Amy Murakami

The plaintiffs brought eight proposed class actions against various long-term care (LTC) home owners and operators in Ontario, alleging systemic negligence and gross negligence in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered whether the claims met the certification criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, particularly in light of the statutory immunity provided by the Supporting Ontario's Recovery Act (SORA).

The court certified six of the actions against the main corporate groups, finding that the pleadings disclosed a viable cause of action in gross negligence and that a class action was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the certification motions against independently owned homes and municipalities due to the lack of a collective enterprise and missing representative plaintiffs.

The applicant apartment association applied to quash City of Toronto By-laws 1121-2019 and 1750-2019, which required apartment owners to provide emergency accommodations to displaced tenants and imposed a full cost recovery fee on landlords if the City provided those services.

The court held that the City lacked the legislative authority to require landlords to provide emergency social services regardless of the cause of the building becoming uninhabitable.

The court quashed the specific provisions imposing the fee and the requirement to provide emergency social services, while upholding the remainder of the by-laws.

The applicant received a parking ticket and challenged the constitutionality of the City of Toronto's administrative penalty system (By-Law 799-2017).

He argued the system violated sections 7 and 11 of the Charter, conflicted with various statutes, and was enacted in bad faith to maximize revenue.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the Charter sections do not apply to administrative penalties with no true penal consequences, the by-law did not conflict with other legislation, and the City enacted the by-law in good faith to efficiently regulate parking.

The plaintiff grocery store sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the municipality from removing a lay-by used for valet parking on a public street during planned road improvements.

The court applied the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR-MacDonald and held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured relief.

The alleged causes of action—injurious affection and an easement—could not support the requested injunction, as any remedy for injurious affection lay in damages before the municipal tribunal and no easement could exist over a public highway.

The court also held that potential economic losses from removal of the lay-by were compensable in damages and that municipal authority over public highways weighed heavily against judicial interference.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiffs’ statement of claim alleging harassment, injuries, and inadequate police response at a social housing complex.

The court held the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action against the landlord or the police board.

The landlord’s liability for third‑party conduct under the Residential Tenancies Act requires foreseeability and notice of repeated conduct, which had not been properly pleaded, and most alleged incidents were also statute‑barred.

Claims against the police board for failure to investigate or lay charges could not ground a civil cause of action due to police discretion in investigative and charging decisions.

The claim was dismissed as statute‑barred and legally insufficient.