Kevin Khoa Van Doan

The applicant sought judicial review and appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision holding him to a 2004 settlement of his motor vehicle accident claims.

The applicant argued the settlement was invalid because he initialed, rather than signed, the Statutory Disclosure Notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant's failure to sign the specific signature line was a technical and immaterial defect that did not invalidate the notice or allow him to rescind the agreement.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that found he was bound by a settlement agreement and precluded from proceeding to the Tribunal.

The applicant alleged the Tribunal breached procedural fairness, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, and made errors of law regarding the statutory requirements of an accident benefits settlement.

The adjudicator dismissed the request, finding no breach of procedural fairness, no cogent evidence of bias, and no errors of law or fact, concluding that the applicant was attempting to re-litigate his case.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a 2000 motor vehicle accident.

The parties engaged in mediation and arbitration at FSCO, ultimately reaching a settlement in 2004.

The applicant signed the Settlement Disclosure Notice (SDN) by initialing each page but did not sign the specific acknowledgment line.

Years later, the applicant attempted to reopen the claim, arguing the settlement was invalid due to the missing signature.

The Tribunal found that a binding contract existed, the SDN substantially complied with O. Reg. 664, and the applicant failed to rescind the settlement within the two-business-day cooling-off period.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought to schedule motions to set aside two 2007 consent orders that dismissed his actions following a settlement for statutory accident benefits.

The plaintiff intended to argue that the settlement was void due to non-disclosure by the insurer and to raise a constitutional challenge against binding Court of Appeal precedent.

The court declined to schedule a single unified hearing, finding the proposed proceedings too complex and fraught with procedural issues.

Instead, the court directed the parties to first schedule a hearing to determine whether the court has jurisdiction (or if the License Appeal Tribunal is the proper forum) and whether the plaintiff must repay the settlement funds before challenging the settlement.

The plaintiff sought to schedule a single, three-hour motion to set aside a 2007 settlement of his statutory accident benefits claims, arguing the insurer failed to provide a mandatory disclosure notice and settled without his authority.

The court found the proposed scheduling premature and procedurally inappropriate, noting complex jurisdictional issues regarding whether the Licence Appeal Tribunal or the court is the proper forum, and whether the plaintiff must first repay the settlement funds.

The court directed the parties to discuss the proper forum and scheduling before proceeding.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2000 and commenced an arbitration proceeding at FSCO in 2002.

A settlement was reached in 2004.

Fifteen years later, the applicant sought to rescind the settlement and continue the arbitration at FSCO.

The insurer argued that under the transitional provisions of O. Reg. 664, the proceeding was extinguished at FSCO and any new application must be brought before the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT).

The arbitrator held that pursuant to section 22(2) of O. Reg. 664, the proceeding was extinguished at FSCO because a settlement had been entered into, and directed that either party could reapply at the LAT.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing his application for judicial review of a Director Delegate's decision.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Divisional Court's application of the appropriate standard of review.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario, which upheld an arbitrator's decision dismissing his claim for accident benefits.

The applicant had settled his claim in 2003 after eight years of litigation but purported to rescind the settlement in 2014, arguing the settlement disclosure notice did not comply with the Settlement Regulation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's Delegate reasonably and correctly applied binding Court of Appeal precedent establishing that the regulation's strict disclosure requirements do not apply to settlements reached after a court action has commenced.

The respondent sought appeal expenses of $3,500 following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal.

The parties agreed on the quantum but disputed the timing of payment.

The appellant argued payment should be delayed pending its application for judicial review, or awarded in the cause.

The Director's Delegate ordered the expenses payable forthwith, noting that a judicial review does not automatically stay the process and the respondent was entirely successful on a discrete issue.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitrator's order refusing to dismiss the respondent's arbitration on the basis of the Doctrine of Laches.

The respondent had rescinded a 2004 settlement in 2014, alleging the insurer failed to provide a Settlement Disclosure Notice as required by the Settlement Regulation.

The Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that the statutory right to rescind a settlement is a legal right, not an equitable one, and therefore the equitable Doctrine of Laches cannot be applied to bar the claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of an arbitrator's order which held that an arbitration arising from a 1990 motor vehicle accident could not proceed because the applicant had signed a full and final release.

