Bruce R. Mitchell

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Pafco Insurance Company’s appeal from a motion judge’s decision regarding the interpretation of the “insured person” definition in the standard Ontario Automobile Policy 44R family protection endorsement.

The court held that the motion judge erred in finding that Ashley Kerr was not an “insured person” under Joe Hesch’s 44R endorsement with Kent and Essex Mutual Insurance Company.

The correct interpretation, supported by prior case law and industry commentary, is that coverage is available to an insured person occupying their own vehicle if family protection coverage is in force on that vehicle.

The court clarified the priority of coverage and the pro rata sharing of excess damages between insurers.

This motion concerned a dispute between two defendant insurers, Pafco Insurance Company and Kent and Essex Mutual Insurance Company, regarding Kent's obligation to contribute to a $950,000 settlement paid by Pafco.

The settlement satisfied claims made by the plaintiffs under the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement, following the death of Ashley Kerr in a car accident caused by an uninsured motorist.

The central issue was whether Ashley Kerr qualified as an "insured person" under Joe Hesch's (her common-law spouse) 44R policy with Kent, which would trigger Kent's contribution.

The court found that Ashley did not meet the definition of an "insured person" under Joe's policy because she owned the "other automobile" she was occupying at the time of the accident, an exclusion explicitly stated in the 44R endorsement and reinforced by the OAP 1 policy.

Consequently, Kent was not obligated to contribute to the settlement.

The court also granted Pafco a subrogated judgment against the at-fault uninsured motorist.

Orchid Leasing Corporation brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim and Kent & Essex Mutual Insurance Company's cross-claim against it, arguing it was not the legal owner of the tractor involved in a motor vehicle accident at the time of the incident.

The court applied the principles of summary judgment and the legal test for ownership under the Highway Traffic Act, which establishes a rebuttable presumption of ownership based on MTO registration.

The court found that Orchid had successfully rebutted this presumption by demonstrating it had transferred all indicia of ownership and control to the driver, Dhillon, prior to the accident.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing all claims against Orchid.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an unreported decision of Patterson J. dated October 22, 2019.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $5,000 inclusive.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend her statement of claim to add Ford Credit Canada Company as a defendant, the owner of a leased vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident.

Ford resisted, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in identifying Ford as a potential defendant within the two-year limitation period, despite having received information about Ford's ownership before the period expired.

The plaintiff's reliance on an erroneous police report and failure to conduct a routine MTO search, coupled with counsel's inadvertence, did not rebut the presumption of discoverability.

The motion to add Ford as a defendant was dismissed.

An appeal from the dismissal of an application for a declaration that the appellant is an insured under two insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the basis of an apparent conflict of interest between the appellant and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada, which appointed and paid for the appellant's counsel.

The court found that the appellant should have had independent counsel to advise on the advisability of bringing the underlying application and to represent him on appeal, given that the insurer's financial interests diverged from the insured's interests.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs $3.565 million for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident caused by an impaired driver, the court determined several post-trial legal issues.

The court denied the third-party bartender's request to amend his pleadings to add a limitation defence due to prejudice.

The court found the bartender was an independent contractor or volunteer, meaning the host was not vicariously liable for his negligence, but the host could seek contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act.

The court also ruled that the plaintiffs could access their OPCF 44R underinsured motorist coverage without having sued the bartender, as his insurance was not 'available' to them within the meaning of the endorsement.

Finally, the court ordered the assignment of future statutory accident benefits to prevent double recovery.

The court ruled on the admissibility of expert toxicological opinion evidence regarding blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels and signs of intoxication during a trial.

The expert was deemed qualified to testify on BAC levels and their physiological effects based on assumptions.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion on whether an individual exhibited signs of intoxication or others' ability to detect impairment, holding that these are matters of common knowledge for a jury and do not require expert testimony.

The court also cautioned against experts developing hypotheses and sifting through evidence to support them.

At the opening of trial, the plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim to plead vicarious liability against the defendant Thomas Bolton for the negligence of the third party, Steve Coulthard.

The Bolton Estate resisted, arguing prejudice due to Mr. Bolton's death and the lateness of the amendment.

The court permitted the amendment, finding it did not raise a new cause of action but rather attached a legal label to existing facts, consistent with Rule 26.01, and that the defence would have understood the basis of liability.

The respondents were wholly successful on the appeal and sought partial indemnity costs totaling over $111,000.

The appellants conceded the respondents were entitled to costs but argued the amounts sought were excessive, proposing a total of $30,000.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs payable by the appellants at $20,000 for Vicentini, $10,000 for Ford Credit, and $10,000 for Personal Insurance, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants sought a new trial arising from a jury verdict in a child pedestrian personal injury action, challenging evidentiary rulings on vehicle brakes, expert human factors evidence, and the fairness of the defence conducted by counsel appointed by an insurer reserving rights.

