Brian M. Cameron

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits for the cost of renting an accessible unit following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant owned a main residence in Thunder Bay and a vacation property in Toronto.

Due to her injuries, she rented an accessible unit in Toronto and rented out both her pre-accident properties.

The respondent argued that the rental income from both properties should be deducted from the housing benefit, resulting in no benefit payable.

The Tribunal found that only the rental income from the pre-accident main residence should be deducted, as the Schedule does not contemplate deducting income from a vacation property.

The applicant was awarded the housing benefit less the main residence rental income, plus interest.

Claims for painting expenses and an award were dismissed.

This decision concerns the interpretation of a contingency fee retainer agreement between Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. and Richard Walter Clare (the "Client") and their former law firm, Harrison Pensa LLP ("HP").

The court found that HP was not entitled to a contingency fee on a judgment obtained by the Client on appeal after new counsel was retained.

The agreement only entitled HP to a contingency fee on damages recovered prior to or at trial.

The court also rejected HP’s claim for compensation under quantum meruit, holding that the enforceable agreement governed the parties’ rights and obligations.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a rental vehicle leased by the defendant lessee but driven by an unauthorized third party.

The sole issue at trial was whether the lessee had given express or implied consent to his friend to possess the vehicle, which would make the lessee vicariously liable under s. 192(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court rejected the lessee's evidence that he had flatly refused his friend's request to use the vehicle, finding his subsequent conduct inconsistent with a refusal.

The court concluded that the presumption of consent was not rebutted and held the lessee vicariously liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying him statutory accident benefits after he fell from the roof of his camper trailer while cleaning it.

The Adjudicator had found the incident did not meet the causation test for an 'accident' because there was no evidence the appellant tripped on the trailer or that the trailer directly caused the fall.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Adjudicator erred in law by requiring direct physical contact with the vehicle to establish causation.

The court found that falling from the trailer while inspecting it was a normal incident of the risk created by its use, satisfying the definition of an accident under the Schedule.

The applicant, who was catastrophically impaired following a 2012 motorcycle accident, sought entitlement to 24-hour attendant care benefits ($7,522.85 per month) due to severe psychological impairments, including panic attacks, memory issues, and anger outbursts.

The respondent argued that 24-hour supervision was not an appropriate psychological treatment and recommended cognitive behavioural therapy instead.

The Tribunal found that while therapy might eventually reduce the applicant's fear of being alone, the proposed attendant care was reasonable and necessary in the interim to address significant safety concerns and manage his psychological symptoms.

The applicant was awarded the ongoing attendant care benefits.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found that his fall from the roof of his trailer did not constitute an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant argued that the adjudicator erred in law by misapplying the causation test.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding no error of law, as the evidence established the applicant lost his footing and the trailer did not directly cause the injuries.

The appellant, Leslie J. O’Connor, appealed a trial judge's decision to discharge a jury and render judgment in favour of the respondent, Peter St. Marthe, following a motor vehicle accident.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in ruling that counsel improperly elicited inadmissible opinion evidence from a non-party expert (Dr. Mussett) regarding the respondent's ability to work, and whether the judge erred in discharging the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding Dr. Mussett's opinion on employability was inadmissible as it went beyond the scope of his original assessment and was highly prejudicial.

The court also found no error in discharging the jury, given the significant impact of the inadmissible evidence and the trial judge's assessment of trial fairness.

The applicant fell from the roof of his fifth wheel trailer while inspecting and cleaning it in preparation for a trip.

He sought statutory accident benefits from the respondent, who denied the claim on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that while the trailer met the definition of an automobile and the activity satisfied the purpose test, the incident failed the causation test.

The fall was caused by a loss of footing, an intervening act, and was not directly caused by the use or operation of the trailer.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury after being hit by a golf ball hit by the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion to increase the damages claimed and to strike the jury notice due to anticipated trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the amendment to damages on consent.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice, adopting a 'wait and see' approach to determine if the region's new civil trial protocol could accommodate urgent civil jury trials, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to renew the motion later.

The appellant, Linda-Sue Pearce, appealed from a motion judge's refusal to allow her to withdraw an admission made during a summary judgment motion regarding ownership of a Ford truck.

The truck was driven by her son, Trevor Middleton, when it was involved in a collision with a Honda Civic.

Middleton was convicted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault.

The respondent Liu sued his own insurer, The Personal Insurance Company, for relief against uninsured or underinsured motorists.

