Immigration Officer is of the opinion that a Convention Refugee is inadmissible to Canada because of a conviction, a Minister's Delegate will determine whether to issue a removal order, refer the matter to an admissibility hearing or choose not to pursue enforcement. Any resulting removal order results in deportation, which once executed results in a banning from Canada for life.

[101] With respect to Mr. Almheini and Mr. Khalifi, immigration opinion letters were filed detailing the expected consequences of the finding of guilt as well as the impact sentencing may have upon their immigration status in Canada. Both are Permanent Residents of Canada, stemming from their status as sponsored refugees from Iraq and Syria. There conviction for aggravated assault, an offence constituting "serious criminality" pursuant to s. 36(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, will assuredly result in a Deportation Order based upon their "inadmissibility". If they are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of less than six months, they would maintain a right of appeal pursuant to s. 64(1) of the IRPA . Otherwise, they face the prospect of removal from Canada and the loss of permanent residency status. The loss of this status means that they will revert to a Convention Refugee. They would not be immediately "removable" from Canada unless the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration found them to be a "Danger to the Public in Canada." Such a finding would result in removal.

[102] By way of further consideration, Mr. Almheini's immigration opinion cites the Supreme Court's ruling in Tran v Canada for the proposition that a conditional sentence does not amount to "time spent in jail" for purposes of defining "serious criminality" as noted in s. 36 of the IRPA . As a result, the imposition of a conditional sentence may allow for the prospect of an appeal under IRPA .

[103] In R v Pham, the Supreme Court confirmed that it is appropriate for sentencing judges to consider the immigration consequences when determining the appropriateness of a sentence. Later, in R v Suter, the Supreme Court explained:

Though collateral consequences are not necessarily "aggravating" or "mitigating" factors under s. 718.2 (a) of the Criminal Code – as they do not relate to the gravity of the offence or the level of responsibility of the offender -- they nevertheless speak to the "personal circumstances of the offender" (Pham, at para. 11 ). The relevance of collateral consequences stems, in part, from the application of the sentencing principles of individualization and parity: ibid.; s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code. The question is not whether collateral consequences diminish the offender's moral blameworthiness or render the offence itself less serious, but whether the effect of those consequences means that a particular sentence would have a more significant impact on the offender because of his or her circumstances. Like offenders should be treated alike, and collateral consequences may mean that an offender is no longer "like" the others, rendering a given sentence unfit.

[104] However, the Pham court also emphasized that "the sentence ultimately imposed [must be] proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender." Further, the Court added:

The general rule continues to be that a sentence must be fit having regard to the particular crime and the particular offender. In other words, a sentencing judge may exercise his or her discretion to take collateral immigration consequences into account, provided that the sentence that is ultimately imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

These consequences must not be allowed to dominate the exercise or skew the process either in favour of or against deportation. Moreover, it must not lead to a separate sentencing scheme with a de facto if not a de jure special range of sentencing options where deportation is a risk.

[105] All of this understood, the seriousness of this offending conduct on the part of each offender cannot be understated. Fortunately, the consequences of this unprovoked attack were not fatal for Mr. Campbell. While I acknowledge that an in carceral sentence over 6 months will prompt a deportation order and makes each of these offenders vulnerable to an ultimate removal order which leads to deportation, a less than 6-month sentence would be gravely disproportionate and unfit in these circumstances. Further, no alternative sentence, including a conditional sentence order, can alternatively meet the need for proportionality. While the imposition of a conditional sentence may permit a right of appeal, as I have noted, even a maximum reformatory range of sentence would fail to meet the principal sentencing objectives and would disproportionately emphasis the circumstances of the offenders to achieve an uncertain immigration result. Only a penitentiary sentence can meet the requirements of proportionality given the extraordinary nature of this serious offending conduct.

