Jay Skukowski

The appellant suffered a catastrophic spinal cord injury in a cycling accident on a dirt path adjacent to Stone Church Road in Hamilton.

The City brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal under s. 44(8) of the Municipal Act, 2001, which exempts municipalities from liability for damages caused by construction, obstruction, or erection on untravelled portions of highways.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the accident occurred on an untravelled portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge applied the wrong legal test.

The correct test requires determining whether the portion of highway was commonly and habitually used by the public for travel, not whether such use was reasonably foreseeable.

The court found the dirt path was commonly and regularly used by pedestrians and cyclists and therefore constituted a travelled portion of the highway, placing it outside the statutory exemption.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful summary judgment motion brought by the City of Hamilton, which resulted in the dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

Following the parties' agreement on costs, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the City of Hamilton an all-inclusive amount of $200,000 for the action and summary judgment motion.

The City of Hamilton moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for injuries sustained while cycling on an off-road path adjacent to Stone Church Road East.

The plaintiff, Otto Bello, suffered complete tetraplegia after riding into a culvert.

The City argued the claim was barred by s.44(8) of the Municipal Act, 2001, as the accident occurred on an untravelled portion of a highway.

The court found that clearly marked bicycle lanes were available, and the plaintiff chose an informal, untravelled path.

The court concluded that it was not reasonably foreseeable that cyclists would use the off-road path instead of the provided bicycle lanes, thus granting summary judgment to the City and dismissing the plaintiff's action.

The appellant, Marguerite Crete, appealed a motion judge's declaration that a snow removal provision in her lease was not inconsistent with the Residential Tenancies Act, making her responsible for snow clearing in areas exclusively used by her.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the snow removal provision was not inconsistent with the RTA, despite finding errors in the motion judge's interpretation of certain RTA sections.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the tenant's responsibility for snow clearing in exclusively used areas.

The plaintiffs brought eight proposed class actions against various long-term care (LTC) home owners and operators in Ontario, alleging systemic negligence and gross negligence in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered whether the claims met the certification criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, particularly in light of the statutory immunity provided by the Supporting Ontario's Recovery Act (SORA).

The court certified six of the actions against the main corporate groups, finding that the pleadings disclosed a viable cause of action in gross negligence and that a class action was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the certification motions against independently owned homes and municipalities due to the lack of a collective enterprise and missing representative plaintiffs.

The plaintiff sued the defendant municipality for injuries sustained after tripping on beach stones scattered on a public sidewalk.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the sidewalk was not in an unreasonable state of non-repair and that it had no knowledge of the stones.

The court granted the defendant's motion, finding that the presence of the stones did not constitute an unreasonable state of non-repair as they could be easily avoided by a person exercising ordinary care.

Furthermore, the court held that the municipality was exempt from liability under s. 44(3)(a) of the Municipal Act because it did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, about the stones on the sidewalk.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the court determined the costs payable to the successful plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs based on an unaccepted offer to settle the motions.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, noting that Rule 49.10 does not provide a responding party much incentive to make an offer to settle in advance of a motion.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs on a partial indemnity basis at $38,328, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, to be paid equally by the three moving party groups.

The defendants brought motions to strike the self-represented plaintiff's statement of claim, which alleged he was racially profiled and falsely accused of theft at a trade show.

The court dismissed the motions brought by the exhibitor and security company defendants, finding the claim disclosed potential causes of action in negligence, misrepresentation, and defamation when read generously.

The court granted the motion brought by the event organizer, striking the claim against it without leave to amend, as no reasonable cause of action was discernible.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their action for delay, which arose from a 2011 property flood.

The court applied the four-factor test from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., assessing the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found significant unexplained delays by both plaintiffs and their counsel, that the missed deadline was not mere inadvertence, and that the motion to set aside was not promptly brought.

Crucially, the defendants suffered actual prejudice due to the death of a key plaintiff (James Freure) and the dementia of another (Fae Freure), which prevented full discoveries and expert examinations, and resulted in the loss of relevant medical records.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the dismissal, emphasizing the need for finality in litigation.

A separate motion to appoint Catherine Chapman as litigation guardian for Fae Freure was granted.

The defendants jointly brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's slip and fall personal injury claim.

The plaintiff slipped on ice while attempting to enter a bridal store.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the factual record was highly disputed and the electronic materials filed by the parties were voluminous, unorganized, and lacked necessary hyperlinks.

The court emphasized that summary judgment is inappropriate when the record does not allow the judge to confidently make findings of fact, and strongly criticized the profession's failure to properly prepare electronic motion records.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision refusing leave to vacate a trial record after the action had been set down for trial.

The trial record had been filed to avoid dismissal following a status notice, but doing so prevented further discovery under rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Master held that leave could only be granted if there was a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances or if substantive rights were affected.

The court held that the Master fettered his discretion by applying the test too narrowly.

Even without a substantial change in circumstances, leave may be granted where the interests of justice require it, particularly where the plaintiff would otherwise suffer significant prejudice in preparing for trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to vacate a trial record and obtain leave to continue a discovery-related production motion after the action had been set down for trial.

The plaintiff acknowledged that counsel had inadvertently set the action down for trial in response to a status notice without considering the consequences of Rule 48.04(1).

The court held that discovery motions are routine interlocutory matters that do not affect substantive rights and therefore require a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances before leave may be granted.

As no such change in circumstances existed, the court declined to vacate the trial record or permit the continuation of discovery.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the defendants.