COURT FILE NO.: FS-16-86329-01
DATE: 2022 06 06
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
M.Q
Catherine Haber and Christopher Haber, for the Applicant
Applicant
- and -
R.C
Philip Viater, for the Respondent
Respondent
Lisa A. Johnson, counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
DECISION
[1] Ms. Q acknowledges that Mr. C was the successful party on this 22-day parenting Trial heard concurrently with her Motion for Contempt. Because he was successful, he obtained terms more favourable than his Offer to Settle, and the Motion for Contempt was withdrawn after the start of Trial, Mr. C asks for a full recovery of his legal fees, disbursements and HST thereon in the amount of $668,930.[^1] Ms. Q does not dispute the amount of costs claimed but she does argue that Mr. C is not entitled to a full recovery. She also asks that the amount of costs be reduced because the litigation has exhausted her own financial resources.
[2] Counsel for the OCL does not seek an award of costs and has not participated in these submissions.
[3] For the reasons set out below, I assess costs to be paid by Ms. Q to Mr. C in the amount of $611,637.
[4] I decline to grant Mr. C’s additional request that his costs be personally paid by Ms. Q’s counsel: Mrs. Catherine Haber and Mr. Christopher Haber; but I will timetable a hearing if Ms. Q serves a motion pursuant to Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules, (“the Rules”) within 30 days of her receipt of this decision.
REASONS FOR DECISION
The Amount of Costs
[5] I will not unduly detail the usual consideration of the factors in setting an award of costs per Rule 24(12) because the amount of costs is not contested. Those factors are:
24(12)(a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues:
(i) Each party’s behaviour,
(ii) The time spent by each party,
(iii) Any written offers to settle, including offers that do not meet the requirements of Rule 18
(iv) Any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates,
(v) Any expert witness fees, including the number of experts and their rates,
(vi) Any other expenses properly paid or payable; and
(b) any other relevant matter.
[6] Mr. C provided a comprehensive Bill of Costs which itemizes his legal fees of (rounded) $522,446 and HST thereon of $67,918, and his disbursements of $78,566 inclusive of HST. The Bill of Costs also separates out from the total account of $668,930 the fees of $278,821 ($246,745 + HST $32,076) and disbursements of $24,323.50 (HST inclusive) totalling $303,145 that were incurred after his June 11, 2021 Offer to Settle. As set out below, that Offer contained terms more favourable to Ms. Q than the result at Trial.
[7] The hourly rates charged to Mr. C and the time spent on the various tasks accord with standard practise across the GTA. The amounts were proportionate to the importance and the complexity of the issues. There was some minor duplication of roles between respondent’s counsel and his associate, a few administrative tasks that were additionally charged that ought to have been included in counsel’s hourly rate and an included invoice of a previous counsel who took a different direction in the early stages of the litigation.
[8] Otherwise, the account balance stands as fair and reasonable, particularly given that one lawyer alone, Mr. Viater conducted the whole of the four-week trial and later the trial continuance. The time docketed by Mr. Viater during the trial reflected his expertise in conducting a virtual trial and its associated savings when done efficiently.
Father’s Offer to Settle the Motion to Change
[9] Rule 18(14) states that the court shall award a full recovery of costs incurred after the service of an Offer to Settle with terms as favourable or more favourable than those awarded at Trial, unless the Court orders otherwise.
[10] On June 11, 2021, Mr. C served an Offer to Settle the issues within this Motion to Change that contained terms that were significantly more favourable to Ms. Q than the result at Trial. In Mr. C’s own words, “he was desperate to settle the trial” The reasonableness of his June 11, 2021 Offer underscored what I observed throughout this proceeding to be a sincere desire to find a parenting solution. All the terms within his Offer were consistent with the long-standing views and preferences of their son, as presented by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer’s assigned clinician.
[11] The series of Offers served by Ms. Q showed no corresponding intention to find a compromise based on their son’s views and preferences. Instead, each of Ms. Q’s Offers sought escalating skeins of relief.
