Christopher J. Haber

This supplementary judgment addresses the penalty for the husband's contempt of court, including the violation of a mareva injunction and preservation order, the issue of a stay pending appeal, costs, mathematical corrections, and further procedural matters.

The court imposes a 90-day custodial sentence, finds the husband acted in bad faith, and awards costs to the wife.

The judgment also addresses the husband's request for a stay, the process for varying the sentence if the husband purges his contempt, and the next steps in related proceedings.

In this class action, the plaintiffs brought a motion, with the defendants' consent, seeking court approval for the notice of a settlement approval hearing, the notice distribution plan, the procedure for class member objections, and the appointment of a notice administrator.

The court granted the motion, finding that the proposed notice and distribution plan complied with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and were consistent with practices in similar class action settlements, ensuring class members would be adequately informed of the proposed settlement and objection process.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of civil contempt for breaching a parenting order.

The motion judge found that the appellant had intentionally picked up the children from school on a day when he was not entitled to do so, contrary to the court order governing transitions.

While the Court of Appeal found that the three elements of civil contempt were established beyond a reasonable doubt, it held that the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider whether to exercise her discretion to decline to make a contempt finding.

The Court emphasized that the contempt power is discretionary and should be exercised as a last resort, particularly in high-conflict matrimonial cases involving children.

The appeal was allowed and the contempt finding was set aside.

The appellant, a teacher at a private school, appealed the dismissal of her constructive dismissal claim by way of summary judgment.

She alleged that the respondent school altered the terms of her employment by failing to protect her from a confrontation with a student's parents over a mark, undermining her authority by having another teacher read and mark assignments, and assigning passing grades to students who had not completed all assignments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal, finding no evidence that the school altered the terms of employment or breached any policy, and that the school's response to the appellant's complaints was measured and reasonable.

Kimberly DeBon, a teacher, sued Hillfield Strathallan College (HSC) for constructive dismissal, alleging a poisoned work environment due to marking disputes, lack of accommodation, and property tampering.

HSC moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court applied the two-part test for constructive dismissal from Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services and the objective test for a poisoned workplace from Shah v. Xerox Canada Ltd. The court found no evidence that HSC's conduct amounted to a substantial breach of the employment contract or created a poisoned work environment.

The individual grounds for constructive dismissal were not established, nor was a causal link between earlier events and the resignation.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, former residential students at Grenville Christian College, moved to certify a class action against the school, its former headmasters, and the Anglican Diocese of Ontario, alleging systemic physical and psychological abuse and religious indoctrination.

The court dismissed the action against the Diocese, finding it plain and obvious that the Diocese owed no duty of care, was not vicariously liable, and had no fiduciary relationship with the students.

The court also dismissed the certification motion against the remaining defendants, concluding that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure because the common issues of systemic negligence would not significantly advance the individual claims.

Instead, the court suspended the dismissal for six months to allow the plaintiffs to propose a new litigation plan to continue the action as a group of case-managed individual actions.