Anna Szczurko

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend two Independent Medical Examinations (IMEs) with a neuropsychologist and an orthopaedic surgeon, arguing that the plaintiff's alleged injuries (physical and brain injury) required assessment by distinct specialists.

The plaintiff opposed, citing timeliness and the sufficiency of a single IME, and sought conditions on the examinations, including pre-approval of questionnaires and a prohibition on ghostwriting.

The court granted leave for the motion, finding a substantial change in circumstances and that it was in the interests of justice.

The court ordered the plaintiff to attend both IMEs, with the neuropsychological assessment contingent on the plaintiff first obtaining her own report.

The court rejected the plaintiff's demands regarding questionnaires and ghostwriting, affirming the statutory obligation to answer relevant questions and the expert's right to choose their method.

However, the court denied the defendants' request for reimbursement of a cancellation fee for a missed IME, as no prior court order or written consent for that specific examination existed.

Three sets of defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims arising from a 30-vehicle winter highway pileup.

The court granted the motion for one defendant (Seney), finding his vehicle was far removed from the main collision and did not contribute to the plaintiffs' injuries.

However, the court dismissed the motions for the other two defendants (Gill and McCallum), holding that while the case against them was not strong, granting partial summary judgment posed a significant risk of inconsistent verdicts at trial, as a jury could still apportion liability to them for allegedly blocking escape routes.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her statement of claim to add Middlesex County as a defendant in a motor vehicle accident claim involving alleged negligent road maintenance.

The motion was brought after the presumptive two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff argued misnomer and discoverability.

The court rejected the misnomer argument because Middlesex County did not have notice of the claim within the limitation period.

However, the court granted leave to amend based on discoverability, finding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of due diligence to raise a triable issue as to whether the claim against the County was discoverable earlier.

The court also held that the plaintiff's alleged failure to provide timely statutory notice under the Municipal Act should be resolved on a full evidentiary record rather than at the pleadings stage.

The insurer brought an application seeking a determination that the respondent was not involved in an "accident" within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and therefore not entitled to accident benefits.

The court held that disputes concerning entitlement to benefits, including whether an accident occurred, must proceed through the statutory dispute resolution process under the Insurance Act.

Allowing an insurer to unilaterally seek a court determination would undermine the legislative scheme and expose insured persons to premature cost consequences.

The court also found that the application procedure was inappropriate where material facts were disputed and no agreed statement of facts existed.

The plaintiff, a 16-year-old driver, was injured in a single-vehicle accident after failing to stop at a stop sign at a rural intersection and crashing into a concrete abutment.

The plaintiff had consumed alcohol prior to the crash.

The plaintiff sued the municipality, alleging the intersection was in a state of non-repair because it lacked warning signs for a change in road alignment (an 'offset' intersection).

The court found that the intersection posed a hidden hazard and required a warning sign in addition to the stop sign.

The court apportioned liability 50% to the municipality for failure to warn and 50% to the plaintiff for failing to stop and driving after consuming alcohol.

The plaintiffs sought an extension of time to serve a statement of claim on a contractor nearly nine years after the action was commenced, and the defendants moved to dismiss the entire action for delay.

The court found the plaintiffs’ efforts to locate and serve the contractor were lackadaisical and that significant prejudice resulted from the lengthy delay, including loss of records, faded memory, and the death of a witness.

Accordingly, the court refused to extend time for service on that defendant.

However, although the court found a period of “inexcusable delay” in prosecuting the action, it held that the remaining defendants had not demonstrated prejudice sufficient to create a substantial risk that a fair trial was no longer possible.

The motion to dismiss the entire action for delay was therefore refused.