[106] Collateral consequences can also include a sentence's impact upon an offender's family. As recently articulated in R v DB, the Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized the mandatory requirement for collateral consequence consideration as part of the sentencing process, there in the context of how incarceration would contribute to familial financial hardship, loss of housing and family separation. Citing R v Suter, the Court noted that these consequences include the impact of family separation and loss of employment and they act to "humanize and individualize" the sentencing process. Some weight to these consequences must be given even when they are not unique and almost inevitable as is the case here. Further, loss of employment frustrates rehabilitation and reintegration and can lessen the need for specific deterrence, particularly with youthful first-time offenders.

[107] Here, Mr. Ahmed provides substantial financial support for his family. His mother is unemployed and receives government assistance while raising her children and she relies upon his employment income to assist with their familial needs. Further, culturally he feels an obligation as the eldest child to provide this support.

[108] Mr. Almheini has for much of his life worked to support his family, which has become all the more pressing since his father's medical leave from employment. He is the eldest child and makes a significant contribution to the family's financial well being.

[109] As part of crafting an individualized sentence for each of Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Almheini, the collateral consequences of a loss of employment and related income for a period of their incarceration will be factored in. While these consequences cannot tip the balance away from the necessity of incarceration given the severity of the offending conduct, I nevertheless consider its import with restraint in mind to fashion the least punitive disposition that still meets the requirements of proportionality.

Duncan Mitigation

[110] I now turn to the issue of "Duncan credit" raised by Mr. Khalifi. As recently noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Brown, "judges must recognize that where an offender has already experienced particularly punitive conditions during their pre-sentence custody, the punishment they receive should be reduced to take this into account, but the degree of mitigation is a matter of discretion in all the circumstances, and not a matter of mathematical precision."

[111] Application of this form of sentencing consideration has evolved. When the Ontario Court of Appeal released R v Duncan, it highlighted the need to readdress "exceptionally punitive conditions which go beyond the normal restrictions associated with pretrial custody." In response, courts adopted a broad practice of responding to harsh pretrial custodial conditions by quantifying and applying a numerical deduction from an otherwise appropriate sentence. However, in R v Marshall, Justice Doherty later cautioned against treating the mitigating effect of harsh conditions of pretrial custody "as a deduction from the appropriate sentence in the same way as the ' Summers' credit." Instead, the preference was to treat punitive pretrial conditions as a mitigating factor to be taken into account with the other mitigating and aggravating factors in arriving at an appropriate sentence. This approach prevents the court from giving such harsh conditions "unwarranted significance in fixing the ultimate sentence imposed." Overall, I must guard against this mitigating factor rendering an otherwise fit sentence unfit.

[112] Mr. Khalifi submitted an affidavit outlining, quite vaguely, his concerns about triple bunking in cells requiring him to sleep on the floor as well as excessive lockdowns at the Elgin Middlesex Detention Centre. He advises that these harsh conditions had adversely, or inflated, his pre-existing mental health issues that have included psychosis. In addition, he complains about having been assaulted by other inmates while in custody causing him to fear for his safety at both EMDC and the Sarnia jail.

[113] In response to this submitted affidavit, the Crown has provided responding records from the custodial institutions.

[114] I do not propose to parse with a fine-tooth comb apparent generalized disparities between these proffered sources. Overcrowding has been acknowledged and outlined as have institutional and range specific lockdowns affecting Mr. Khalifi. Further, a few assaultive reports involving Mr. Khalifi for which no cooperation or report was procured, were identified. Suffice it to say, overcrowding in such an institutional environment is not only dehumanizing but is both inherently and actually dangerous. It can and does disproportionately foster violence and intimidation on custodial ranges and, as Mr. Khalifi outlined, it is harmful mentally to inmates exposed to it, particularly those with presenting pre-existing conditions.

[115] Frankly, these bunking and lockdown conditions, however reliable the quantum may be, are no surprise to this court, indeed they have become regrettably expected. That it has come to this, an expectation of poor custodial inmate conditions, is a blight to the repute of the administration of justice in general. Presumed innocent individuals, crowded into a cell, locked down too often, and frequently forced to sleep on the floor gives meaning to the regrettable monicker of "warehousing" that too often forms on the lips of justice system participants. It is no surprise, therefore, that courts give real effect, as I intend to, to the mitigating effect of harsh pretrial conditions.

