Raymond A.D. Watt

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a rental vehicle leased by the defendant lessee but driven by an unauthorized third party.

The sole issue at trial was whether the lessee had given express or implied consent to his friend to possess the vehicle, which would make the lessee vicariously liable under s. 192(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court rejected the lessee's evidence that he had flatly refused his friend's request to use the vehicle, finding his subsequent conduct inconsistent with a refusal.

The court concluded that the presumption of consent was not rebutted and held the lessee vicariously liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a van driven by a 16-year-old unlicensed driver.

The driver had taken the van, owned by his mother, without her permission while she slept.

In this liability trial, the court found the driver negligent but dismissed the claims against the mother, finding she did not give express or implied consent to possession of the vehicle and was not negligent in securing her keys.

The court also found the plaintiff ought to have known the vehicle was taken without consent, thereby excluding him from uninsured motorist coverage under the mother's insurance policy.

The Minister of Finance, on behalf of the uninsured defendant driver, brought a motion seeking to preclude the co-defendant insurer from relying on a policy exclusion for operating a vehicle without consent.

The moving party argued that because the insurer had previously settled the plaintiff's statutory accident benefits claim, relying on the exclusion in the tort action constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the accident benefits settlement was explicitly without prejudice and did not constitute an admission of liability that would prevent the insurer from defending the tort claim on its merits.

Following a jury verdict apportioning fault for a motor vehicle accident between two motorcyclists, the appellant challenged the trial judge’s jury instructions on causation, joint tortfeasor liability, and concurrent liability.

The court held that any alleged error concerning joint tortfeasor instructions was immaterial because the jury’s answers clearly established liability as a concurrent tortfeasor, and the evidence supported that route to liability.

The court also rejected the argument that the charge was unbalanced or unfair when read as a whole.

It further upheld the dismissal of a post-verdict Rule 21.01 motion concerning insurance coverage, holding that the issue could properly proceed in a separate action.

The applicant sought expenses for an arbitration proceeding regarding statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer did not seek expenses.

The arbitrator reviewed the criteria under section 12 of Ontario Regulation 664.

Although the applicant achieved significant financial success and made a settlement offer lower than the final award, the arbitrator found the proceeding was unnecessary.

The applicant had failed to produce highly probative evidence regarding his employment history until shortly before or during the hearing, despite the insurer's requests six years prior.

Consequently, the arbitrator ordered that each party bear their own expenses.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident shortly after immigrating to Canada.

He applied for income replacement benefits, relying on a written job offer from his brother's trucking company to establish a legitimate contract of employment under section 4(3) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the applicant lacked the English skills and licensing to perform the job.

The arbitrator found the contract was legitimate, as the parties reasonably intended for the applicant to learn English and obtain his licenses while working.

The arbitrator awarded income replacement benefits, subject to deductions for post-accident income earned from delivering pizzas, and mandatory interest on overdue payments.

The claim for a special award was dismissed because the insurer's delay was due to the applicant's late production of necessary documentation.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for income replacement benefits (IRBs).

The insurer denied the claim on multiple occasions, but the applicant did not apply for mediation until more than two years after the latest refusal.

The insurer argued the claim was statute-barred under s. 281(5) of the Insurance Act.

The Arbitrator found that none of the insurer's refusals were valid because they either failed to provide adequate reasons, failed to fully explain the dispute resolution process, or were equivocal.

Because a valid refusal was never given, the limitation period was not triggered, and the applicant was not precluded from proceeding to arbitration.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought ongoing caregiver benefits beyond the 104-week mark, claiming a complete inability to carry on a normal life due to chronic pain and depression.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's severe chronic pain disorder and major depression continuously prevented her from engaging in substantially all of her pre-accident activities, including caring for her three special needs children.

The arbitrator awarded the maximum weekly caregiver benefit of $350.00, plus interest, but denied the applicant's claim for a special award, finding the insurer's termination of benefits was not unreasonable based on the medical reports available at the time.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's refusal to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance.

The Court of Appeal held that the decision was discretionary and found no basis for appellate intervention.

The court noted that even if the motion judge erred in assessing prejudice, the test for special circumstances was not met.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and settled her damages for over $2.5 million.

The at-fault driver had $300,000 in third-party limits and a $1,000,000 personal liability umbrella policy.

The respondent's insurer sought to deduct both amounts from her $500,000 OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement.

The Court of Appeal held that the umbrella policy did not constitute 'motor vehicle liability insurance' under the endorsement's definition.

Therefore, the insurer could only deduct the $300,000 third-party limits, entitling the respondent to $200,000.

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the court received written submissions on costs of the cross-appeal.

On consent of the appellant in the cross-appeal, the court awarded costs of the cross-appeal to the respondents in the cross-appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $2,000 each.

The plaintiffs, Ontario residents, were injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York State involving a vehicle driven by a New York resident.

The plaintiffs sued in Ontario.

The defendant moved to determine the applicable law.

The Court of Appeal held that the substantive law of New York (lex loci delicti) applies, while the procedural law of Ontario (lex fori) applies.

The Court determined that costs and the cap on non-pecuniary damages are procedural matters governed by Ontario law, whereas pre-judgment interest is a substantive right governed by New York law.

York Fire applied to revoke a previous arbitration order which found that Dorna Osbourne was the spouse of its insured, Winston Smart, making York Fire responsible for the applicant's statutory accident benefits.

York Fire introduced new evidence demonstrating that both Osbourne and Smart had lied under oath during the initial hearing about their marital histories and continuous cohabitation.

The arbitrator admitted the new evidence, found the witnesses' credibility severely undermined, and revoked the previous order.

The arbitrator concluded that Osbourne and Smart were not spouses at the time of the accident, and ordered Allstate to respond to the applicant's claims.

The Applicant, a pedestrian, was struck by a motor vehicle insured by Allstate.

She sought statutory accident benefits.

A preliminary issue hearing was held to determine whether Allstate or York Fire (the insurer of her mother's partner) was responsible for paying benefits.

The arbitrator found that the Applicant's mother and the named insured under the York Fire policy were 'spouses' within the meaning of the Insurance Act, as they had cohabited continuously for over three years despite maintaining separate residences for a 17-month period due to financial difficulties.

Therefore, the Applicant was an 'insured person' under the York Fire policy and York Fire was responsible for paying the benefits.

The applicant, a minor who suffered severe injuries after being struck by a motor vehicle, applied for statutory accident benefits from two insurers.

Allstate paid benefits to date, while York Fire denied liability.

On a preliminary issue hearing, the arbitrator ordered both insurers to share equally in the payment of interim benefits pending the final arbitration to determine priority.

The arbitrator found jurisdiction to make interim orders under section 279(4.1) of the Insurance Act and held that the applicant established a prima facie case for entitlement and urgency.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in November 1991 and received statutory accident benefits until July 1992.

She applied for arbitration seeking ongoing weekly income benefits and housekeeping expenses, claiming she was substantially unable to perform her essential tasks.

The arbitrator found that the applicant suffered from chronic pain syndrome resulting from a prior 1989 accident, and that the 1991 accident only caused a minor exacerbation that had resolved by July 1992.

The claims for ongoing weekly income benefits and housekeeping expenses were dismissed, as the ongoing symptoms were not causally connected to the 1991 accident.

The applicant was awarded her arbitration expenses.