Lauren Furukawa

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed motions by tenants Michael Schram and Leslie Mitchell for an extension of time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal and a notice of appeal regarding the termination of their tenancy and the dismissal of their action.

The court found that the proposed appeals lacked merit and that the justice of the case did not warrant an extension.

The court also dismissed the request for a stay of eviction and awarded costs to the responding parties.

The moving parties, including Chartwell Retirement Residences, Sienna Senior Living Inc., Extendicare Inc., and Schlegel Villages Inc., brought four motions for leave to appeal the decision of Morgan J. dated March 7, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The plaintiffs brought eight proposed class actions against various long-term care (LTC) home owners and operators in Ontario, alleging systemic negligence and gross negligence in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered whether the claims met the certification criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, particularly in light of the statutory immunity provided by the Supporting Ontario's Recovery Act (SORA).

The court certified six of the actions against the main corporate groups, finding that the pleadings disclosed a viable cause of action in gross negligence and that a class action was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the certification motions against independently owned homes and municipalities due to the lack of a collective enterprise and missing representative plaintiffs.

The Applicant, First Condo Group Ltd., sought an order for insurance coverage from the Respondent, Lloyd’s Underwriters, which was dismissed in a prior application.

This decision addresses the Respondent's claim for costs on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $31,548.48.

The Applicant argued the Respondent's counsel fees were excessive given the limited scope of the application and compared them to its own billable hours.

The court found the Respondent's costs claim reasonable, noting the serious nature of the underlying application (exposing Lloyd's to $2 million liability) and the helpfulness of the legal research, and granted the full amount requested.

The applicant, an engineering firm, sought insurance coverage from the respondent for a professional negligence claim.

The claim arose from a reserve fund study completed in November 2013, which allegedly failed to identify a corroded lamppost.

A worker was injured in October 2015 due to the lamppost's collapse.

The insurer denied coverage based on a retroactive date exclusion clause (September 11, 2015), arguing the "incident" was the negligent study preparation (2013), which occurred before the retroactive date.

The applicant contended the "incident" was the worker's injury (2015), which occurred after the retroactive date.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the word "incident" in the exclusion clause unambiguously referred to the alleged misconduct in 2013, not the subsequent injury in 2015.

The appellant Economical Insurance appealed a motion judge's determination of the priority in which three insurance policies would respond to a motor vehicle accident claim.

The driver was covered under the vehicle owner's State Farm automobile policy, the owner's State Farm personal liability umbrella policy, and the driver's own Economical automobile policy.

The motion judge ordered that the State Farm auto policy respond first, followed by the Economical auto policy, and then the State Farm umbrella policy.

Economical argued that the umbrella policy was an owner's first loss policy under section 277(1) of the Insurance Act and should respond before the Economical policy, or alternatively, that both policies should respond rateably under section 277(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the umbrella policy was not an owner's first loss policy as defined by the Act and that section 277(2) did not apply to the Economical policy.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) from her insurer until they were terminated in 2003.

She commenced an action against the insurer for other benefits in 2005, but did not claim IRBs.

In 2007, she commenced a new action against the insurer for IRBs and against her former lawyer for negligence.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the IRB claim as statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the insurer's 2003 notice of termination was clear and unequivocal, triggering the two-year limitation period, which had long expired.