[116] As a result, I will grant Duncan mitigation credit as an additional mitigating circumstance short of it rendering the totality sentence for these offences unfit. As suggested in Marshall, I will not strictly quantify this credit but apply it as a significant mitigating factor as part of my overall proportionality assessment.

Summers Credit

[117] Section 719 of the Criminal Code allows a sentencing court to credit a person with a ratio of 1.5 days in jail for each actual day served "if the circumstances justify it". Unlike Duncan mitigation, the Supreme Court in R v Summers established that this enhanced pre-sentence custody credit is given in recognition that in two respects, pre-trial custody is even more onerous than post-sentencing custody: first, by acknowledging the lack of credited eligibility for parole in pre-sentence custody; and second, by acknowledging the reduced rehabilitative programming available in remand detention. Short of detention being occasioned by an offender's bad conduct or unlikelihood for early release, Summers credit has practically become a norm deducting the allowable Criminal Code credit.

[118] Here, as noted, Mr. Khalifi has accumulated time in pre-sentence custody which is here applicable due to the application of s. 524 of the Criminal Code . To this point, he has served 433 days of pre-sentence from June 27, 2024 to the present. As a result, he will be granted a total of 650 days enhanced credit for his time already served.

Charter Breach Remedy for Offender Khalifi

[119] As part of this sentencing hearing, as noted, the Crown sought out custodial institutional records from EMDC on February 19, 2025, to respond to Mr. Khalifi's Duncan mitigation application. They utilized a subpoena for these records which included an expressed request for "health care records". In response, EMDC released to the Crown and the Court all healthcare records in their possession, which the Crown then distributed to all defence counsel. Included in these records where not simply internal healthcare records but also all of his transfer of care records that had been accumulated from his caregivers in the community, dating back several years and including extensively private treatment information. In addition, notes and documentation regarding privileged meetings with legal counsel and health care service providers were included. Upon complaint from counsel, the Crown removed these records from the Court's electronic filing system and asked all parties to delete them without review.

[120] In response, Mr. Khalifi brought a ss. 7 and 8 Charter application scrutinizing the use of the subpoena process to procure these records from the detention centre. Instead, it was submitted that the correct procedure to seize such private medical records was to seek formal judicial authorization. To remedy these breaches, Mr. Khalifi is seeking a substantial reduction in his sentence, from a maximum term conditional sentence order to a 6-month conditional sentence, amounting to an 18-month sentence reduction.

[121] Pragmatically, the Crown not only undertook not to rely upon these procured records but, ultimately, conceded the procedural irregularity of their subpoena approach as opposed to seeking a Production Order and that this oversight resulted in a violation of Mr. Khalifi's s. 8 Charter rights. The Crown noted, however, that within minutes of counsel's complaint, the materials were removed from Court and general party access in an effort to mitigate the effects of the breach. By way of remedy, the Crown suggests that I issue a declaration identifying that a judicial authorization is the appropriate mechanism for procurement of such records given the lack of statutory guidance available. Further, the Crown submits that its resulting inability to rely upon these records to respond to the Duncan application is a further noteworthy consequence.

[122] As part of this sentencing judgment, I do not intend to delve substantively into the nuances of various Charter remedies. Informed by the Supreme Court's ruling in R v Nasogaluak, the necessity of a formal s. 24(1) remedy in not clear. The Nasogaluak court highlighted that a Charter violation may otherwise be a relevant factor for sentencing consideration "given the court's broad discretion under ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Code to craft a fit sentence that reflects all the factual minutiae of the case." As a result, recourse to the Charter and s. 24(1) would generally be unnecessary because the same factors that would make sentence reduction an appropriate and just remedy under s. 24(1) would usually also be relevant to the implementation of established sentencing principles under the Code . Hence, a Charter breach may well become a mitigating factor as long as it is relevant "to the individual offender and the circumstances of his or her offence."

