James Hrycay

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck by a left-turning pickup truck while crossing an intersection at night.

The plaintiff suffered a severe traumatic brain injury.

The plaintiff sued the driver, the municipality, and the municipality's electrical contractor, alleging the intersection was in a state of non-repair due to missing streetlights on the median.

The court found the driver 100% liable for failing to ensure the turn could be made safely.

The claims against the municipality and contractor were dismissed, as the intersection had sufficient illumination from other sources and was deemed in a state of repair under the Minimum Maintenance Standards.

Damages of approximately $2 million were awarded against the driver.

The defendant driver brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligence claim against him arising from a severe winter motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiffs' vehicle lost control and crossed into the defendant's lane, resulting in a head-on collision.

The motion relied on eyewitness accounts and an expert report suggesting the defendant had no time to react.

The plaintiffs relied on competing expert engineering evidence suggesting the defendant had sufficient time to perceive the hazard and take evasive action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the conflicting expert opinions on perception, response time, and evasive maneuvers created a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellants sought a new trial arising from a jury verdict in a child pedestrian personal injury action, challenging evidentiary rulings on vehicle brakes, expert human factors evidence, and the fairness of the defence conducted by counsel appointed by an insurer reserving rights.

The court held the trial judge properly excluded late-disclosed participant expert opinion evidence extending beyond the contemporaneous inspection form, properly admitted unobjected-to accident reconstruction and human factors evidence, and committed no error in charging the jury.

The court also held that any alleged insurer-insured conflict had to be raised promptly before trial and that no unfairness in the defence was demonstrated.

The appeal was dismissed on liability and damages, but the costs order was varied so that trial costs payable to successful defendants were payable only by the litigation guardian personally and in that capacity, not by the minor appellants personally.

The respondent, a 16-year-old driver, drove through a stop sign at 80 km/h on an unfamiliar rural road, lost control on a curve, and crashed into a concrete bridge.

He sued the municipality for non-repair, arguing it should have posted a warning sign for the curve.

The trial judge found the municipality 50% liable, holding that ordinary rural drivers do not always stop at stop signs and the curve was a hidden hazard.

The Court of Appeal allowed the municipality's appeal and dismissed the action, holding that a municipality's statutory duty of repair is limited to ensuring roads are safe for ordinary drivers exercising reasonable care.

The municipality has no duty to keep roads safe for negligent drivers who ignore stop signs.

The plaintiff, a cyclist with significant pre-existing psychological and cognitive vulnerabilities, was struck by a police cruiser while riding through a pedestrian crosswalk at night.

The court apportioned liability 60% to the defendant police officer and 40% to the plaintiff.

Applying the thin skull rule, the court found the collision exacerbated the plaintiff's pre-existing conditions and caused a mild traumatic brain injury, rendering him completely disabled and requiring 24/7 attendant care.

Total damages were assessed at over $5.2 million, reduced to $3,131,370 after accounting for contributory negligence.

Following a 21‑day personal injury trial concerning municipal liability for road conditions and signage, the successful plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $1,045,000.

The court considered the complexity of the litigation, the extensive expert evidence, and the reasonableness of the fees and disbursements claimed.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay rather than fully reflective of the successful party’s expenditures, the court concluded that the amounts claimed exceeded reasonable expectations.

Significant reductions were made to both fees and disbursements.

Costs were fixed at $406,000 in fees and $200,000 in disbursements, plus applicable taxes.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs failed to meet the corroboration requirement under the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage Endorsement for accidents involving unidentified vehicles.

The plaintiffs alleged the driver was forced off the road by a red pickup truck that was never identified, relying on tire marks and expert reconstruction evidence as physical corroboration.

The court held that “physical evidence” under the endorsement does not need to originate from the unidentified vehicle itself, provided it indicates the involvement of another vehicle.

Tire marks consistent with evasive action could constitute corroborative physical evidence.

Given conflicting expert opinions regarding accident reconstruction, the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial and declined to resolve credibility issues on summary judgment.

The plaintiffs brought a negligence action against a municipality arising from a single‑vehicle collision on a rural road curve that caused catastrophic injuries to a young driver.

The court considered whether the municipality breached its duty under s. 44 of the Municipal Act to keep the roadway in a reasonable state of repair, focusing primarily on inadequate warning signage and the absence of an advisory speed sign for a sharp curve.

Expert evidence established that proper signage, including a 40 km/h advisory speed tab and additional warning devices required by the Ontario Traffic Manual, should have been installed.

The municipality had not conducted any evaluation of the signage following amalgamation and allowed substandard signage to remain in place for years.

The court found the municipality liable for failing to maintain the road in a reasonable state of repair, but also held the driver contributorily negligent for failing to sufficiently reduce speed in snowy conditions.

The plaintiff, a 16-year-old driver, was injured in a single-vehicle accident after failing to stop at a stop sign at a rural intersection and crashing into a concrete abutment.

The plaintiff had consumed alcohol prior to the crash.

The plaintiff sued the municipality, alleging the intersection was in a state of non-repair because it lacked warning signs for a change in road alignment (an 'offset' intersection).

The court found that the intersection posed a hidden hazard and required a warning sign in addition to the stop sign.

The court apportioned liability 50% to the municipality for failure to warn and 50% to the plaintiff for failing to stop and driving after consuming alcohol.

During a civil jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a child pedestrian, the court ruled on the permissible scope of testimony from an accident reconstruction expert.

The plaintiffs sought to elicit opinion evidence concerning alleged deficiencies in the defendant vehicle’s braking system and on driver perception and reaction times.

The court held that Rule 53 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires expert reports to clearly state the opinions being advanced and their factual bases, and an expert cannot introduce a new field of opinion not articulated in the report.

Because the expert’s reports did not opine that the brake condition contributed to the collision, such testimony would improperly expand the report.

The court also barred additional human factors opinion evidence as duplicative of testimony already provided by a qualified human factors expert.

The plaintiffs in a motor vehicle personal injury action involving a child with an alleged brain injury sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three expert witnesses at trial.

The court considered factors governing leave to call additional experts, including necessity, duplication of evidence, fairness between parties, and proportionality.

While acknowledging the complexity of the medical issues and future care claims, the court emphasized the trial judge’s gatekeeping role and the need to avoid unnecessary or repetitive expert testimony.

Leave was granted for several experts with distinct specialties but denied for others whose proposed evidence lacked a compliant Rule 53 report or would duplicate testimony from other experts.

The court limited the number of occupational therapists who could testify and refused permission for certain proposed witnesses whose opinions were unnecessary or procedurally deficient.