[12] Ms. Q’s position as set out in her pre-trial Offers to Settle, summarized in her Opening Statement at Trial, and detailed in her direct evidence was singular. In her view, L must have no ongoing contact with his father until she was satisfied that it was appropriate. She did not propose a timeline for her reunification with L (the need for which she has rejected throughout this proceeding) or a subsequent transition plan for normative father-son parenting time. In the process, she misinterpreted the Family Bridges Program, which is in essence, reunification therapy (or relationship counselling) with the rejected (or estranged) parent. As set out in my reasons for judgement, this was unreasonable litigation behaviour.
[13] I see no basis for not providing Mr. C with a full recovery of his costs incurred after June 11, 2021. He was required to respond to a series of unreasonable and unnecessarily adversarial positions throughout the litigation. At no time prior to the third week of trial – after Mr. C had incurred at least a half million dollars in costs, and while he was in active cross examination - did Ms. Q serve a reasonable Offer to Settle that was consistent with L’s views and preferences.
[14] Mr. C is awarded a full recovery of his fees of $278,821 ($246,745 + HST $32,076) incurred after the service of his June 11, 2021, Offer to Settle.
Father’s Offer to Settle the Motion for a Finding of Contempt
[15] On July 4, 2021, Mr. C served an Offer to Settle the contempt proceeding by way of a withdrawal without costs provided the Motion was withdrawn by the first day of Trial. The Offer was not accepted. The Motion for a finding of contempt was withdrawn late mid-trial by counsel specifically retained to conduct the contempt proceeding: Mr. Haber. Pursuant to Rule 18(14) Mr. C is entitled to a full recovery of his fees in defending the Motion for Contempt unless the court orders otherwise.
[16] Rule 12(3) provides that costs are to be paid on a withdrawal up to the date of the withdrawal unless a court orders otherwise. I find that Mr. C is entitled to full recovery of his fees in defending the Motion for Contempt for the following reasons.
[17] A contempt proceeding is a serious matter which requires special care in its assertion and its answer. It is remedial in nature, not punitive. It must not be misused as a litigation tactic or taken lightly by a potential contemnor. As set out in Ruffolo v David 2019 ONCA 385, contempt is a remedy of last report that must be used sparingly. It is not to be reduced to a mere means of enforcing judgements. And when the main issue concerns a child’s parenting time, irrespective of the terms of the Order, the best interests of the child is the paramount consideration.
[18] As outlined in my trial reasons, Ms. Q’s Motion for Contempt was misconstrued. This was a variation proceeding under section 17 of the Divorce Act in which Ms. Q asked to end L’s involvement with his father and to permit her to move their son to Montreal. It was issued in the wake of her lengthy breach of the final Order which provided Mr. C with regular parenting time. In the period leading up to service of her Motion to Change, Ms. Q used her custodial authority to place L in a homeschooling program, to require L to make a false complaint to the CAS and to strictly limit Mr. C’s access to any parenting information. During this period of withdrawal, L rejected his father.
[19] The lengthy period of no contact between father and son was eventually cured after Mr. C served a Response to the Motion to Change and took steps to obtain an assessment. But as the recommendations of the assessor moved forward, Ms. Q terminated her son’s personal counsellor and refused to participate further in the neutral process that had been established. She refused to pay her previously agreed one-half of the cost of the section 30 report. Ms. Q then, through a series of steps, crafted her own therapeutic processes with experts that she vetted for potential alliance. CAS became involved.
[20] Ms. Q’s actions strained the mother-son relationship and ultimately, L rejected his mother. But instead of restarting the neutral therapeutic process that had so effectively restored the father-son relationship, Ms. Q instructed her counsel to serve Mr. C with a Motion for Contempt on the very same final Order that she had breached and now sought to vary.
[21] This was a misuse of a Motion for Contempt for at least two reasons. First, the final Order was in the process of being varied because both parents agreed that there had been a material change in circumstances affecting L. The reason for the change was in dispute, but its presentation was unmistakable. L’s tolerance of the conflict between his parents, threadbare at best, had snapped. He sought shelter through dramatic shifts in allegiance, first away from his father and later, away from his mother. As consistently explained by the OCL clinician, the latter was not a deliberate or wilful act by Mr. C, it was a genuine expression of L’s views and preferences.
[22] Second, many steps were available to Ms. Q before invoking a Motion for Contempt, such as engaging in reunification therapy. L was keen to attend therapy with his mother and he desperately wanted to go back to his personal counsellor. Neutral family counselling was the clear path towards restoring the mother-son relationship.
