Melissa Miles

The applicants, victims of extensive fraud involving forged cheques and unauthorized online banking, sought a declaration that their insurer, State Farm, was obligated to provide coverage.

While State Farm accepted coverage for losses from forged cheques, the central issue was whether losses from unauthorized online banking transactions fell under the policy's "Forgery or Alteration" clause.

The court determined that online banking transactions were analogous to a direct transfer of money, not a promise to pay money, and therefore did not fall within the scope of the "Forgery or Alteration" clause.

The application for coverage of online banking losses was dismissed.

The plaintiff, York Region Vacant Land Condominium Corporation No. 1010, brought a motion for leave to file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, including the addition of a new defendant, Patrick Greco.

The defendants opposed certain proposed amendments, arguing they were scandalous, irrelevant, or pleaded evidence.

The Master granted leave to amend the statement of claim and add the new defendant, but struck paragraphs 8, 95, and 102-105 from the proposed pleading, finding them to be scandalous references, irrelevant, or improper pleadings of evidence.

The plaintiff, Silani Sweet Cheese Limited, brought a motion under Rule 51.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to withdraw deemed admissions under Rule 51.03 and for an order extending the time to serve a response to a request to admit.

The defendant, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, opposed the motion.

The court applied the three-part test for withdrawing admissions, finding that there was a triable issue, the failure to respond was inadvertent, and the withdrawal would not result in uncompensable prejudice to the defendant.

The motion was granted, allowing the withdrawal of deemed admissions and extending the time for the plaintiff to serve a proper response, with no costs awarded.

The defendant insurer, Compagnie d'Assurance Traders Generale ("Traders"), brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that Justin Gough operated Nancy Gough's vehicle with implied consent, thereby making Nancy vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act and negating the plaintiff's uninsured automobile claim against Traders.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that "consent" under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act requires a positive conferral of permission to possess the vehicle, not merely a failure to prevent unauthorized use.

The evidence showed no express or implied consent for Justin to drive the vehicle, as his license was suspended, and he took the keys without permission.

At the opening of a scheduled 7-week trial, the defendant insurer brought a motion for an adjournment due to the plaintiff's late disclosure of physical evidence and additional documents.

The plaintiff had disclosed the existence of particles and other physical evidence relevant to the cause of the equipment failure just weeks before trial.

The court found that it would be unjust to force the defendant to proceed without an opportunity to obtain expert advice and conduct further discovery on the newly disclosed evidence.

The motion for an adjournment was granted.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a van driven by a 16-year-old unlicensed driver.

The driver had taken the van, owned by his mother, without her permission while she slept.

In this liability trial, the court found the driver negligent but dismissed the claims against the mother, finding she did not give express or implied consent to possession of the vehicle and was not negligent in securing her keys.

The court also found the plaintiff ought to have known the vehicle was taken without consent, thereby excluding him from uninsured motorist coverage under the mother's insurance policy.

The Minister of Finance, on behalf of the uninsured defendant driver, brought a motion seeking to preclude the co-defendant insurer from relying on a policy exclusion for operating a vehicle without consent.

The moving party argued that because the insurer had previously settled the plaintiff's statutory accident benefits claim, relying on the exclusion in the tort action constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the accident benefits settlement was explicitly without prejudice and did not constitute an admission of liability that would prevent the insurer from defending the tort claim on its merits.

The respondents were wholly successful on the appeal and sought partial indemnity costs totaling over $111,000.

The appellants conceded the respondents were entitled to costs but argued the amounts sought were excessive, proposing a total of $30,000.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs payable by the appellants at $20,000 for Vicentini, $10,000 for Ford Credit, and $10,000 for Personal Insurance, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants sought a new trial arising from a jury verdict in a child pedestrian personal injury action, challenging evidentiary rulings on vehicle brakes, expert human factors evidence, and the fairness of the defence conducted by counsel appointed by an insurer reserving rights.

The court held the trial judge properly excluded late-disclosed participant expert opinion evidence extending beyond the contemporaneous inspection form, properly admitted unobjected-to accident reconstruction and human factors evidence, and committed no error in charging the jury.

The court also held that any alleged insurer-insured conflict had to be raised promptly before trial and that no unfairness in the defence was demonstrated.

The appeal was dismissed on liability and damages, but the costs order was varied so that trial costs payable to successful defendants were payable only by the litigation guardian personally and in that capacity, not by the minor appellants personally.