Raymond A.D. Watt

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a van driven by a 16-year-old unlicensed driver.

The driver had taken the van, owned by his mother, without her permission while she slept.

In this liability trial, the court found the driver negligent but dismissed the claims against the mother, finding she did not give express or implied consent to possession of the vehicle and was not negligent in securing her keys.

The court also found the plaintiff ought to have known the vehicle was taken without consent, thereby excluding him from uninsured motorist coverage under the mother's insurance policy.

The Minister of Finance, on behalf of the uninsured defendant driver, brought a motion seeking to preclude the co-defendant insurer from relying on a policy exclusion for operating a vehicle without consent.

The moving party argued that because the insurer had previously settled the plaintiff's statutory accident benefits claim, relying on the exclusion in the tort action constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the accident benefits settlement was explicitly without prejudice and did not constitute an admission of liability that would prevent the insurer from defending the tort claim on its merits.

Following a jury verdict apportioning fault for a motor vehicle accident between two motorcyclists, the appellant challenged the trial judge’s jury instructions on causation, joint tortfeasor liability, and concurrent liability.

The court held that any alleged error concerning joint tortfeasor instructions was immaterial because the jury’s answers clearly established liability as a concurrent tortfeasor, and the evidence supported that route to liability.

The court also rejected the argument that the charge was unbalanced or unfair when read as a whole.

It further upheld the dismissal of a post-verdict Rule 21.01 motion concerning insurance coverage, holding that the issue could properly proceed in a separate action.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's refusal to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance.

The Court of Appeal held that the decision was discretionary and found no basis for appellate intervention.

The court noted that even if the motion judge erred in assessing prejudice, the test for special circumstances was not met.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and settled her damages for over $2.5 million.

The at-fault driver had $300,000 in third-party limits and a $1,000,000 personal liability umbrella policy.

The respondent's insurer sought to deduct both amounts from her $500,000 OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement.

The Court of Appeal held that the umbrella policy did not constitute 'motor vehicle liability insurance' under the endorsement's definition.

Therefore, the insurer could only deduct the $300,000 third-party limits, entitling the respondent to $200,000.

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the court received written submissions on costs of the cross-appeal.

On consent of the appellant in the cross-appeal, the court awarded costs of the cross-appeal to the respondents in the cross-appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $2,000 each.

The plaintiffs, Ontario residents, were injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York State involving a vehicle driven by a New York resident.

The plaintiffs sued in Ontario.

The defendant moved to determine the applicable law.

The Court of Appeal held that the substantive law of New York (lex loci delicti) applies, while the procedural law of Ontario (lex fori) applies.

The Court determined that costs and the cap on non-pecuniary damages are procedural matters governed by Ontario law, whereas pre-judgment interest is a substantive right governed by New York law.