[23] As stated by Justice Jamal in Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, it is especially important for courts to consider options other than findings of contempt in high conflict family disputes, “[o]therwise, there is a danger that contempt proceedings may exacerbate the parental conflict to the detriment of the children".
[24] Ms. Q’s Motion for Contempt did just that. It exacerbated the parental conflict to the detriment of L.
[25] I find that Ms. Q’s Motion for Contempt was unreasonable litigation conduct that must be actively discouraged and sanctioned, one of the four fundamental purposes of a costs award, as set out in Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867, the others being to partially indemnify successful litigants; to encourage settlement, and to ensure that cases are dealt with justly under subrule 2 (2) of the Rules.
[26] Pursuant to Rule 18(14) and to discourage and sanction unreasonable litigation conduct, I award Mr C a full recovery of his fees and disbursements incurred in defending Ms. Q’s Motion for Contempt. Because a separate accounting of fees incurred in defending the Motion for Contempt was not provided to me, I will address those incurred prior to June 11, 2021 within the pre-Offer costs.
Disbursements
[27] Ms. Q takes no issue in her costs submission with Mr. C’s request for the full recovery of his disbursements. I have reviewed the HST inclusive invoices from Mr. Cross, Dr. Szkibu-Day, Ms. Goldbar and Ms. Barclay attached to his Bill of Costs, as well as the invoices from the Court Reporters for questioning. Mr. C also asks for a full recovery of joint expenses that Ms. Q refused to pay, such as her half of the cost of the Section 30 report prepared by Mr. Cross and all of Ms. Barclay’s written questioning.
[28] Mr. C shall have a full recovery of his disbursements in the amount of $78,566.
Ms. Q’s Submission for a Reduction to a Full Recovery of Costs
[29] Although not cited by Ms. Q, Rule 24(4) provides that a successful party may be deprived of his costs if he has acted unreasonably. Because Ms. Q does not contest the costs of disbursement, I will focus this portion of my reasons only on legal fees.
[30] Rule 24(5) states that when deciding whether a party has behaved reasonably or unreasonably, the court shall examine:
a) The party’s behaviour in relation to the issues from the time they arose, including whether the party made an Offer to Settle;
b) The reasonableness of any offer the party made; and
c) Any offer the party withdrew or failed to accept.
[31] Reasonableness as it relates to reducing a successful party’s recovery of costs is primarily an assessment of the parties’ expectations and conduct. Were the Orders sought attainable? Were Offers made and efforts taken to cool the dispute? Were options presented and considered? Was professional advice given an appropriate regard? Was litigation limited to what was necessary to secure a just and child-focused outcome, or was it waged to gain advantage and cause harm to the opponent?
[32] Ms. Q first asks that Mr. C not receive a full recovery of costs because her counsel incurred excessive fees in responding to “3,000 – 3,500” emails. She writes that “Ms. Q’s counsels were required to write to Mr. Viater and request that he stop sending multiple emails which only served unnecessarily to increase the cost of this case.”
[33] It is fair to say that both counsel’s correspondence became heated from time to time, but not in a manner that in my view reduces an award of costs pursuant to Rule 24(5). It is the subject matter of those exchanges that informs their reasonableness.
[34] Two themes animated Ms. Q’s litigation and permeated her correspondence: that any experts’ involvement with the family was conditional on their adoption of her narrative, and that her son’s views and preferences could not be trusted when they did not accord with her own views and preferences. Each was an unreasonable expectation that misinformed and fueled inflammatory exchanges.
[35] I do however, give effect to the number of emails being a concern. Over 3,000 written communications between counsels is not an exaggeration. My review of the evidence during this four-week trial – much of which consisted of a vast number of email communications between counsels - demonstrates to my satisfaction that it was Ms. Haber who was the primary source of those increased costs. When Mr. Viater sent multiple emails, it was because Ms. Haber had not responded to his inquiry or she had raised additional, non-sequitur issues.
[36] Ms. Q’s costs submission further lists eleven additional bases for Mr. C having engaged in unreasonable or bad faith litigation in a manner that she argues should disentitle him to a full recovery of costs.