During the motion, all parties agreed that if Pearce was found to be the owner, Wawanesa would respond and the action against Personal could be dismissed.

After the motion judge found Pearce was the owner and dismissed the action against Personal, Pearce sought to withdraw her admission, arguing that section 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act made her liable only for negligence, not intentional torts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interests of justice did not favour allowing withdrawal of the admission.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the action from Barrie to Toronto, arguing that all parties, the motor vehicle accident, and the plaintiff's medical treatment were predominantly located in Toronto, with no substantial connection to Barrie other than the plaintiffs' counsel's practice location.

The plaintiffs opposed, asserting that remaining in Barrie would avoid significant delays and be more cost-effective.

The court granted the transfer, finding that Toronto was a significantly better venue based on a holistic application of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the convenience of parties and witnesses, the location of events and damages, and the local community's interest.

The appellant appealed a costs award following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge had added notional pre-judgment interest to the jury's general damages award before applying the statutory deductible, which resulted in the plaintiff beating the defendant's offer to settle and triggering the costs consequences of Rule 49.10.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that notional pre-judgment interest should be added to the general damages award for the purpose of determining whether a judgment is more favourable than an offer to settle.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's holistic consideration of the offers to settle under Rule 49.13.

The appellant appealed an order refusing leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add her insurer as a defendant.

The proposed amendment sought a determination of catastrophic impairment.

The motion judge held that while multiple applications for catastrophic impairment are not strictly precluded under s. 40(4) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, a subsequent application under the same sub-paragraph requires evidence of a material change in circumstances.

Finding no such change, the motion judge refused the amendment.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's interpretation and found no error in her decision to refuse the amendment based on the record before her.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application for judicial review concerning the interpretation of catastrophic impairment.

The applicant opposed the motion, arguing OTLA's interest was indirect and the case involved straightforward statutory interpretation.

The court granted the motion, finding that OTLA had expertise, could provide a broader perspective on the legislative scheme, and its participation would not prejudice the parties.

Leave to intervene was granted subject to conditions.

The insured was left with quadriplegia following an automobile accident in Jamaica caused by an underinsured motorist.

The insured sought coverage under the underinsured motorist endorsement of their standard Ontario Automobile Policy.

The insurer denied coverage, relying on the territorial limitation in the main policy.

The motion judge found the endorsement ambiguous and ruled in favour of the insured.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the endorsement clearly incorporated the territorial limitation of the main policy.

The appeal was allowed, and the court declared that the endorsement did not provide coverage for the accident in Jamaica.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision that he had not established a permanent and serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function resulting from a motor vehicle accident under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her consideration of future events.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did consider future events but properly concluded the evidence was mere conjecture, and her conclusion that the statutory threshold was not met was supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent suffered a 'serious impairment' under s. 267.5(5)(b) of the Insurance Act following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapplied the threshold test by relying on a previous appellate endorsement that allegedly lowered the standard to only require an effect on the enjoyment of life.

The Court of Appeal clarified that its previous endorsement did not modify the established test, which requires a substantial interference with the ability to perform usual daily activities or regular employment.

Finding no error in the trial judge's application of the law or appreciation of the evidence, the appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when her bicycle collided with a tow truck driven by an employee in the course of his employment.

The tow truck was owned by the employer.

The employer claimed 'protected defendant' status under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act, which limits the liability of motor vehicle owners.

The Court of Appeal held that while the employer was protected in its capacity as the vehicle's owner, it was not protected from vicarious liability in its capacity as the driver's employer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and settled her damages for over $2.5 million.

The at-fault driver had $300,000 in third-party limits and a $1,000,000 personal liability umbrella policy.

The respondent's insurer sought to deduct both amounts from her $500,000 OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement.

The Court of Appeal held that the umbrella policy did not constitute 'motor vehicle liability insurance' under the endorsement's definition.

Therefore, the insurer could only deduct the $300,000 third-party limits, entitling the respondent to $200,000.

The plaintiff, who claimed to suffer from chronic fatigue syndrome, was denied long-term disability benefits by the defendant insurer.

The plaintiff commenced an action and successfully moved for a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring the insurer to pay periodic disability benefits and arrears until trial.

The insurer appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction, finding that the motions judge erred in concluding the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm.

The majority held that the plaintiff's financial hardship and potential loss of dignity did not constitute irreparable harm, as damages would be an adequate remedy if the plaintiff succeeded at trial.