Andrew K. Lee

The plaintiffs requested a remote hearing for a pre-trial conference, citing travel distance, winter driving conditions, and counsel's childcare arrangements.

The court denied the request, noting that the presumptive mode of hearing for pre-trial conferences is in-person to facilitate settlement, and that the reasons provided were not clear and compelling.

However, the court reduced the conference duration to one hour and adjusted the start time to accommodate travel and childcare.

The court also offered the parties the option of a 30-minute remote case conference focused solely on trial management if they agreed to forgo settlement discussions.

The moving parties, including Chartwell Retirement Residences, Sienna Senior Living Inc., Extendicare Inc., and Schlegel Villages Inc., brought four motions for leave to appeal the decision of Morgan J. dated March 7, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant, OZ Merchandising Inc., appealed the dismissal of its action for negligence and intentional interference with economic interests against several soccer associations.

It also sought leave to appeal a costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that OZ Merchandising failed to prove duty of care, breach, or damages for negligence, and failed to prove intent, unlawful act, or damages for intentional interference.

The court also dismissed allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial bias (personal, institutional, and ethnic).

Leave to appeal the costs order was granted, but the costs appeal was also dismissed, affirming the substantial indemnity costs awarded against OZ Merchandising and personal costs against its president, Mr. Sezerman, due to his control over the litigation and egregious conduct.

The plaintiff brought an unopposed motion to transfer a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision from Brampton to Toronto.

The collision occurred in Toronto, the plaintiff resides and sustained damages in Toronto, and two other related actions were already commenced in Toronto.

Applying the holistic factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the plaintiff met the onus of demonstrating that a transfer was in the interest of justice.

The motion was granted.

The plaintiff, OZ Merchandising Inc., sought to defer the determination of costs following the dismissal of its claims against the Eastern Ontario District Soccer Association (EODSA), The Ontario Soccer Association (OSA), and the Canadian Soccer Association (CSA).

The plaintiff also argued for a Bullock or Sanderson order and partial indemnity costs.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's requests, finding no basis to defer costs pending appeal or resolution of claims against other defendants.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the successful defendants from the date of their offers to settle, citing the plaintiff's egregious litigation conduct and the pursuit of unfounded allegations.

Additionally, the court found Omur Sezerman, a non-party, jointly and severally liable with the plaintiff for the trial costs due to his direct control over counsel and conduct undermining the administration of justice.

The plaintiff, a corporate entity managing a sports facility, brought an action against several soccer associations for negligence and intentional interference with economic relations (unlawful means tort).

The claims arose from the issuance of International Transfer Certificates for two players, the non-approval of an invitational tournament, and communications regarding unsanctioned indoor soccer leagues.

The court dismissed the action, finding that no duty of care existed between the plaintiff and the associations, as the plaintiff was not a member and had actively distanced itself from them.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence of unlawful acts against third parties or intent to harm the plaintiff, and concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove any damages.

During a civil jury trial involving claims of negligence and intentional interference with economic interests against various soccer associations, the defendants moved to strike the jury following the plaintiff's closing address.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff's counsel made 69 improper statements, including suggesting new legal claims, misstating the jury's role, attempting to adduce new evidence, and misstating the law and evidence.

The trial judge found that the plaintiff's counsel repeatedly crossed the line and that the cumulative effect of the misstatements rendered correction by an appropriate charge impossible.

The motion was granted, the jury was discharged, and the trial judge assumed responsibility for determining liability and damages.

This endorsement, issued by the Case Management Judge, addresses a request for leave by Aviva General Insurance Company to bring a motion to amend a prior order to add Aviva as a statutory third party in various actions arising from a specific incident.

The court directs that any such request for leave must be made by way of a motion in writing, on notice to all necessary parties, in accordance with Rule 37.12.1(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The endorsement also includes directions for distributing the order and notifying an incarcerated defendant.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's notice of appeal, which was filed significantly out of time for decisions on the merits and somewhat out of time for a costs decision.

The appellant appeared and claimed circumstances supporting an extension of time but failed to file an affidavit in response to the motion.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal without prejudice to the appellant's right to move for an extension of time on proper material, awarding costs of the motion to the respondents.

The self-represented appellants appealed a trial judge's finding of liability and decision to strike a jury notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's liability finding and concluding that fresh evidence would not have altered the result.

The court also held it was open to the trial judge to strike the jury notice.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The applicants, who were injured in a motor vehicle accident, brought a motion for interim income replacement benefits after the insurer terminated their benefits.

The arbitrator found that the applicants failed to establish the requisite urgency for an interim order, noting that they had previously consented to or requested adjournments of their hearing dates.

The motion for interim benefits was dismissed.

The applicants, a husband and wife who lived and worked on a farm together, were both injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

Disputes arose with the insurer, and both applicants filed applications for arbitration.

The parties consented to combining the applications.

The arbitrator found that because the applicants' duties with respect to their home and farm were intertwined, there were common issues of fact and law, and combining the claims would be the most just, quickest, and least expensive means to deal with the applications pursuant to Rule 30 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

The applications were ordered to be combined.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action for injuries sustained in a horse-related accident.

The appellants argued there were genuine issues for trial regarding whether the appellant intentionally held onto the lead shank due to the premises' condition, and whether the horse owners had prior knowledge of the horse's dangerousness.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's affidavit and evidence of the horse's breed and prior incidents created genuine issues for trial.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's self-serving affidavit and hearsay evidence insufficient to survive summary judgment.