[37] I remind the reader that I made no finding of unreasonable conduct or bad faith against Mr. C. Most of Ms. Q’s proposed eleven points, such as Mr. C having breached the final Order during the period of L’s rejection of his mother, were a consequence of Ms. Q’s conduct. It was her refusal to restore L’s therapist and her refusal to engage in reunification counselling that ultimately broke the mother-son relationship.
[38] Other points raised by Ms. Q are attempts to re-litigate the issues already decided, rather than examples of unreasonable conduct that would deprive a successful litigant of his costs per Rule 24(4). Some of her assertions were not in the evidence or are contrary to the evidence.
[39] A few points hold some merit, such as Mr. C suggesting to involved persons, without a professional diagnosis that Ms. Q suffered from Munchhausen by Proxy and was extremely dangerous. I was able to observe during the trial that when distressed, or unable to obtain a professional’s attention, Mr. C became alarmist. He could also be obstructionist, such as when he refused in the trial hiatus period to give the OCL counsel permission to speak to the therapist engaged by Ms. Q. Although these actions may have precipitated some unnecessary litigation, all were isolated, often provoked incidents that had little bearing on the overall cost of the proceeding.
[40] When I view the costs incurred prior to June 11, 2021, I find no basis to significantly reduce Mr. C’s costs recovery because of unreasonable behaviour. Mr. C remained open to working with an independent reunification professional, restoring L’s therapist and securing a child focussed outcome. Although some of his efforts were uneven and occasionally alarmist, they are not in my view a sufficient basis to significantly reduce his costs.
[41] At the same time, I am not prepared to award a full recovery of his fees for the whole of the period prior to June 11, 2021, but for those that are related to the contempt proceeding. A Bill of Costs is not a blank cheque, and it should not be expected that every litigation dollar will be recovered. Nor was Ms. Q unreasonable at every stage of the proceeding. She demonstrated some ability to work with the father and professionals in a child focussed manner up until the time that she fired Ms. Barclay. It was only after that event that her litigation conduct ceased to be child focused.
What is an appropriate reduction?
[42] Even though Ms. Q does not take issue with the amount of costs, I must still be satisfied that they are fair, reasonable, and proportionate. As most recently confirmed by the Divisional Court in Zhang v. Guo, 2019 ONSC 5767 a useful benchmark for determining whether costs claimed are fair, reasonable, and proportionate is to consider the amount that the unsuccessful party paid for her own legal fees and disbursements.
[43] Rule 24(12.2) specifically sets out that “a party who opposes a claim for costs respecting fees and expenses shall provide documentation showing the party’s own fees and expenses to the court and to the other party.
[44] Ms. Q has chosen not to file a Bill of Costs within her costs submissions, and she does not set out what she has paid in costs to her own counsel but for confirming her counsel’s casual statement during the trial that her costs “were at least $600,000.” I can therefore not measure Mr. C’s costs award based on what Ms. Q has paid.
[45] This 2019 Motion to Change was issued only a year after the final consent Order, which had finally ended four years of high conflict litigation. Its express purpose was to terminate L’s parenting time with his father and move him to Montreal to live with Ms. Q’s new partner. The events leading up to the Motion to Change and the subsequent litigation followed closely on the heels of the consent final Order, which should have provided stability for the balance of L’s childhood, which by 2018 had already been long overdue.
[46] In considering the context of the litigation, each parent’s conduct and what would be fair, reasonable and proportionate for the pre-Offer period, I award the father the amount of $254,250 ($225,000 plus HST of $29,250.)
[47] I am satisfied that the resulting total of $611,637 being
• $278,821 in fees ($246,745 + HST $32,076) post Offer, and
• $78,566 in disbursements, and
• $ 254,250.00 in pre-Offer fees ($225,000 + HST $29,250)
is a reasonable, proportionate, and fair recovery of costs given the complexity and importance of this proceeding, and the purposes of a costs award as set out in Mattina v. Mattina.
Request for Further Reduction
[48] Ms. Q asks that the amount of costs awarded to Mr. C be further reduced because the litigation to date “has exhausted her financial resources”. She does not suggest any reduced amount that she should pay and without a Bill of Costs, I cannot determine what she has paid.
