Brian M. Cameron

This decision concerns the interpretation of a contingency fee retainer agreement between Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. and Richard Walter Clare (the "Client") and their former law firm, Harrison Pensa LLP ("HP").

The court found that HP was not entitled to a contingency fee on a judgment obtained by the Client on appeal after new counsel was retained.

The agreement only entitled HP to a contingency fee on damages recovered prior to or at trial.

The court also rejected HP’s claim for compensation under quantum meruit, holding that the enforceable agreement governed the parties’ rights and obligations.

The appellant, Leslie J. O’Connor, appealed a trial judge's decision to discharge a jury and render judgment in favour of the respondent, Peter St. Marthe, following a motor vehicle accident.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in ruling that counsel improperly elicited inadmissible opinion evidence from a non-party expert (Dr. Mussett) regarding the respondent's ability to work, and whether the judge erred in discharging the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding Dr. Mussett's opinion on employability was inadmissible as it went beyond the scope of his original assessment and was highly prejudicial.

The court also found no error in discharging the jury, given the significant impact of the inadmissible evidence and the trial judge's assessment of trial fairness.

The plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury after being hit by a golf ball hit by the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion to increase the damages claimed and to strike the jury notice due to anticipated trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the amendment to damages on consent.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice, adopting a 'wait and see' approach to determine if the region's new civil trial protocol could accommodate urgent civil jury trials, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to renew the motion later.

The appellant, Linda-Sue Pearce, appealed from a motion judge's refusal to allow her to withdraw an admission made during a summary judgment motion regarding ownership of a Ford truck.

The truck was driven by her son, Trevor Middleton, when it was involved in a collision with a Honda Civic.

Middleton was convicted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault.

The respondent Liu sued his own insurer, The Personal Insurance Company, for relief against uninsured or underinsured motorists.

During the motion, all parties agreed that if Pearce was found to be the owner, Wawanesa would respond and the action against Personal could be dismissed.

After the motion judge found Pearce was the owner and dismissed the action against Personal, Pearce sought to withdraw her admission, arguing that section 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act made her liable only for negligence, not intentional torts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interests of justice did not favour allowing withdrawal of the admission.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the action from Barrie to Toronto, arguing that all parties, the motor vehicle accident, and the plaintiff's medical treatment were predominantly located in Toronto, with no substantial connection to Barrie other than the plaintiffs' counsel's practice location.

The plaintiffs opposed, asserting that remaining in Barrie would avoid significant delays and be more cost-effective.

The court granted the transfer, finding that Toronto was a significantly better venue based on a holistic application of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the convenience of parties and witnesses, the location of events and damages, and the local community's interest.