6 total
Six COVID-19 class actions against long-term care corporate groups certified for gross negligence; independent homes dismissed.
The plaintiffs brought eight proposed class actions against various long-term care (LTC) home owners and operators in Ontario, alleging systemic negligence and gross negligence in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The court considered whether the claims met the certification criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, particularly in light of the statutory immunity provided by the Supporting Ontario's Recovery Act (SORA).
The court certified six of the actions against the main corporate groups, finding that the pleadings disclosed a viable cause of action in gross negligence and that a class action was the preferable procedure.
However, the court dismissed the certification motions against independently owned homes and municipalities due to the lack of a collective enterprise and missing representative plaintiffs.
Judicial review of physician's interim suspension dismissed; failure to cooperate with investigation justified College's order.
The applicant physician sought judicial review of an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario suspending her certificate of registration.
The suspension followed investigations into her infection prevention and control practices, dissemination of COVID-19 misinformation, and alleged issuance of a vaccine exemption to an immunocompromised patient.
The applicant refused to cooperate with the investigations, arguing the College lacked jurisdiction.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the suspension order was reasonable, factually grounded, and necessary to protect the public from harm given the applicant's ungovernability.
The court also dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence and found no breach of procedural fairness.
The court permitted a neurologist to testify as an expert despite a prior treating relationship with the plaintiff, condemning the defendants' late challenge as trial by ambush.
This decision addresses a challenge to the admissibility of an expert witness, Dr. David Gladstone, during a medical malpractice trial.
Counsel for the defendants argued that Dr. Gladstone was not impartial or objective and was in a conflict of interest due to a prior treating relationship with the plaintiff.
The court found that Dr. Gladstone had disclosed the prior relationship to the plaintiffs' counsel, believed it irrelevant to his expert opinion, and was confident in his objectivity.
The court also clarified that treating physicians can act as medical experts, with their duty solely to the adjudicative body, not to advocate for former patients.
The judge qualified Dr. Gladstone as an expert and permitted him to testify, criticizing the defendants' counsel for raising the challenge for the first time at trial as a 'trial by ambush'.
The court approved 'caused or contributed to' language for causation jury questions and declined to require jury reasons.
The court addressed a dispute in a medical malpractice jury trial regarding the wording of causation questions and whether the jury should provide reasons for their findings.
The plaintiffs proposed "caused or contributed to" language, while the defendants advocated for "but for" and requested reasons.
The court accepted the plaintiffs' "caused or contributed to" language, finding no compelling reason not to translate the "but for" test into everyday language, and rejected the request for the jury to provide reasons, citing the risk of confusion and violation of jury secrecy.
Appeal of professional discipline finding dismissed; no procedural unfairness and credibility findings were reasonable.
The appellant massage therapist appealed a decision of the Discipline Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct for authorizing an employee to issue false receipts.
He argued the panel erred by convicting him on a different theory of liability than advanced by the prosecutor and erred in its factual findings.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness as the appellant knew the case he had to meet, and holding that the panel's credibility findings and ultimate conclusion were reasonable.
Tenant who took possession and opened for business waived strict compliance with lease completion conditions.
The appellant tenant appealed a decision regarding its obligation to pay rent under a commercial lease.
The lease contained a latent ambiguity regarding the Completion Date and Rental Commencement Date.
The tenant argued it was not required to pay rent because the landlord had not completed all buildings in the shopping centre as stipulated in the lease.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was not commercially reasonable for the tenant to take possession, operate its business, and use the landlord's services without paying rent.
By taking possession and opening for business, the tenant effectively waived strict compliance with the landlord's obligation to complete all buildings as a condition precedent to paying rent.