[49] Ms. Q’s costs submissions do not set out the legal framework for a reduction in costs based on a party being of modest means. Nor has Ms. Q filed any evidence of her financial circumstances. No Financial Statement was ever filed in this proceeding which is a Motion to Change only the parenting terms of the May 7, 2018 final Order.
[50] In reply to Ms. Q’s assertion that she does not have the financial means to pay any significant costs and that the proceeding has exhausted her financial resources” Mr. C states that:
a) Ms. Q has vast family wealth of which she is a beneficiary. Her long-term disability income of at least $136,859 (her income at the time of the May 7, 2018 final Order) is only one source of income.
b) Ms. Q has the qualifications to work as a pilot in the range of $200,000 per annum.
c) Ms. Q lives in a “multi-million dollar” home and drives a Porsche.
d) Until August 26, 2021 her home was mortgage free, the mortgage of $1,275,000 on the date of separation (January 23, 2014) having been discharged by an advance of monies outside her net family property on the date of separation.
e) A certified title search of that home: 972 Porcupine Avenue, Mississauga (attached to his materials) shows that the home continued to be unencumbered until August 26, 2021, after which $1,401,377 in equity was withdrawn as follows.
On August 26, 2021 Mr. Haber placed a charge of $200,000 on title (the trial concluded September 3, 2021)
On November 25, 2021 Stephen McCullough (Ms. Q’s partner) registered a charge in the amount of $921,377 on title. This amount can be contrasted with Mr. McCullough’s testimony at trial that over the past few years he had loaned Ms. Q “a few hundred thousand dollars” to help with her legal fees.
On November 25, 2021 another charge was registered in the amount of $250,000 to Double R Land C. Ltd which is her family of origin’s company from which she receives income.
On November 25, 2021 a third charge was registered on title in the amount of $30,000 payable to Ms. Q’s mother.
[51] Ms. Q bears the onus in demonstrating that she is unable to pay an award of costs or that she should be granted a reduction because of her financial means. In the absence of any evidence as to Ms. Q’s means, I cannot conclude that she is unable to pay an award of costs which she agrees on its face, is a reasonable amount. Neither can I assume that she has exhausted her financial resources absent evidence.
[52] When a party who is defending a claim for costs refuses to disclose what she has spent, the Court can take an adverse interference and conclude that her costs are at least equal to what has been incurred by the opposing party.
[53] In these circumstances, such an interference is supported by her counsel’s admission during trial that her costs “were at least $600,000.” It is further supported by the evidence of a certified title search which shows that Ms. Q has encumbered her home in the amount of $1,401,377. On these facts, it cannot be said that Ms. Q would be unaware of the range of costs payable to Mr. C were she to be unsuccessful.
[54] As I have written previously, family law litigants are responsible not only for their litigation positions, but also for the financial consequences of those litigation positions to the family as a whole. Excessive litigation depletes both parents’ ability to meet the expenses of their own future, and their child’s future. A former spouse who engages in “win at all costs” litigation chooses to be as answerable for the resulting litigation fees to the other side as for one’s own fees.
[55] L is now in his father’s care, and because of the excessive costs of the litigation, Mr. C has depleted all his financial reserves that would otherwise be available to support his parenting. He has depleted the proceeds from the 2018 transfer of his equity in the former matrimonial home and he has cashed in all his RRSPs.
[56] In his costs submissions, Mr. C advises that Ms. Q has refused to voluntarily pay child support since the release of the parenting decision, so he must now fund a second Motion to Change to obtain an Order for child support. Mr. C worries that he will struggle to meet their son’s financial needs without a meaningful recovery of his costs in this proceeding.
[57] I see no basis for a further reduction of the award of costs. Order to issue that Ms. Q shall forthwith pay costs of $611,637 to Mr. C.
Should the Costs or a Portion of the Costs be Paid by Ms. Q’s Counsels?
[58] Mr. C asks that the award of costs, or a portion of it be personally paid by Ms. Q’s counsels: Ms. Haber and Mr. Haber. He asserts that counsels took positions at trial that were clearly unattainable, forcing a 22-day trial with claims of alienation of a pre-teen who just wanted shared parenting. He points to questionable counsel tactics, the pejorative treatment of neutral third parties, argumentative advocacy, and a bombardment of excessive written materials. He worries that Ms. Q being by nature excessively litigious, was recklessly encouraged by her counsels and is now being assisted by them to drain any realizable equity from her home.