[123] Here, the Crown has acted in good faith but in a procedurally flawed fashion all the while unaware of the scope of the health care records that would be forthcoming. Their efforts to mitigate the breach of Mr. Khalifi's privacy interests are noteworthy. However, there is a broader need to promote "respect for the law" by addressing state misconduct. Mr. Khalifi was entitled to the maintenance of his privacy interest in such core biographical information even despite raising related health issues as part of his Duncan application, at least subject to judicial vetting of the Crown's request.

[124] Given the full context of this state misconduct, I am satisfied that it can be most properly remedied as a substantive mitigating factor upon sentence and will be treated accordingly.

Disposition

[125] I have carefully considered individualized sentences for each offender informed by both the consistent aggravating factors as well as their consistent and independent mitigating circumstances.

[126] Overall, on the available evidence I am convinced that each offender participated equally and is equally liable as parties for the seriousness of their offending conduct. This conduct, as noted, is informed by the totality of the violence perpetrated upon Mr. Campbell, including as a necessary implication of their finding of guilt, the fact that he was subjected to multiple and serious stab wounds for which their presence and participation in the group attack facilitated and encouraged. Further, I am satisfied their moral culpability is equivalent but for the identified mitigating factors noted.

[127] The Crown has proposed a sentence of 3 ½ years for each offender, on the basis of their party status and presenting mitigating circumstances. I find this sentencing recommendation entirely reasonable, judicious, and well within, if not on the lower end, of the appropriate range of sentencing for such a gratuitously violent group attack scenario. Had any of these offenders been proven to be the principal stabber, I would have seriously considered the top end of the Tourville range. Given the ferocity of this attack, which but for its interruption could reasonably have turned fatal, this aggravated assault narrative falls closer to attempted murder than it does to a mere assault with a weapon or bodily harm conviction.

[128] As a result, with respect to both Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Almheini, I see little principled reason to meaningfully distinguish between their respective sentences. They share moral culpability in an overall sense for meaningfully consistent conduct with predicable and foreseeable results. As youthful first offenders, I find that the minimum sentence that can achieve proportionality and reflect their respective party liability is 3 ½ years incarceration, or 1,277 days.

[129] With respect to Mr. Khalifi's sentence, proportionality dictates a similar sentencing range informed by similar sentencing considerations. However, I have also taken into consideration his mental health barriers, which make more difficult his resulting incarceration, as well as the mitigating effect of the Crown's breach of his Charter privacy interests in his medical records, and finally consideration of Duncan mitigation. Cumulatively, I find that a proportional sentence reflective of his party liability should be 3 years incarceration, or 1,095 days. Of course, an additional 650 days of Summers credit must be deducted from this total, amounting to a remaining sentence of 445 days, or over 14 months of further time in custody.

Ancillary Orders

[130] The parties have reached consensus on the appropriate ancillary orders.

DNA

[131] Given the qualifying nature of this offending conduct as a "primary designated offence", under s. 487.04, pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Code, each offender will be required to provide samples of bodily substances reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis to be used in accordance with the DNA Identification Act.

Weapons Prohibition

[132] Given the nature of this offending conduct and its surrounding circumstances, each offender will, pursuant to s. 109 of the Code, be prohibited from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, prohibited ammunition and any other firearm or any cross-bow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for a period of 10 years.

Non-Communication Order

[133] Finally, pursuant to s. 743.21(1) of the Code, each offender is prohibited from communicating, directly or indirectly with Mr. Campbell, and in addition, witnesses G.C., Olawuale Babatunde and Ben Varghese.

Conclusion

[134] In response to the extraordinary violence perpetrated against Mr. Campbell, and predominantly informed by need to express both deterrence and denunciation, for the reasons outlined, Mr. Ahmed and Mr. Almheini are sentenced to 3 ½ years incarceration, or 1,277 days. Mr. Khalifi is sentenced to 3 years incarceration, or 1,095 days, reduced to 445 days remaining after pre-sentence custody credit deduction.

[135] As noted, they will all be subject to DNA order compliance, a 10-year weapons prohibition and non-communication orders while serving their sentences.

M. B. Carnegie

Released: September 3, 2025