The applicant sought the stay pending an application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court noted that the delay was largely attributable to the applicant and that financial compensation would ultimately be available if successful.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant sought to rescind a 2003 settlement of his accident benefits claim and proceed to arbitration for further income replacement benefits.

The Arbitrator found that the Full and Final Release precluded arbitration because the Settlement Regulation's cooling-off and disclosure provisions do not apply to settlements reached after a court action has commenced.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate upheld the Arbitrator's decision, finding that binding Court of Appeal precedent established that the Settlement Regulation does not apply in the context of litigation, and subsequent regulatory amendments did not alter this principle.

The Applicant was injured in a 1997 motor vehicle accident and settled his statutory accident benefits claim in 2004.

Ten years later, the Applicant purported to rescind the settlement, alleging the Insurer failed to provide a Settlement Disclosure Notice as required by Ontario Regulation 664, and applied for arbitration.

The Insurer raised a preliminary issue, arguing the application should be dismissed under the equitable Doctrine of Laches due to the extreme delay and resulting prejudice from lost files and witnesses.

The Arbitrator held that the right to rescind under the Regulation is a statutory legal right, not an equitable claim, and therefore the Doctrine of Laches does not apply.

The preliminary motion was dismissed, allowing the arbitration to proceed.

The Applicant sought accident benefits for two separate motor vehicle accidents (1990 and 1996).

In a preliminary issue hearing, the Arbitrator determined whether the arbitrations could proceed.

For the 1990 accident, the Arbitrator found that the arbitration was barred because the Applicant had signed a Full and Final Release in 2003 to settle a related civil action, and the right to rescind under the Settlement Regulation did not apply to settlements reached in court proceedings.

For the 1996 accident, the Arbitrator found that the claim for income replacement benefits was not time-barred because the Insurer's termination notice failed to clearly and unequivocally inform the Applicant of the dispute resolution process and time limits, as required by the Smith v. Co-operators test.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against her insurer for terminating her Income Replacement Benefits.

The motion judge found the action was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the termination notice was clear and unequivocal, and affirming that the limitation period is triggered by a single event—the refusal to pay the benefits claimed—rather than operating as a rolling limitation period.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding the respondent bank's refusal to approve a rehabilitation plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bank had the discretion to refuse approval for expenses over $5,000 and that its refusal was reasonable based on the medical opinion evidence.

The court also held that the application judge's reasons were adequate.

The defendant, The Personal Insurance Company of Canada, sought to have the same judge who granted its initial summary judgment motion hear a subsequent 'further motion' to dismiss the balance of the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff opposed this request, arguing the relief was inappropriate for summary judgment and citing concerns about the judge's prior favourable ruling.

The court, referencing Hryniak v. Mauldin, declined to seize itself of the further motion, clarifying that the obligation to craft a trial process arises when summary judgment motions are dismissed, not granted.

However, the court offered to case manage the interim issues related to the second motion.

The defendant bank successfully brought a motion for summary judgment and sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on two offers to settle.

The court found that the defendant's second offer, which required the plaintiff to resign and forfeit ongoing long-term disability benefits, superseded the first offer.

Because the value of the ongoing benefits was unknown, the defendant could not prove the summary judgment dismissal was more favourable than the second offer.

The court awarded the defendant costs of the motion and the action on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $57,500 inclusive.

The plaintiff sued her employer, CIBC, and the plan administrator, Great-West Life, for long-term disability benefits, funding for treatment plans, and damages for mental distress and punitive damages.

CIBC brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it.

The court found that CIBC did not breach its duty of good faith in refusing to fund the proposed treatment plans, as its decision was based on proper principles and supported by medical opinions.

The court also found no bad faith in CIBC withholding one month of benefits due to the plaintiff's failure to provide advance notice of out-of-province travel.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claims against CIBC were dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) from her insurer until they were terminated in 2003.

She commenced an action against the insurer for other benefits in 2005, but did not claim IRBs.

In 2007, she commenced a new action against the insurer for IRBs and against her former lawyer for negligence.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the IRB claim as statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the insurer's 2003 notice of termination was clear and unequivocal, triggering the two-year limitation period, which had long expired.