[59] I will note here that if Ms. Q has taken steps to divest herself of equity, Mr. C has remedies other than a motion that her counsels pay the costs personally.
[60] The jurisdiction to order personal costs against a lawyer is set out in Rule 24 (9) which reads as follows:
(9) If a party’s lawyer or agent has run up costs without reasonable cause or has wasted costs, the court may, on motion or on its own initiative, after giving the lawyer or agent an opportunity to be heard,
a) order that the lawyer or agent shall not charge the client fees or disbursements for work specified in the order, and order the lawyer or agent to repay money that the client has already paid toward costs;
b) order the lawyer or agent to repay the client any costs that the client has been ordered to pay another party;
c) order the lawyer or agent personally to pay the costs of any party; and
d) order that a copy of an order under this subrule be given to the client. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 24 (9).
[61] Ms. Q’s costs submissions extensively argue that the request for costs against her counsels personally is without merit, that they only acted in accordance with their duty to advocate and that Mr. C’s claim is merely an attempt to gain security for the payment of costs. Her submissions set out the often-quoted passage of paragraph 263 in Young v Young, 4 S.C.R. 3 in which former Chief Justice McLachlin wrote in 1993 that:
Courts must be extremely cautious in awarding costs personally against a lawyer, given the duties upon a lawyer to guard confidentiality of instructions and to bring forward with courage even unpopular causes. A lawyer should not be placed in a situation where his or her fear of an adverse offer of costs may conflict with these fundamental duties of his or her calling.
[62] In March of 2021 section 7.2 of the Divorce Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) imposed duties upon parties to a proceeding. To the best of their ability, parents have a duty to protect any child of the marriage from conflict arising from the proceeding. Section 7.3 requires parties to the extent that it is appropriate to do so, to try to resolve matters through a family dispute resolution process.
[63] Legal advisors also have duties under section 7.7(2) of the Divorce Act:
Duty to discuss and inform
(2) It is also the duty of every legal adviser who undertakes to act on a person’s behalf in any proceeding under this Act
(a) to encourage the person to attempt to resolve the matters that may be the subject of an order under this Act through a family dispute resolution process, unless the circumstances of the case are of such a nature that it would clearly not be appropriate to do so;
(b) to inform the person of the family justice services known to the legal adviser that might assist the person
(i) in resolving the matters that may be the subject of an order under this Act, and
(ii) in complying with any order or decision made under this Act; and
(c) to inform the person of the parties’ duties under this Act.
[64] The duties set out in section 7.7(2) of the Divorce Act are also fundamental duties of a lawyer’s calling.
[65] I am not satisfied that Ms. Q’s costs submissions are independent of her counsel’s response to a motion that they pay Mr. C’s costs personally. Moreover, Rule 24(9) provides the Court with a wide array of remedies should it find that costs were caused by the fault of a Lawyer. Only one of those remedies is the direct payment of an award of costs.
[66] I have considered Mr. C’s request, the context in which it is made, and his written submission that “his primary interest is recovering his Costs and not necessarily from whom.”
[67] I decline to order on this record that Ms. and/or Mr. Haber pay the costs or a portion of the costs award directly, but I do give leave that should Ms. Q seek an Order pursuant to Rule 24(9) that Ms. Haber and/or Mr. Haber not charge her for fees or disbursements, return moneys already paid by her, repay her the costs or a portion of the costs ordered herein or pay those costs to Mr. C directly; she may serve a Motion on Ms. Haber and/or Mr. Haber and on Mr. C within 30 days of her receipt of this decision. Thereafter, I will timetable the motion for an immediate hearing.
[68] Order to issue pursuant to Rule 24(9)(d) that a copy of this Costs Endorsement is to be given to Ms. Q.
McGee, J
Released: 2022 06 06
COURT FILE NO.: FS-16-86329-01
DATE: 2022 06 06
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
M.Q
Applicant
- and –
R.C
Respondent
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
McGee J.
Released: 2022 06 06
[^1]: as set out in his Bill of Costs, the amount transposed to his Costs Submissions being $669,920.78