The court held the trial judge properly excluded late-disclosed participant expert opinion evidence extending beyond the contemporaneous inspection form, properly admitted unobjected-to accident reconstruction and human factors evidence, and committed no error in charging the jury.

The court also held that any alleged insurer-insured conflict had to be raised promptly before trial and that no unfairness in the defence was demonstrated.

The appeal was dismissed on liability and damages, but the costs order was varied so that trial costs payable to successful defendants were payable only by the litigation guardian personally and in that capacity, not by the minor appellants personally.

The appellants and the respondent insured brought motions to disqualify the law firm appointed by the insurer from continuing to represent the insured on an appeal and cross-appeal.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident where the jury found the insured solely responsible, primarily for negligent parental supervision (uncovered), but also for an unsuitable choice of unloading area (potentially covered).

The insurer-appointed counsel filed a cross-appeal challenging the only finding that could trigger coverage.

The Court of Appeal granted the motions, finding a reasonable apprehension of a conflict of interest, and ordered the insurer to pay for independent counsel to represent the insured.

Following a prior decision in the underlying proceeding, the court addressed costs.

The court accepted the written submissions of the applicant and one respondent regarding the appropriate allocation of costs.

Applying the criteria under the Rules governing costs assessments and considering the procedural history and outcome of the litigation, the court ordered that costs be payable by the other respondent.

Costs were awarded to both the applicant and the co-respondent.

The appellants (Daimler Chrysler) appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed their motion to have the actions against them declared statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had relied on a police accident report that incorrectly identified the driver as the owner of the vehicle.

The true owner, Daimler Chrysler, was discovered during examinations for discovery, more than two years after the accident.

The motion judge found that the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence and the discoverability principle applied for the Limitations Act claims.

For the Trustee Act claims, the motion judge found special circumstances and no prejudice to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in her application of the discoverability principle or the special circumstances test.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant insurer moved for declarations that the plaintiff must hold in trust and pay over certain future statutory accident benefits and collateral benefits pursuant to s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act.

The insurer argued that the jury’s award for future care costs overlapped with potential medical and rehabilitation benefits, raising concerns of double recovery.

The court held that deductions or trust obligations to prevent double recovery require clear proof that the plaintiff’s entitlement to collateral benefits is certain and that the tort award compensates the same losses.

Given uncertainty regarding the plaintiff’s future entitlement to statutory accident benefits and the extent to which the jury’s lump-sum award corresponded to benefits available under the accident benefits scheme, the evidentiary threshold was not met.

The requested declarations and related relief were therefore refused.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff was awarded substantial damages, the defendant insurer brought a motion for a ruling that the plaintiff's claims did not meet the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The court found that the plaintiff's chronic low back pain was caused by the accident and constituted a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, concluding that the plaintiff met the statutory threshold for non-pecuniary loss and future care costs.

Two insurers disputed liability for indemnity arising from a motor vehicle accident and whether the plaintiff insurer’s claim against the defendant insurer was statute‑barred.

The issue was when the claim was discovered for the purposes of the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that discoverability occurs when the plaintiff knows or ought to know that the at‑fault driver was insured under a valid policy.

The plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence and did not discover the existence of applicable insurance until 2010 despite earlier related litigation.

The action commenced shortly thereafter was therefore within the limitation period.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle personal injury action, the plaintiffs moved for an order staying the determination of costs pending satisfaction of the judgment or resolution of a separate insurance coverage dispute involving the liable defendant and his insurer.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be deferred because the verdict was under appeal and because the defendant’s ability to pay costs was uncertain pending determination of coverage, particularly given their intention to seek a Sanderson costs order.

The court held that the existence of an appeal or unresolved insurance coverage litigation does not justify departing from the usual practice of fixing costs after trial.

The ability to pay costs is only one factor in determining whether a Sanderson order is appropriate and does not require postponement of the costs determination.

The motion for a stay of the costs determination was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed an order determining insurance priorities in a tort action involving a rental car.

The Court of Appeal held that under the Ontario Insurance Act, as amended by Bill 118, the appellant's policy was required to respond first, regardless of whether the policies were limited to Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Quebec, was catastrophically injured by an uninsured automobile in Ontario.

She received a non-pecuniary damage indemnity under the SAAQ and sought to recover the full uninsured limits under her mother's Ontario automobile insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal held that the SAAQ benefit was deductible from the uninsured limits pursuant to s. 2(1)(b) of Reg. 676 to avoid double recovery, and that this regulation did not conflict with s. 267.8(7) of the Insurance Act.

The appeal was dismissed.